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ABSTRACT 
Since the beginning of naval power, navies have been used by their states as instruments of 
foreign policy.  In South Africa, the political transition since 1994 originated the evolution of the 
country’s foreign policy.  Accordingly, foreign policy has implications for the South African 
Navy (SAN).  Traditionally, navies have three main roles, namely: military, policing and 
diplomatic, roles.  This study only focuses on the diplomatic role of the navy, termed naval 
diplomacy.  In this regard, the SAN is the custodian of South African naval diplomacy. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate and theoretically appraise the nature and scope of 
South African naval diplomacy since 1994.  The study has two objectives: firstly, it seeks to 
outline the most salient features of South Africa’s foreign policy, post-1994, as the framework for 
naval diplomacy; and secondly, it seeks to analyse and describe how the SAN has utilised naval 
diplomacy, namely: maritime coercion, naval cooperation, international maritime assistance, and 
international conflict resolution and management, in pursuit of South Africa’s foreign policy 
objectives.  The research methodology is a qualitative descriptive analysis, using a literature 
study, factual data sources, and interviews, as techniques.  Both primary and secondary sources 
are consulted. 
This study makes an original contribution to the gap in the literature on South African naval 
diplomacy.  In this regard, with the procurement of the recent ships and submarines, South 
African naval diplomatic capabilities have improved significantly.  It is for this reason that the 
SAN is currently instrumental in maritime coercion in the region, particularly deterrence against 
piracy and other maritime insecurity issues.  The SAN is also immensely involved in naval 
cooperation.  In terms of international maritime assistance, the SAN does not only assist other 
countries in search and rescue missions, but also empower them.  It also plays a vital and 
evolving role in international conflict resolution and management.  The, however, SAN faces 
several hindrances including ageing equipment and ships (such as strike craft and hydrographic 
survey vessel); lack of patrol vessels and sea lift capability; loss of skilled personnel; and other 
challenges.   
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OPSOMMING 
Sedert die ontstaan van vlootmagte het state vlote as buitelandse beleidsinstrumente aangewend.  
Die politieke oorgang in Suid-Afrika in 1994 het tot ŉ evolusie in die land se buitelandse beleid 
aanleiding gegee, wat ook gevolge vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Vloot (SAV) ingehou het.  
Tradisioneel het vlote drie hooffunksies, naamlik ŉ militêre, ŉ polisiëring en ŉ diplomatieke 
funksie.  Hierdie studie fokus slegs op die diplomatieke funksie van die vloot, waarna verwys 
word as vlootdiplomasie, en die SAV se rol as die ‘bewaarder’ van Suid-Afrikaanse 
vlootdiplomasie. 
Die doel van hierdie studie is om ondersoek in te stel na die aard en omvang van Suid-Afrikaanse 
vlootdiplomasie sedert 1994 en dit aan die hand van relevante teoretiese beginsels te beoordeel.  
Hieruit voortspruitend is twee doelwitte: eerstens om die wesenskenmerke van Suid-Afrika se 
buitelandse beleid na 1994 as raamwerk vir vlootdiplomasie te gebruik; en tweedens om die wyse 
waarop vlootdiplomasie ter ondersteuning van Suid-Afrikaanse buitelandse beleidsdoelwitte 
aangewend is, te beskryf en te ontleed met spesifieke verwysing na maritieme dwang, 
samewerking tussen vlootmagte, internasionale maritieme hulpverlening, en internasionale 
konflikresolusie.  Die navorsingsmetodologie is 'n kwalitatiewe beskrywende ontleding, gegrond 
op 'n literatuurstudie, feitlike bronne, en onderhoude. Beide primêre en sekondêre bronne is in die 
proses geraadpleeg. 
Hierdie studie is 'n oorspronklike bydrae om die leemte in die literatuur oor die Suid-Afrikaanse 
vlootdiplomasie aan te spreek.  Na die onlangse aanskaffing van nuwe skepe en duikbote, het die 
SAV se diplomatieke vermoëns aansienlik verbeter.  Die gevolg is dat die SAV tans ŉ wesenlike 
bydrae met betrekking tot maritieme dwang in die streek speel, veral wat teen-seerowery en ander 
maritieme veiligheidsbedreigings betref.  Die SAV is ook baie betrokke in maritieme 
samewerking.  Wat internasionale maritieme hulp betref, het die SAV ander lande met soek en 
reddingsoperasies bygestaan en ook bemagtig.  Die SAV lewer ook ‘n groeiende bydrae tot 
internasionale konflikresolusie en bestuur.  Maar die SAV staar ook verskeie uitdagings in die 
gesig wat die volgende insluit: verouderde toerusting en skepe (soos aanvalsvaartuie en die 
hidrografiese opmetingskip); 'n gebrek aan patrollievaartuie en 'n see-verplasingsvermoë; verlies 
van opgeleide personeel, en verskeie ander uitdagings. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
South Africa is a sovereign state and an actor in international relations.  As a state South 
Africa meets the criteria of statehood because it has a permanent population, defined territory, 
effective government, capacity to enter into relations with other states and respect for human 
rights and self determination (Dugard, 2005:82-9).  The capacity to enter into relations with 
other states is facilitated by foreign policy.  Foreign policy is a multifaceted concept and 
suffers from definitional ambiguities.  The general definition of foreign policy, however, is 
the totality of all activities by which international actors (mostly states) act, react and interact 
with the environment outside their territorial boundaries (Vale & Mphaisha, 1999:89).   
Foreign policies of states tend to reflect their constitutions.  Following the 1994 elections, 
South Africa became a democratic state.  The new Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (1996), hereafter Constitution, was adopted two years after the elections.  This 
Constitution serves as a foundation for all other policies of the country.  The historical 
experience of apartheid has led to an adoption of a constitution with values inclined towards 
peace rather than war.   
Accordingly, South Africa’s foreign policy, towards Southern Africa, Africa and the 
international community, reflects the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution.  The 
Foreign Policy Discussion Document (1996) of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), 
currently known as the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), 
outlines the fundamental principles of the country’s foreign policy in the post-1994 period 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996:7).   
South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994 can be divided into three eras namely; the Mandela 
era, which was based on peace-building and promoting human rights; the Mbeki era, which 
continued with peace-building, but had a strong focus on wealth creation and security; and the 
Zuma era commencing in 2009, which substantively reflects continuity with the Mbeki era in 
terms of wealth creation and security.   
There are various instruments used to implement foreign policy, namely; political or 
diplomatic, economic, psychological and military instruments, as described in chapter two of 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
2 
this study, hereafter chapter two (Du Plessis, 2003:108).  The military instrument features 
prominently in the domain of security in South Africa’s foreign policy.  It is stated that the 
military can be used “in a situation short of war, such as military threats, military intervention, 
military aid and assistance, and pacific use … in peace support operations” (Du Plessis, 
2003:109).  The emphasis is on human security rather than state security.  The Defence 
Review (Department of Defence, 1998:3) refers to these uses of the military as secondary 
functions.   
It is important to note that the military instrument in this case refers to the SANDF, which is 
formed by four services, namely; the South African Army (SA Army), South African Air 
Force (SAAF), South African Navy (SAN) and South African Medical Health Services 
(SAMHS).  All these services support South Africa’s foreign policy objectives as components 
of the military.  The main focus for this study is not on the military instrument as a whole in 
foreign policy; it is rather on South African naval diplomacy, as part of the SAN’s role as an 
instrument of South Africa’s foreign policy.   
The navies of the world have been instruments of their states’ foreign policies since the 
beginning of naval power.  There are three main roles of navies as instruments of foreign 
policy, namely: diplomatic, military and policing roles as outlined in chapter two (Booth, 
1977:19-21).  The diplomatic role of navies is termed naval diplomacy.  It is important to note 
that the diplomatic function of navies emanates from the state’s foreign policy.  Although the 
SAN is a coastal state navy rather than a blue water navy, it plays a role in foreign policy.  
The roles which the SAN plays are those mentioned on the main roles of navies namely; 
diplomatic, policing and military roles.  However, the extent and scope of these roles in South 
Africa’s context is smaller than those of blue water navies.   
Following from the aforementioned, it may be deduced that South Africa’s foreign policy has 
a direct impact on the diplomatic role of the SAN, which is termed South African naval 
diplomacy.  Accordingly, South African naval diplomacy may be defined as the use of the 
SAN as an instrument of foreign policy since 1994 through maritime coercion, naval 
cooperation, international maritime assistance and international conflict resolution and 
management.  Goosen (1973:191) concurs that South African naval diplomacy is used to 
advance foreign policy.  However, South African naval diplomacy remains understudied. 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The research problem stems from the observations that the role of the SAN does not feature 
much on the discourse of the military instrument in South Africa’s foreign policy.  The 
evidence is found in the gap in the literature regarding the role of the SAN as part of the 
military instrument in foreign policy.  The most discourse surrounding the role of the SANDF 
in promoting South Africa’s foreign policy revolves around the SA Army (specially being the 
larger component), SAAF (as the air transporter of equipment for peace missions), and 
SAMHS (as the provider of medical support).  Perhaps the reasons for the lack of emphasis 
on the SAN are embedded on the landward military and strategic culture of South Africa, 
hence the emphasis on the SA Army.  Outside naval ranks, very little is known about South 
African naval diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy.  Preliminary sources, as 
illustrated in the literature review of this study, indicate that there is a dire lack of literature on 
the diplomatic role of the SAN as an instrument of foreign policy.  The available literature is 
incomprehensive and dated.  In the light of the above, a research question can be formulated 
as follows:  what is the nature and scope of South African naval diplomacy since 1994? 
To unpack the research question, the study focuses on: 
 The most salient features of post-1994 South Africa’s foreign policy as the 
framework for naval diplomacy. 
 South African naval diplomacy with specific reference to naval coercion; naval 
cooperation; international maritime assistance; and international conflict resolution 
and management.  
1.3 DEMARCATION AND LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
Navies are important components of sea power, which includes contributions of the other 
services to influence events at sea.  Navies are employed for different functions such as 
ensuring command of the sea, maintaining good order at sea, expeditionary operations and 
maritime power projection, as well as naval diplomacy in support of foreign policy (Booth, 
1977; Till, 2004; Till, 2009; Cable, 1971; Luttwak 1975 & Mahan 1890).  This study does not 
focus on sea power in general, which Mahan (1890:1) defines as the contributions of navies as 
well as other services and non-military aspects of sea use to events at sea, and events on land 
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or in the air.  In addition, the study does not focus on naval power, which is the ability to 
influence the behaviour of people or things using the navy.   
The study has been demarcated to solely focus on South African naval diplomacy, with 
specific reference to maritime coercion, naval cooperation, international maritime assistance, 
and international conflict resolution and management.  Amongst the three roles of the SAN 
(outlined in chapter two), only the diplomatic role is dealt with in this study.  The study 
focuses on the period from 1994 to 2012.  This period is significant because South Africa’s 
foreign policy underwent radical transformation from the foreign policy of war in pre-1994 to 
a foreign policy of peace in post-1994.  The major limitation of this study is that there is a gap 
in the literature regarding South African naval diplomacy.  This implies that books, 
specifically relating to South African naval diplomacy, used in the study are limited. 
1.4 PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY  
The purpose of the study is to investigate and theoretically appraise the nature and scope of 
South African naval diplomacy since 1994.  It is understood that the SAN is not only an 
instrument of foreign policy, but also the custodian of South African naval diplomacy as part 
of the SANDF.  The significance of this study stems from the need to contribute to the body 
of knowledge regarding the role of the SAN as an instrument of South Africa’s foreign policy.  
This study makes an original scholarly contribution on South African naval diplomacy. The 
study also stimulates the discourse regarding the dichotomy between the non-offensive 
posture of South Africa’s foreign policy and the SAN’s recent offensive capable acquisitions 
(warships and submarines). With South Africa being viewed as the beacon of hope to extract 
Africa from the malaise of underdevelopment by promoting the African Renaissance, it is 
expected that South Africa invest in resources for peace.  Yet, despite the fact that peace 
missions are at the top of South Africa’s foreign policy priorities, the SAN has recently 
acquired some of the top of the range naval war fighting platforms of the 21
st
 century.  The 
need of these platforms is hotly debated in the ‘guns versus butter’ discourse.   
In addition, there was an announcement that the SAN needs carrier-type landing vessels, the 
Mistral Class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD), in order to project South Africa’s contingents 
to participate in peace missions as well as humanitarian and relief operations.  These vessels 
have the capability to carry forces and equipment for extended periods with limited 
replenishment challenges.  Contrary to their utility, the need for LHD vessels seems to have 
generated arguments that they illustrate an alignment towards war, rather than peace, which is 
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of course a misperception.  The findings of this study may assist foreign policy decision-
makers in determining whether or not the SAN is fulfilling its diplomatic role, and whether it 
is equipped with the resources to fulfil its role or not.  The findings may also be utilised to 
determine the need for improvement of the naval capacity by acquiring resources in order to 
improve South African naval diplomacy.  Proper deductions in this regard could also 
influence budget allocations and resources for the SAN.   
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
According to Babbie (2007:89), most social scientific studies aim to describe situations and 
events.  In this regard, the nature of this study is a qualitative descriptive analysis, using 
literature, factual data and interviews as techniques in order to investigate and theoretically 
appraise South African naval diplomacy since 1994.  In terms of the literature, both primary 
and secondary sources were used.  Primary sources include documents such as the White 
Paper on Defence (1996), Defence Review (1998), White Paper on Participation in 
International Peace Missions (1999) and DOD Bulletins. 
Secondary sources include books highlighted in the literature review as well as journals and 
magazines such as Navy News and South African Soldier.  Neither fieldwork nor 
questionnaires were utilised for this study. Accuracy and preciseness is significant for this 
study.  Consequently, structured and semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
knowledgeable experts on South African naval diplomacy.  These experts include higher 
officials of the SAN such as such as flag officers, senior officers, junior officers and warrant 
officers. Some are or were officers commanding, while others are experts in their fields.  The 
interviews were recorded using a recording device for future reference and confirmation.  The 
ethical dimension of interviews as outlined by the Ethics Committee of Stellenbosch 
University was adhered to.  Clearance for conducting interviews in the SANDF was requested 
and obtained.    
1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW 
As already mentioned, there is a gap in the body of knowledge regarding South African naval 
diplomacy.  The literature review is informed by the modified theory of naval diplomacy 
adopted from Till (1993, 2004 & 2009), Booth (1977), Luttwak (1975), Cable (1971), and 
Mahan (1890, 1898, 1899 & 1902).  This theory is composed of four main functions of naval 
diplomacy, which are maritime coercion, naval cooperation, international maritime assistance 
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and methods for international conflict resolution and management.  Numerous scholarly 
works by various authors have been consulted and contributed to the analytical framework of 
this study; and may be classified into five categories as discussed below.   
The first category addresses South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994, diplomacy and the 
military instrument of foreign policy.  The second category deals with the theoretical 
framework underpinning naval diplomacy, with specific focus on maritime coercion, naval 
cooperation, international maritime assistance, and international conflict resolution and 
management.  The third category addresses maritime coercion in South Africa’s context, with 
special emphasis on the role of the SAN in terms of deterrence and compellence using SAN’s 
war fighting capabilities.  The fourth category focuses on South African naval cooperation in 
international, continental and regional levels.  The fifth category focuses on international 
maritime assistance and the role of the SAN in international conflict resolution and 
management.   
The literature consulted for this study includes the following: 
Literature regarding South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994, diplomacy and the military 
instrument of foreign policy.  The cornerstone is the Constitution and the South African 
Foreign Policy, Discussion Document of 1996 by the DFA (now DIRCO), as well as 
statements from DIRCO.  These are primary sources regarding South Africa’s foreign policy.  
Secondary sources include articles from various journals such as South African Journal of 
International Affairs, and books. Scholarly works by Habib (2009a; 2009b), Le Pere and Van 
Nieuwkerk (2006), Van Wyk (2004), Landsberg (2010; 2011), Fabricius (1999), Mills (1997), 
Vale and Maseko (1998), and Chikane (2001) are used.  Literature regarding diplomacy 
includes Berridge (1995) and Barston (1996).  Primary sources relating to the military 
instrument in foreign policy include the Defence Review (1998) and the White Paper on 
Participation in International Peace Missions (1999).  Secondary sources on the military 
instrument include some of the mentioned works on foreign policy.   
Literature on naval diplomacy.  The most influential author on naval diplomacy is Mahan; 
The Influence of Seapower upon History (1890), The Interest of America in Seapower: 
Present and Future (1898), The Life of Nelson (1899), and Retrospect and prospect (1902).  
Till’s Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (2009) and The changing roles of 
navies world-wide (1993) are also very instrumental for the theoretical framework.  Other 
sources include Booth’s Navies and Foreign Policy (1977), Alford’s Sea Power and 
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Influence: Old Issues and New Challenges (1980) and Cable’s Gunboat Diplomacy: Political 
Applications of Limited Naval Force (1971).   
Literature regarding maritime coercion.  The sources on maritime coercion include Simpson-
Anderson (2000:69), who emphasised that “[f]rom whichever way one looks at it, South 
Africa is economically and strategically a maritime country.  It therefore needs appropriate, 
balanced Navy as part of an appropriate, balanced ... (SANDF)”.  Other sources include 
Uncharted Waters: A Review of South Africa’s Naval Options (1996) by Edmonds and Mills, 
Campbell’s Sea power and South Africa (1985),  Gray and Barnett’s Seapower and Strategy 
(1989) and The Leverage of Sea Power by Gray (1992), Beyond the Horizon: Defence, 
Diplomacy and South Africa’s Maritime Opportunities (1998) by Edmonds and Mills and 
South Africa’s Navy (2008) by Bennett and Söderlund. 
Literature regarding naval cooperation.  The Search for Naval Co-ordination and 
Cooperation, by Edmonds (2000) provides a good background on South African naval 
cooperation.  Other sources include Kempf (2000), Luttwak (1975), Richmond (1934) and 
Schäfer (1998).   
Literature regarding international maritime assistance and international conflict resolution 
and management.  Rafrouf’s chapter, An African View of Maritime Challenges (2000), is 
important as it focuses on Africa’s maritime challenges which may be overcome by effective 
international maritime assistance.  Other sources include various journals such as African 
Armed Forces Journal, Naval Digest, Scientia Militaria, Strategic Analysis, African Security 
Review, as well as South African Soldier and Navy News magazines. There are various 
sources regarding South Africa’s role in international conflict resolution and management.  
The stepping-stone is the Constitution (1996), the White Paper on Participation in 
International Peace Missions (1999), the Defence Review (1998), and the South African 
Foreign Policy Discussion Document (1996) as already mentioned.  Other sources includes 
different articles on peace missions by different authors and institutions such as the Institute 
for Security and Studies, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, the 
Institute for Strategic Studies, the United Nations (UN), Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), DIRCO, and journals such as African Armed Forces, Jane’s Defence, 
Naval Review, Canadian Naval Review, as well as other relevant journals and magazines.   
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1.7 CONTENTS DESIGN 
The study is composed of six chapters structurally comprising a theoretical framework, a 
main body and a conclusion.  Chapter one of this study, hereafter chapter one, is an 
introduction, which possesses an orientation, problem statement, demarcation and limitations, 
purpose and significance, research methodology, literature review, and contents design of the 
study.  Chapter two provides a theoretical framework underpinning naval diplomacy.  It 
focuses on the different functions of naval diplomacy in accordance with the modified theory 
of South African naval diplomacy comprising maritime coercion, naval cooperation, 
international maritime assistance, and international conflict resolution and management.   
Chapter three of this study, hereafter chapter three, focuses on maritime coercion.  The role of 
the SAN in terms of deterrence and compellence is analytically described in detail.  
Deterrence includes the discussion of the SAN war fighting capabilities using frigates, 
submarines and other small ships.  Compellence focuses on the role of the SAN in enforcing 
South Africa’s laws at sea and the protection of Durban and Cape Town strategic harbours, 
and keeping Southern African waters safe.  Naval cooperation is dealt with in chapter four of 
this study, hereafter chapter four.  The chapter commences with an analysis of the reasons for 
naval cooperation.  It then focuses on South African naval cooperation efforts on the 
international level.  It also focuses on the continental efforts such as the SAN role in the 
African Union (AU) and the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF).  It also has a 
regional focus on southern Africa, particularly SADC.   
Chapter five of this study, hereafter chapter five, focuses on international maritime assistance 
and international conflict resolution and management.  International maritime assistance 
include the secondary roles of the SAN as outlined in the White paper on Defence (1996), 
such as humanitarian and disaster relief, search and rescue at sea, hydrography, as well as 
assisting state departments and international organisations. International conflict resolution 
and management focuses on the role of the SAN is peace missions, specifically the newly 
formed Maritime Reaction Squadron (MRS).  Chapter six of this study, hereafter chapter six, 
provides a summary and conclusions that address the research question posed in chapter one.  
The conclusions subsume the challenges facing the SAN.   
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1.8 CONCLUSION 
The research problem of this study stems from the observations that the role of the SAN 
features very little on the discourse of the military instrument in South Africa’s foreign 
policy.  It is also informed by the lack of literature on the role of the SAN as an instrument of 
South Africa’s foreign policy.  Emanating from this, the research question is:  what is the 
nature and scope of South African naval diplomacy since 1994?  To unpack the research 
question, the study focuses on the most salient features of post-1994 South Africa’s foreign 
policy as the framework for naval diplomacy; and South African naval diplomacy with 
specific reference to naval coercion; naval cooperation; international maritime assistance; and 
international conflict resolution and management.  
The purpose of the study is to investigate and theoretically appraise the nature and scope of 
South African naval diplomacy since 1994.  The significance of this study stems from the 
need to contribute to the literature regarding the role of the SAN as an instrument of South 
Africa’s foreign policy.  The study is an original scholarly contribution on South African 
naval diplomacy.  The study also contributes to the debate about the dichotomy between the 
non-offensive posture of foreign policy and SAN recent acquisitions of submarines and 
warships, which are offensive platforms.  The findings of this study may assist foreign policy 
decision-making bodies in understanding naval requirements for the successful diplomatic 
role of the SAN.   
The following chapter of the study, namely; chapter two, conceptualises foreign policy and 
naval diplomacy in order to provide the theoretical framework underpinning naval diplomacy, 
whereas the other chapters addresses the four functions of South African naval diplomacy. 
Chapter three describes the coercive extreme of naval diplomacy, namely; maritime coercion 
with specific reference to deterrence and compellence.  In contrast, chapter four focuses on 
naval cooperation, which is located on the peaceful extreme of naval diplomacy.  Chapter five 
focuses on the last two functions of South African naval diplomacy, namely; international 
maritime assistance; and international conflict resolution and management.  Chapter six offers 
a summary and conclusions of the study.   
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CHAPTER 2 
FOREIGN POLICY AND NAVAL DIPLOMACY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to conceptualise foreign policy and naval diplomacy in order to 
provide the theoretical framework underpinning South African naval diplomacy since 1994.  
To achieve this aim the chapter describes the concepts and theories of foreign policy and 
naval diplomacy, with specific reference to their definitions, instruments of foreign policy, the 
different roles of navies, the naval diplomacy spectrum, and the nature and scope of naval 
diplomacy.  It also briefly outlines South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994 with specific 
reference to three different eras.  The chapter then offers a modified theory of South African 
naval diplomacy with specific reference to maritime coercion, naval cooperation, international 
maritime assistance, and international conflict resolution and management.  It also briefly 
outlines the advantages of South African warships as diplomatic instruments of foreign 
policy.     
2.2 FOREIGN POLICY AND NAVAL DIPLOMACY: CONCEPTS AND THEORY 
South Africa is a sovereign state and an actor in international relations.  A state may be 
defined as a political association that establishes sovereign jurisdiction and exercises authority 
within its defined territorial borders through its institutions (Heywood, 2002:86).  As a state, 
South Africa meets the criteria for statehood as contained in the Montevideo Convention of 
1933, which include having a permanent population, defined territory, effective government, 
capacity to enter into relations with other states, respect for human rights, and self 
determination (Dugard, 2005:82-9).
1
  The capacity to enter into relations with other states is 
facilitated by foreign policy, which is a multifaceted concept suffering from definitional 
ambiguities as is indicated below.   
 
                                                          
 
1 For detailed discussion on criteria for statehood consult J. Dugard. 2005. International Law: a South African Perspective. 
3rd ed. Lansdowne: Juta & Co. pp 82-84; J. Crawford. 2006. The Creation of States in International Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. pp 37-93; M. Nicholson. 2002. International Relations: A Concise Introduction. Houndmills: 
Palgrave Mcmillan. pp 17-18; and K.G. Adar. 2006. States and the Inter-state System. In McGowan, P.J., Cornelissen, S. & 
Nel, P. (eds.). Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa. 3rd ed.  Cape Town: UCT 
Press. pp 106-7.   
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2.2.1 Defining and Conceptualising Foreign Policy 
Nicholson (2002:21) defines foreign policy as a set of principles that guide decision-makers 
towards the external world.  Hill (2003:3) defines foreign policy as the totality of official 
foreign relations undertaken by an independent actor, state or non-state, in international 
relations. Landsberg (2006:250) avers that “(f)oreign (p)olicy is a subset of the process and 
subject of policy”.  This implies that it is a branch of the totality of national policy, defined as 
a purposive action undertaken by the leaders of a state to achieve clarified objectives.  
Consequently, foreign policy is a planned course of action that guides decision-makers in 
their relations with other parties, especially in the external environment.   
This conceptualisation corresponds with Hill (1993:312) who states that foreign policy is 
utilised to pursue national objectives of the state when dealing with other actors.  In addition, 
Holsti (1995:18) outlines a number of objectives pursued by states such as national security, 
welfare and prestige, which are contained in national interests.  The general definition of 
foreign policy, however, is the totality of all activities by which international actors (mostly 
states) act, react and interact with the environment outside their territorial boundaries (Vale & 
Mphaisha, 1999:89). 
Traditionally, foreign policy was considered state-centric due to its concomitance to states 
and government (Landsberg, 2006:251).  In the current international system, however, 
globalisation has led to the erosion of preoccupation with the state (Du Plessis, 2006:122).  
Consequently, the state-centric focus is transcended by the involvement of other non-state 
actors, which include non-governmental organisations, interests groups, multinational 
corporations, the media, academia, and influential individuals (Hill, 2003:3; Landsberg, 
2006:251).  The fact that other actors from both the domestic and international milieu are 
involved in foreign policy issues illustrate that it is more than a policy directed towards the 
external environment (Hill, 2003:23).  In essence, foreign policy constitutes a viaduct 
connecting the domestic and international milieu of policy (Du Plessis, 2006:122).  Although 
other actors are involved in foreign policy, the main architects are principal office bearers 
such as presidents, prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, and key ministers in 
governments (Landsberg, 2006:251).   
As cautioned by Hill (2003:30), any study of foreign policy that neglects the state as the main 
actor will be deemed superficial. Amongst the features of the state, sovereignty is probably 
one of the most significant.  Adar (2006:108) and Heywood (2002:87) state that sovereignty 
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implies the supremacy of state authority over its own territory.  Most importantly, sovereignty 
is two pronged, internal and external sovereignty.  The ability of the state to enforce supreme 
powers over its citizenry and subjects is a function of internal sovereignty, whereas the ability 
of the state to be autonomous in international relations is a function of external sovereignty 
(Hill, 2003:30).   
Although there is widespread misconception on the issue of external sovereignty, all states 
irrespective of their tangible and intangible powers are legally equal in international law, 
which is a set of binding rules, norms, customs and procedures governing the conduct of 
actors (Adar, 2006:108-9; Dugard, 2005:1; Hill, 2003:31; Smith, 2006:148).  This implies that 
states have to abide by international law for them to retain their recognition (Murphy, 
2004:12).  Failure to abide by international law may result in a state being tainted with the 
label of a rogue (Blum, 2006:24; Geldenhuys, 2004:3).  Consequently, the foreign policy of a 
state is subject to international law.   
Hill (2003:39) likens foreign policy with a two-way boulevard by stating that it has both 
domestic and foreign influences.  Du Plessis (2006:122) concurs by stating that both internal 
and external milieus influence foreign policy. For instance, external and domestic events 
influenced the foreign policy of the United States of America (USA), overshadowed by the 
so-called Bush Doctrine, since 2001, particularly during George W. Bush’s administration.2   
Domestic and external events also influence South Africa’s foreign policy decision-makers 
during decision-making processes.  Consequently, there is interplay between domestic and 
foreign policies.  For instance, South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994 reflects the objectives 
and aspirations contained in domestic policy documents such as the Constitution (1996); 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994) (Landsberg, 2010:276); the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (1996), and the Accelerated and Growth Initiative of South 
                                                          
2 The attack on the US on 9 September 2001 precipitated an outcry by the citizenry who demanded that the perpetrators be 
punished. Based on its intelligence, the US believed that Al-Qaeda under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden was responsible 
for the attacks.  Furthermore, some states which Bush called the Axis of Evil; Iran, Iraq and North Korea were believed to be 
providing safe havens to terrorist groupings.  For more information consult J. Cole. 2009. Engaging the Muslim world. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. p116; C. Gray. 2006. “The Bush Doctrine revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the 
USA”, Chinese Journal of International Law, 5(3). p557; K. Katzman. 2003. “Iraq: Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, 
and U.S. Policy”. CRS Issue Brief for the Congress. Washington D.C.: The Library of Congress. p3; M. Cox. 2004. Empire? 
The Bush Doctrine and the Lessons of History, in Held, D. & M. Koenig-Archibugi (eds.).  American Power in the 21st 
Century. Cambridge: Polity Press. p.22; J. Lichtenberg. 2004. Pre-emption and exceptionalism in US foreign policy: 
Precedent and example in the international area, in Weiss, TG, Crahan, ME & J, Goering (eds.). Wars on terrorism and Iraq. 
New York: Routledge. p63; and White House. 2002. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”. 
Internet: http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2002.pdf. Access date: 3 May.   
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Africa (2006).
3
  Once formulated, foreign policy is implemented through techniques or 
instruments (Habib, 2009a:149).   
2.2.2 Instruments of Foreign Policy 
According to Du Plessis (2003:108), there are four instruments of foreign policy, namely: the 
political or diplomatic, economic, psychological and military instruments.  These instruments 
are ranked in escalating order in terms of international norms and legal prescriptions 
regulating and limiting the use of force in international law (Du Plessis, 2008:90), from the 
most peaceful in the form of diplomacy to coercive means in the form of the military.   
Before describing each of the instruments, it is imperative to note they are the main 
components of national power.  In international relations, power may be defined as the ability 
of an actor to change or influence the behaviour of another actor or actors.  Attributes of 
power are either tangible such as the population, territory, natural resources, agriculture and 
the military; or intangible such as the leadership, ideology, culture and bureaucracy of an 
actor.  Tangible attributes are known as hard power, whereas intangible attributes are soft 
power (Adar, 2006:109).  The main distinction between the hard power and soft power is that 
the former focuses on coercion, while the latter focuses on attraction, interaction and 
persuasion.  It is important to note that hard power include the military and economic 
techniques, which may achieve the desired outcomes utilising the sticks (threats) and carrots 
(incentives). Soft power includes the diplomatic and psychological techniques, which shapes 
the preferences of others (Nye, 1990:158-160; Nye, 2004:5-6).   
Both hard power and soft power are utilised within the diplomatic, economic, psychological 
and military instruments.  The diplomatic instrument, which is considered to be the most 
traditional, peaceful and direct instrument (Du Plessis, 2003:108), is the use of diplomacy in 
advancing foreign policy.  Diplomacy is defined variously by authors.  For instance, Berridge 
(1995:1) defines diplomacy as the practice of international relations by other means than war.  
Barston (1996:1) concurs and further states that diplomacy is the non-violent conduct of 
international interactions.  Du Plessis (2006:125) articulates that diplomacy is the most 
preferred instrument used to pursue foreign policy objectives due to its political nature and its 
inclination towards peace. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 
                                                          
3 These are various policy documents aimed at socio-economic transformation and building a democratic future for South 
Africa.  For more information see Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 1994. White Paper on Reconstruction and 
Development. Pretoria: Ministry in the Office of the President; Department of Finance. 1996. Growth, Empowerment and 
Redistribution. Pretoria: Department of Finance; The Presidency. 2004. Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative-South 
Africa. Pretoria: The Presidency. 
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Washington D.C., on the other hand, defines diplomacy as nothing but an art of advancing 
national objectives by nation states (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1988:2).  
The first sets of definitions explicitly associate diplomacy with peace, whereas the one by 
CSIS does not specify what is contained in the ‘art of advancing national objectives by nation 
states’.  The essence of the above definitions, however, is that diplomacy is an instrument of 
the state used in pursuing foreign policy through, but not only limited to, peaceful means.  It 
should be emphasised that diplomacy exists in a spectrum, with peaceful diplomacy on the 
one end, and coercive diplomacy on the other end.   
Peaceful diplomacy has been outlined in the above definitions.  Coercive diplomacy refers to 
the use of threats or limited use of force (hard power) to convince an enemy to refrain from 
encroaching on a specific issue or area of interests, or to behave in a specific way.  Coercive 
diplomacy is not limited to negative actions, it can also be utilised positively to ensure allies 
and bystanders of the presence of its practitioner.  War is part of coercive diplomacy and the 
military instrument is used in war (Adar, 2006:112).  In reality, states utilise other instruments 
before employing the military.   
The economic instrument, which refers to the use of economic means such as aid, trade 
embargoes, and sanctions to fulfil the ends of policy (Schreiber, 1971:388), is often used 
before the military instrument.  Economic techniques may be used coercively or persuasively 
depending on their purpose.  Du Plessis (2003:109) argues that economic techniques tend to 
produce umbrage, opposition and reprisal by the targeted actor and are often regarded, by 
some scholars, as the least effective instrument of foreign policy.  In some instances, 
nonetheless, they have been very successful.  For instance, the UN economic sanctions and 
embargoes instituted against apartheid South Africa contributed to ending apartheid (Bond, 
2003:64).  The psychological or the informational instrument, which is the use of information 
and propaganda to achieve foreign policy objectives by influencing decision-makers, is used 
in conjunction with all the instruments.  This use of the psychological instrument is part of the 
soft power that states and other actors in world politics possess.   
The military, also known as the instrument of the last resort, involves the use of military 
means to achieve the end of policy.  As previously stated, the military is the main component 
of state’s hard power.  Du Plessis (2008:89) states that the military means can be used 
coercively in defensive or deterrent modes in situations of war, and can also be used is 
situations short of war such as military threats, interventions, aid and assistance, as well as 
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peace missions.  It is important to comprehend that these instruments are not solely used in 
isolation; they are used concurrently supporting each other depending on the need.  In 
practice, however, there is an inverse relationship between the diplomatic and military 
instruments.  In addition, their degree of utilisation is extensively complex and varies from 
one situation to the other depending on circumstances.  In the post-Cold War international 
environment, the military instrument can and has been used as a peaceful instrument in roles 
such as cooperation, military assistance, and conflict resolution and management.   
Contrary to the pre-1994 coercive use of force, South Africa since 1994, with the exception of 
the Lesotho intervention, has mostly utilised the SANDF in the peaceful manner regardless of 
its primary function of defending the territorial integrity of the Republic as stipulated in the 
Constitution and White Paper on Defence (Department of Defence, 1996:16).  The SAN as 
part of the military instrument can be employed for both coercive and peaceful purposes 
according to the preferred mode of a diplomatic role of a navy or naval diplomacy. 
2.2.3 The Traditional Roles of a Navy 
Before delving into naval diplomacy, it is necessary to reflect on the traditional roles or main 
functions of navies (Du Plessis, 1987:4).  According to Booth (1977:20) and Grove 
(1990a:232) navies world-wide perform the following roles: the military function; policing 
function; and diplomatic function or roles, as shown in Figure 1 in the next page.   
2.2.3.1 The Military Role of a Navy 
The military role of a navy refers to the use of naval forces in operations, both at sea and from 
the sea.  Naval capabilities determine the kind of operations each navy can conduct.  For 
instance, blue water navies are able to conduct extended military operations, whereas brown 
water navies, such as the SAN, have certain constraints and limitations.  There are two broad 
categories of military operations by navies.  The first category is combat operations at sea, 
which include intelligence collection and surveillance; maritime strike and interdiction; 
advance force operations; guidance for shipping; layered defence; sea denial; command of the 
sea; and control of the sea to name but few (Gray, 1992:9).  The second category is combat 
operations from the sea, which include amphibious operations; naval gunfire support; and 
land strike (Booth, 1977:20-4; South African Navy, 2006:35-6).  Navies that are able to 
conduct these operations are also capable of performing policing roles.   
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2.2.3.2 The Policing Role of a Navy 
The policing role of a navy refers to the use of naval forces as instruments of law enforcement 
as well as implementing certain rules established by an international mandate such as the UN 
Security Council resolutions (Grove, 1990a:234).  Policing role ranges from peaceful to 
coercive functions as shown in Figure 1 above.  Some of the policing functions or roles are 
peace operations, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, arms embargoes and enforcement of 
sanctions, peace-building, defence aid to civil power, environmental and resource 
management and protection, anti-piracy operations, drug interdiction and the prevention of 
illegal immigration (Booth, 1977:17-8; South African Navy, 2006:30-34).  Amongst the 
aforementioned policing functions, some are also considered to be part of the diplomatic 
functions such as peace operations and anti-piracy operations.   
2.2.3.3 The Diplomatic Role of a Navy 
The diplomatic role of a navy refers to the use of naval forces “as a diplomatic instrument in 
support of political objectives and foreign policy” (South African Navy, 2006:33).  This role 
is termed naval diplomacy and encompasses a variety of functions ranging from benevolent 
Figure 1: The Main Roles of Navies (Adopted from Booth, 1977:16; Grove, 
1990a:232; South African Navy, 2006:35) 
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postures to naval and maritime coercion, as shown in Figure 1.  The first function under this 
role is disaster relief, which is benevolent in nature and refers to tasks such as assisting own 
citizenry or foreign citizenry during cataclysms such as floods and tsunamis.  The second 
function is assistance rendered to foreign forces as requested (see chapter five).   
The third function is presence, which refers to the practice of naval diplomacy in a general 
way.  It includes deployments, ports visits, conducting coordinated exercises, operating in 
areas of interest, reassuring allies and friends, and deterring possible adversaries (see chapters 
three and four) (Booth, 1977:18-9).  The fourth function is evacuation operations, which 
include both evacuations during peace and when war is imminent.  There are two kinds of 
evacuation operations, combatant and non-combatant; the latter falls within the ambit of naval 
diplomacy. Non-combatant evacuation operations include relocating non-combatants 
threatened in a foreign country.  These operations are mostly conducted to protect own 
nationals in states experiencing predisposing conditions for potential armed conflict.   
The fifth function is coercion, which is the use or threat of force to influence the behaviour of 
the opponents to do what they would otherwise not do (see chapter three) (South African 
Navy, 2006:33-4).  These functions constitute the theory of naval diplomacy applied in this 
study.  It is imperative to note that the three roles of navies, the military, policing and 
diplomatic, contain fuzzy boundaries in practice and do not require different naval forces to 
be executed.  Amongst the three discussed role of navies, the diplomatic role, which is naval 
diplomacy, is of interest in this study.     
2.2.4 Defining Naval Diplomacy  
Du Plessis (2008:93) makes a distinction between defence diplomacy, military diplomacy, 
naval diplomacy, gunboat diplomacy and coercive diplomacy.  All these concepts are 
included in the military-diplomatic nexus.  They should, however, not be confused with one 
another.  Only the diplomatic role of a navy or naval diplomacy and its subset, gunboat 
diplomacy, are of interest to this study.  
It is significant to comprehend that naval diplomacy is not a new concept.  It has been in the 
literature since the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan when he stated that the use of naval forces 
should be tailored to complement national strategy and political objectives (Mahan, 
1902:193).  Other scholars concur with this statement.  For instance, Mill cited in Graham 
(1978:415) states that diplomacy means nothing if a state lacks a navy to support its 
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diplomatic efforts.  Richmond (1934:189) once stated that great nations view a great navy as 
the assuror of world peace. Assuring peace, rather than war, is a consequence of diplomacy. 
In addition, Mahan (1899:463) states that the primary function of navies is to facilitate 
diplomatic efforts of their home states.  The essence is that naval diplomacy has a significant 
role in foreign policy.  Gray (1992:3) supports this view by stating that navies are instruments 
of their state’s foreign policy through naval diplomacy. 
Accordingly, what is naval diplomacy?  Several authors define naval diplomacy variously.  
Mahan (1902:193) defines naval diplomacy as the use of naval forces to fulfil foreign policy 
objectives.  Dismukes and McConnell (1979:xiii) define naval diplomacy as the utilisation of 
naval power, in cooperative ways and coercive forms, in the service of state’s foreign policy.  
Simpson-Anderson (1996:36) defines naval diplomacy as the use of navies in promoting the 
national aims and objectives of their governments.  Following from various definitions naval 
diplomacy can be defined as the ability of naval forces to use different capabilities to pursue 
foreign policy objectives.   
In the past, naval diplomacy was equated to gunboat diplomacy.  This was due to the 
environment, concomitant to war and conflicts, in which navies operated.  In addition, several 
scholars regarded gunboat diplomacy as the only diplomatic role of a navy.  Abrahamse 
(1995:129), however, rightly disagree by stating that it is fallacious to regard gunboat 
diplomacy as the only diplomatic role.  In actual fact, gunboat diplomacy is a subset of naval 
diplomacy.  A distinction between gunboat diplomacy and naval diplomacy is a prerequisite 
in the current international system given the propensity towards peace rather than war.   
Although Ghosh (2001:2006) contends that gunboat diplomacy is an amorphous concept 
associated with definitional ambiguity, Cable (1971:21) defines “[g]unboat diplomacy [a]s the 
use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure 
advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against 
foreign nationals within a territory or the jurisdiction of their own state”.  Bennett (2006:105), 
however, defines gunboat diplomacy as “virtually any action taken by a naval force apart 
from direct action against another navy in time of war, or international training at any time”.  
He further clarifies that gunboat diplomacy can take forms such as “formal visits to friendly 
states; exercising with the navy of a friendly state; inviting friendly navies to visit your 
harbours; providing assistance at sea to foreign ships in danger, etc.”  Bull (1980:8), however, 
contends that gunboat diplomacy is not a suitable term for the activities described by Bennett.  
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Bennett’s definition refers to the functions outlined in the diplomatic role of navies as 
articulated in the previous section.   
Gunboat diplomacy as defined by Cable (1971:21) is more inclined to war (threat of use of 
force) than peace.  In contrast, the definition by Bennett (2006:105) offers a more peaceful 
orientation of gunboat diplomacy.  It is this kind of diplomacy referred to as naval diplomacy 
because it consists of both the elements of gunboat diplomacy (as defined by Cable) and 
peaceful elements (as outlined by Bennett).  The emphasis is not mainly on war-fighting 
(threat of use of force), but on both war fighting capability (coercion) and peace-making 
capability (cooperation).  The war-fighting capability is used for deterrence and compellence, 
whereas the peace-making capability is used for picture and coalition building as well as 
maritime assistance, and international conflict resolution and management.   
Based on the aforementioned, naval diplomacy in this study refers to the ability of naval 
forces to use different capabilities such as maritime coercion, naval cooperation, international 
maritime assistance, and international conflict resolution and management to support foreign 
policy.  Following from this definition, South African naval diplomacy, as stated in chapter 
one, may be defined as the use of the SAN as an instrument of foreign policy since 1994 
through maritime coercion, naval cooperation, international maritime assistance and 
international conflict resolution and management.   
2.2.5 Spectrum of Naval Diplomacy 
Analogous to diplomacy, naval diplomacy exists in a spectrum.  On one extreme naval 
diplomacy is peaceful, cooperative and persuasive, that is non-coercive, whereas it is non-
peaceful, conflictive and coercive on the other extreme (Du Plessis, 2008:95).  The non-
peaceful, conflictive and coercive naval diplomacy often involves the use or threat of use of 
force, which is contained in gunboat diplomacy (Ghosh, 2001:2006).  Subsequently, gunboat 
diplomacy is synonymous to coercive naval diplomacy.   
It is important to note that naval diplomacy is extremely complex (Du Plessis, 2008:94).  The 
complexity is evident in the nebulous boundaries between non-coercive and coercive naval 
diplomacy, which are often difficult to demarcate.  In addition, some forms of non-coercive 
naval diplomacy may be transformed into coercive naval diplomacy in a short space of time.  
In this regard, Till (2004: 200; 2009:257) argues that the activities of naval diplomacy may 
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differ not in type, but in degree.  The complexity of the spectrum implies that the nature and 
scope of naval diplomacy is also complex.     
2.2.6 The Nature and Scope of Naval Diplomacy 
Numerous scholars have produced varying taxonomies on the scope and nature of naval 
diplomacy (Till, 2009:255).  For instance, Luttwak (1975:11) explains naval diplomacy in 
terms of the theory of naval suasion.  Luttwak (1985:80) argues that suasion suggest indirect 
political application of naval force.  He further states that naval suasion can be categorised 
into latent suasion, in the form of routine operations, and active suasion, in the form of 
premeditated attempts to invoke unambiguous response.  Booth (1977:27) takes this notion 
further by making a distinction between naval force and naval diplomacy, arguing that naval 
force is concomitant to power, whereas naval diplomacy is concomitant to influence.  Booth 
(1977:28-46) explains naval diplomacy in terms of the influencers and the influenced.   
The practitioner of naval diplomacy (the influencer) aims to influence the other actor or actors 
(the influenced) during their interactions.  There are several factors, which affect naval 
influence potential to achieve the desired outcomes.  Some of these factors are beyond the 
influencer’s control.  Factors affecting naval influence potential include the quality, quantity 
and appropriateness of naval capabilities; skill of tactical employment; skill of the diplomatic 
support aiding naval efforts, government’s volitional restraints; “and the character and 
effectiveness of the influence-building efforts of [the] competitors” (Booth, 1977:28).   
In addition, there is no direct nexus between naval capabilities and diplomatic effectiveness.  
It is argued that “the mobilisation of capabilities is not synonymous with the ability to 
exercise power and influence” (Booth, 1977:29). In short, positioning the right naval assets at 
the right time may results in a state achieving the desired diplomatic outcomes.  Most 
importantly, the influenceability of naval power depends on the psychological environment of 
the relevant influenced decision-makers.  Luttwak (1985:79) concurs by further stating that 
influenceability relies on the reactions of others.  Factors that affect influenceability include 
the character and quality of decision-makers perceptions and public opinion forming groups; 
the type of bilateral relations of the states concerned; the type of needs of the target state and 
the availability of alternative sources for those needs; and the response of the target state to 
actions of the influencer (Alford, 1980:2; Booth, 1977:31).  In times of need, practitioners of 
naval diplomacy often employ gunboat diplomacy to affect and achieve the desired outcomes.   
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As previously mentioned, some mistakenly regard gunboat diplomacy as synonymous to 
naval diplomacy.  In fact the concept ‘gunboat’ itself suggests a coercive nature of (naval) 
diplomacy rather than non-coercive one.  It is of paramount importance to comprehend the 
fact that navies conduct gunboat diplomacy during peace as an alternative to war.  Ghosh 
(2001:2006) warns that if gunboat diplomacy manifests into war, it should not be regarded as 
failure; such situation, from the onset, should not be given the name gunboat diplomacy.  The 
limited naval force of gunboat diplomacy which Cable refers to (as defined in section 2.2.4), 
can be categorised into four, namely definitive force, purposeful force, catalytic force and 
expressive force (Schäfer, 1998:59).  
Definitive force is utilised to achieve particular limited aims. According to Cable (1971:27), a 
force can only be limited if certain conditions are met.  The first is that the use or threat of 
force should possess a definitive purpose apparent for both parties.  The second condition is 
that the purpose of the employer of the force must not only be limited, but also tolerable.  This 
means that the force applied must be proportionate to the purpose.  The third condition is that 
both parties in conflict must accept the capability of the applied force to achieve the purpose.  
The fourth condition is that the minimum force should be used to achieve the desired outcome 
or outcomes (Cable, 1971:27-30).   
Ghosh (2001:2011) states that definitive force influences the adversary to agree to an 
escalation or submit to the demands of the employer. Examples of the successful use of 
definitive force include the actions of HMS Cossak in February 1940 leading to the freeing of 
299 British prisoners onboard Altmark, a German tanker, and Operation CACTUS by Indian 
warship Godavari which rescued hostages kidnapped by mercenaries in Maldives.  Another 
case, although led to war, was Operation ROSARIO by Argentineans in 1982 in Falkland 
Islands (Ghosh, 2001:2005-17).    
The purposeful force, in contrast, aims to influence the policy or character of a foreign 
government or group (Cable, 1971:39).  It is important to note that the purposeful force does 
not achieve anything in itself, but deters the other party from certain actions.  This type of 
force is indirect and less reliant compared to definitive force.  Purposeful force is directed 
towards decision makers in order to influence their decision-making processes (Cable, 
1971:40).  The success of the purposeful force relies on the response of the recipient of the 
force.  Examples of successful purposeful force include the deployment of USS Kennedy to 
monitor airborne drug trafficking in the coast of Columbia (Ghosh, 2001:2005-17).   
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Unlike definitive and purposeful forces with explicit objectives defined in advance, the 
objectives of catalytic force are implicit (Cable, 1971: 29).  Definitive force has limited aims, 
while purposeful force aims at influencing the policy of a foreign government or group, as 
already mentioned.  Catalytic force, in contrast, is concerned with being at the right place at 
the right time.  As Cable puts it, “[a] situation arises pregnant with a formless menace or 
offering obscure opportunities.  Something, it is felt, is going to happen, which might 
somehow be prevented if force were available at the critical point” (Cable, 1971:49).  From 
this statement, it is clear that objectives are undetermined at the time of employing the force.  
Those who put instant and suitable naval force at an opportune period harvest the fruits of 
employing the navy.  The fact that warships, as already discussed, have advantages known as 
asserts and liabilities make them good agents of catalytic force (Booth, 1977:33-5).   
Expressive force refers to the employment of warships to “emphasise attitudes, to lend 
verisimilitude to otherwise unconvincing statements or to provide an outlet of emotion” 
(Cable, 1971:63).  Its exact nature lies between threat of purposeful force and flying the flag.  
The expressive mode of limited naval force is similar to ceremonial and representational 
aspects of diplomacy (Ghosh, 2001:2005-17).   
The four categories of limited naval force; definitive force, purposeful force, catalytic force 
and expressive force, as outlined above, best describes gunboat diplomacy (Schäfer, 1998:59).  
The essence is that gunboat diplomacy focuses on the use or threat of use of naval force.  
Consequently, gunboat diplomacy is adjunct to naval diplomacy because of its emphasis on 
peaceful, cooperative and persuasive measures as well as non-peaceful, conflictive and 
coercive measures.  Bull (1980:8) argues that gunboat diplomacy is declining and more 
peaceful forms of naval diplomacy are utilised in the current international system, especially 
by smaller navies like the SAN.  In this regard, Grove (1990b:194) concurs and further 
reiterate that other nations utilised navies as peacetime diplomatic instruments.  Given the fact 
that foreign policy and naval diplomacy have been defined and conceptualised, it is necessary 
to shift focus to South Africa’s foreign policy in order to outline the priorities underpinning 
the country’s naval diplomacy since 1994.   
2.3 SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1994 
There are three eras of South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994 namely, the Mandela era 
(1994-1999); the Mbeki era (1999-2008); and the Zuma era commencing from 2009 
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onwards.
4
  During each period, different principles and decision-making structures and 
processes prevailed. In terms of South Africa’s foreign policy decision-making process, 
numerous models such as the rational model, bureaucratic politics, organisational process, 
royal court model, network model, consultative model as well as the muddle-through 
approach, apply.
5
   
2.3.1 The Mandela Era Foreign Policy, 1994 to 1999 
Following the 1994 elections, Nelson Mandela became the first democratically elected 
president of South Africa.  Given the fact that the country was for numerous years isolated 
due to apartheid policies, Mandela overhauled and transformed South Africa’s foreign policy.  
Le Pere and Van Nieukerk (2006:284) call South Africa’s foreign policy during the Mandela 
era, the foreign policy of transformation, because of the transitional period concomitant to this 
era.  Ethical and humanitarian principles underpinned the Mandela era foreign policy. 
In 1995, Alfred Nzo, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, unveiled South Africa’s foreign policy 
principles during the Heads of Mission Conference held in Pretoria.  These principles are: 
commitment to the promotion of human rights; commitment to the promotion of democracy; 
commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations; 
commitment to the interests of Africa in world affairs; and commitment to international peace 
and to internationally agreed-upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts (Habib, 
2009a:148; Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996:7).   
Van Wyk (2004:104), Barber (2005:1079) and Landsberg (2006:252) regard these principles 
as pillars that guide South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994.  Van Wyk (2004:105) argues 
that the norms and values of the country determine the core principles of South Africa’s 
foreign policy.  These principles inform the foreign policy decision-making process.  
Landsberg (2006:252) outlines guidelines for approaches to the foreign policy making and 
implementation during the Mandela era.  The first is that foreign policy is an extension of the 
                                                          
4 Note that Kgalema Motlanthe was a care-taker president following Mbeki’s recall by the African National Congress in late 
2008.  
5 For more information on various models and approaches to foreign policy analysis consult Allison, G. & Zelikow, P. 1999. 
Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2nd Ed. New York: Longman; Korany, B. 1986. How foreign 
policy decisions are made in the Third World. A comparative analysis. Boulder & London: Westview Press; Neack, L., Hey, 
J.A. & Haney, P.J. 1995. Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall; Art, R.J. & Jervis, R. 1992. International Politics. Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. 3rd Ed. New 
York: Harper Collins; and Carlsnaes, W. 1993. On analysing the dynamics of foreign policy change: a critique and 
reconceptualisation. Cooperation and Conflict. 28(1), for explanations regarding the different approaches to foreign policy 
analysis.   
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
24 
domestic policy.  The second is that South Africa’s relation with other states is based on 
national interests.  The third is that South Africa will act as the link between the developed 
North and the developing South.  As reflected in the Constitution and other important policy 
documents, it is in the national interests of the country to promote human rights, democracy, 
justice and international law, international peace and internationally agreed-upon mechanisms 
for the resolution of conflicts (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996:7).  
Mandela’s presidency enjoyed international moral legitimacy made possible by his status.  
The decision-making resembled the bureaucratic process, coupled with a muddle through 
approach.  The bureaucratic model involves bargaining among different officials and 
departments involved in foreign policy (Landsberg, 2011:236-237).  The muddle-through 
approach is whereby decision-makers respond to events instead of having coherent and 
cohesive guidelines underpinning foreign policy (Janis, 1982:6-7).   
It is important to note that Mandela’s personality overshadowed the foreign policy decision-
making process during his tenure (Landsberg, 2011:237).  It is argued that Mandela did not 
appoint a foreign policy advisor in his office because of the suspicion and postulation that 
such advisors tend to be manipulative (Fabricius, 1999:221).  He relied on his Director-
General Jakes Gerwel and Alfred Nzo for foreign policy formulation.  The two were also 
responsible for communicating with the other stake holders such as the National Intelligence 
Agency, South African Secret Service and the Defence Intelligence.   
Mandela was hands-off in foreign policy making, and had a hectic schedule in promoting the 
new South Africa to the rest of the world (Landsberg, 2011:237).  Le Pere and Van 
Nieuwkerk (2006:285) state that Mandela’s stature, personality and international prestige 
substituted meticulous foreign policy-making processes and his charisma resembled policy 
making itself.  This, however, created several problems in foreign policy formulation.  
Mandela’s characteristics, according to Mills (1997:24), have created a situation whereby 
public statements preceded and dictated policy.  Fabricius (1996:221) and Moyo (1998:10) 
use the cases of arms sales to Rwanda and the impulsive announcement of peace negotiations 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  The DFA was about to announce the 
termination of arms sales to Rwanda when Mandela stated that South Africa will continue 
selling arms to Rwanda, and his impulsive statement on the DRC delayed and nearly 
disrupted the peace initiative of which the country was fully involved (see chapter five).  The 
DFA remained weak with regard to foreign policy formulation process during the Mandela 
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era.  One of the problems aiding to this was the crisis in the leadership of the DFA 
(Landsberg, 2011:239).  The crisis in the DFA leadership, Mandela’s hands-off approach to 
policy formulation as well as other operational matters meant that a strategic cue had to come 
from the office of Thabo Mbeki, then Deputy President.  Mbeki was dominant and energetic 
in foreign policy formulation and management, and this became clear during his presidency 
(Mills, 1996:120).        
2.3.2 The Mbeki Era Foreign Policy, 1999 to 2008 
Given the fact that he was the chief representative of the African National Congress (ANC) in 
Swaziland and Nigeria, and his role in searching for South Africa’s new relationships as the 
Deputy President in the Mandela era, Mbeki had the necessary and essential experience to 
reconfigure the country’s foreign policy when he commenced as the head of the state (Vale & 
Maseko, 1998:2).  The driving forces behind reconfiguring foreign policy were the 
appointment of Jackie Selebi as the then new Director-General of the DFA and the 
commitment to the African Renaissance as well as a shift in principles (Habib, 2009a:148; Le 
Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2006:287; Van Wyk, 2002:180).   
South Africa’s foreign policy principles coined during the Mandela era continued into the 
Mbeki era, however, priorities shifted from human rights issues to wealth creation and 
security (Van Wyk, 2004:121; Williams, 2000:80).  The Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), Africa and the Global South became the policy anchors under Mbeki’s 
Presidency (Landsberg, 2011:240; Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2006:288).    
Mbeki’s decision-making process resembled the royal court as well as the rational models.  In 
terms of the royal court model, he pursued a highly centralised, even dictatorial, style of 
decision-making (Landsberg, 2011:240).  His leadership reflected a highly centralised system 
dominated by the head of state or government and or his advisors.  According to the rational 
model, decisions of decision-makers are calculative and rational, with the aim of achieving 
national strategic objectives as set out by the state as a unitary actor (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999:23; Geldenhuys, 1984:238; Mingst, 2008:122).   
Mbeki fortified himself with policy strategists and advisors instrumental in policy formulation 
and implementation (Landsberg, 2011:241).
6
  To ensure effective foreign policy decision-
                                                          
6 Aziz Pahad (Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister), Essop Pahad (Minister in the Presidency), Mjaku Gumbi (Mbeki’s legal 
advisor), Sydney Mufamadi (Minister of Local and Provincial Government), Trevor Manuel (Minister of Finance), Geraldine 
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making and implementation, Mbeki instituted changes based on the recommendations of the 
Presidential Review Committee (PRC) established during the Mandela era.  The PRC 
believed that the Presidency needed restructuring.  Accordingly, the restructuring ensured that 
the staff of the Presidency functioned as a Cabinet Office, with Mbeki, Jacob Zuma (then 
Deputy President), Essop Pahad and the Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services (PCAS), 
unit managed by Frank Chikane (Chikane, 2001:7).  Cabinet committees, which were 
previously dominated by sectoral thinking, were restructured.   
One of the six clusters was the International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) cluster, 
which is instrumental in South Africa’s foreign policy formulation and implementation.  
According to Pityana (2001:35), the most idiosyncratic feature of the Mbeki era is the 2001 
IRPS strategic plan featuring South Africa’s domestic interests, objectives of the African 
Renaissance, promoting the agenda of the Global South, and creating an equitable global 
system.   
Various foreign policy instruments, including the military, pursued the African Renaissance 
as indicated by the involvement in peace missions, which is discussed in chapter five (Habib, 
2009a:148).  Promoting the agenda of the Global South resulted in agreements such as the 
India, Brazil and South Africa partnership in 2003, which includes maritime cooperation (see 
chapter four).  The SAN together with the Brazilian and Indian navies engage in IBSA 
Maritime (IBSAMAR) exercises, which is part of the South-to-South cooperation.  This 
cooperation has continued into the Zuma era.     
2.3.3 The Zuma Era Foreign Policy, 2009 to 2012 
After the recall of Mbeki, Kgalema Motlanthe took over as a caretaker president from 25 
September 2008 to 9 May 2009 following the elections.  Motlanthe’s Presidency was a 
continuation of Mbeki’s administration as no major changes occurred.  The electoral results of 
2009 resulted in Zuma becoming the president.  Although Zuma’s administration has yet to 
finish a term in office, it is clear that South Africa’s foreign policy principles remain 
unchanged.  In contrast, decision-making has changed.  The Strategic Plan 2009-2012 of 
DIRCO shows that the principles underpinning South Africa’s foreign policy during the Zuma 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Fraser-Moleketi (Minister of Public Service and Administration), Billy Modise (Chief of State Protocol), Frank Chikane 
(Director-General in the Presidency), and Trevor Fowler (Mbeki’s Chief of Operations) were employed by Mbeki as his 
strategists and advisors.  See Landsberg, C. 2011. South African foreign policy formulation, 1989-2010, in Venter E. & 
Landsberg, C. (eds.). Government and Politics in the new South Africa .4th ed. Pretoria: Van Schaik. p. 241.   
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era resemble those of Mandela and Mbeki eras (Department of International Relations & 
Cooperation, 2009:6).  The strategic priorities include consolidating the African Agenda, 
strengthening South-to-South cooperation, strengthening North to South cooperation, 
participating in global governance, and strengthening political and economic relations with 
other actors (Landsberg, 2010:280; Landsberg, 2011:246; Nkoana-Mashabane, 2010:Online; 
Department of International Relations & Cooperation, 2009:7).   
These priorities are similar to those of Mbeki era contained in the framework of wealth 
creation and security.  Zuma’s continuation in the path of Mbeki’s South-to-South 
cooperation has resulted in the country becoming part of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa (BRICS) partnership of emerging economies in 2011 (Department of 
International Relations & Cooperation, 2011a:Online; Department of International Relations 
& Cooperation, 2011b:15).  Deepening cooperation with BRICS partners has increased trade 
and South Africa pledges to deepen cooperative efforts (Zuma, 2011:Online).  Being part of 
BRICS does not only provide opportunities in trade but also in defence cooperation, 
particularly maritime and naval cooperation, as articulated in chapter four.      
With regard to decision-making and implementation, Zuma vowed to a more responsive, 
compassionate and interactive government during the 2009 National Executive Committee of 
the ANC (Zuma, 2009:Online).  Consequently, scholars began asserting that foreign policy 
decision-making will become a consultative process (Habib, 2009b:Online).  At the end of the 
first year of his era, it was clear that Zuma, unlike Mbeki, had a low-key approach to foreign 
policy.  Prior to the end of the second year, nonetheless, it was epiphanic that foreign policy 
decision-making resembled a network model rather than the anticipated consultative model.  
The suggestion that DIRCO would become the locus of foreign policy, as anticipated by the 
Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Maite Nkoana-Mashabane (2009:Online), 
did not manifest. Foreign policy decision-making remained in the Presidency, “targeted by 
powerful economic groups for economic gain and influence” (Landsberg, 2011:247).   
It is worth noting that Zuma did not become the epicentre of foreign policy decision-making.  
Instead, he instituted the Advisor’s Forum and the National Planning Commission headed by 
Trevor Manuel (former Minister of Finance).
7
  The two became the locus of foreign policy 
                                                          
7 The forum is a tight unit composed of Lindiwe Zulu (former South African ambassador to Brazil), Mandisa Mpahlwa 
(former Minister of Trade and Industry), Charles Nqakula (former Minister of Defence), Welile Nhlapho (former South 
African ambassador to the United States of America), Jesse Duarte (former Chief Director of African multilateral at DFA 
before name change to DIRCO), and Mac Maharaj (ANC stalwart).  See Landsberg, C. 2011. South African foreign policy 
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and DIRCO became an implementation and execution machinery rather than a leader 
(Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009:1).   
The three eras reflect the evolution in South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994.  Although 
different administrations had different priorities, South Africa’s foreign policy during the 
different eras remained constant with its focus on the African Renaissance, wealth creation 
and security, the promotion of the agenda of the Global South in multilateral forums and the 
regional focus.  In this regard, South Africa is considered a soft power for various reasons 
(April, 2009:126).  Firstly, is has the determination to lead Africa from the malaise of 
underdevelopment into the Africa Renaissance as witnessed during the Mbeki era.  Secondly, 
its moral leadership, particularly owing to the Mandela era, has earned the country a special 
place within the international community.  It is for this reason that the country took leadership 
in international conflict resolution and management, as discussed in chapter five of this study.  
Thirdly, South Africa has managed to advocate for the Global South in multilateral forums 
due to its status as a regional power in Africa. 
The soft power status and the focus of South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994 have definite 
intimations for the SAN.  Firstly, it is clear that the SAN focuses on secondary, the so-called 
constabulary functions rather than primary roles.  Secondly, the benign or benevolent posture 
of the SAN enables it to play a pertinent role in foreign policy (Mills, 2000:119).  In this 
regard, during the Mandela era, the SAN began opening its doors through naval diplomacy to 
other navies, and reciprocally the navy reinstituted relations with other navies.  In 1996, the 
SAN in partnership with the Hanns Seidel Foundation hosted a conference, “The Utility of 
Naval Power”, in Cape Town on 17 October 1996 (Cilliers, 1997:i).  The following year, a 
fleet review, as discussed in chapter four, was hosted in Simon’s Town.  In 1997, the then 
support vessel of the SAN, SAS Outeniqua, became instrumental in the Great Lakes as a 
platform for negotiations when Mandela and other South African dignitaries brokered peace 
in the then Zaire.  In this regard, the SAN supported conflict resolution and management 
efforts of South Africa as discussed in chapter five.  The forging of relations through naval 
cooperation continued into the Mbeki era in which the SAN hosted as well as participated 
international conference.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
formulation, 1989-2010, in Venter E. & Landsberg, C. (eds.). Government and Politics in the new South Africa .4th ed. 
Pretoria: Van Schaik. 
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Whilst Mbeki continued with the quest for the African Renaissance and advancing the 
interests of the Global South, the SAN became a partner.  Naval exercises as well as visits by 
grey diplomats continued and intensified during the Mbeki era with the acquisition of new 
ships as outlined in chapter four.  Similarly to the continuity in the country’s foreign policy in 
the Zuma era, naval diplomacy has been continuous.  The major addition is that of the use of 
the SAN in naval coercion, particularly anti-piracy operations as discussed in chapter three.  
Some of the initiatives dating back to the Mbeki era culminated in naval cooperation effort in 
the Zuma era such as the naval exercises between the navies of South Africa, Brazil and India 
as part of the agreement between the three states.  Each of the following chapters explains the 
nature and scope of naval diplomacy during the three eras of South Africa’s foreign policy.  
Accordingly, South African naval diplomacy, which will is investigated and appraised, using 
a modified model of naval diplomacy, is increasingly becoming more significant.  
2.4 MODIFIED THEORY OF SOUTH AFRICAN NAVAL DIPLOMACY 
The navies of the world have been instruments of their states’ foreign policies since the 
begging of naval power.  Although the SAN is a coastal state navy rather than a blue water 
navy, it plays a crucial role in foreign policy.  The roles which the SAN plays are those 
mentioned on the main roles of navies (diplomatic, policing and military).  The extent and 
scope of these roles in South Africa’s context is smaller compared to those of blue water 
navies of major states such as the USA and the United Kingdom (UK).  Among these roles, 
naval diplomacy is the interest of this study and may be analytically described using Till’s 
theory.   
Till explains naval diplomacy in terms of three functions which exist in a continuum, namely; 
coercion, picture building, and coalition building (Till, 1993:3-5; Till, 2009:257).  This theory 
contains all the elements of naval diplomacy ranging from peaceful to coercive diplomacy as 
discussed in the previous section.  Although this theory is mainly applicable to blue water 
navies, it may also be applied to constabulary navies such as the SAN.  Till’s theory of naval 
diplomacy is very useful in understanding South African naval diplomacy.  To fully 
investigate and appraise the nature and scope of South African naval diplomacy, however, a 
modified theory as shown in Figure 2 below is a necessity.  This theory is adopted from Till 
(1993:3), Till (2009:257), Booth (1997:26), Cable (1971:21) and other scholars. It is 
imperative to indigenise naval diplomacy theory as it was mainly developed to explain actions 
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of blue water navies during both periods of war and peace. The modified theory consists of 
four functions of naval diplomacy as shown in Figure 2.
8
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In this study, naval diplomatic functions are termed maritime coercion, naval cooperation, 
international maritime assistance, and international conflict resolution and management.  
Subsequent to the afore mentioned, South African naval diplomacy, which is used to advance 
foreign policy (Goosen, 1973:191), may be defined as the use of maritime coercion, naval 
cooperation, international maritime assistance and methods for international conflict 
resolution and management to support foreign policy objectives.  Each of these functions 
forms a component of South African naval diplomacy.  In order to unpack this definition, 
each of the functions, which are dealt with in details in the following chapters, is briefly 
described in the next sections. 
2.4.1 Maritime Coercion 
Maritime coercion is the use or threat of naval force to influence the behaviour of other 
parties in order to achieve political objectives (Booth, 1977:41).  It is intimately concomitant 
                                                          
8 Figure 2.2 represent the author’s conceptualisation of South African naval diplomacy. 
Figure 2: Functions of South African naval diplomacy 
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to gunboat diplomacy, which is located in the non-peaceful, conflictive and coercive end of 
the naval diplomacy spectrum as shown in Figures 2.  Maritime coercion includes naval and 
merchant coercion and consists of both deterrence and compellence (Kalyanaraman, 
2002:479; Menon, 1998:29; Till, 1993:3). Kalyanaraman (2002:479) states that deterrence 
and compellence are significant subsets of strategic maritime coercion and rely on threats to 
influence the decision-making of the adversary.  Deterrence refers to an action pursued to 
influence the other party to refrain from certain actions by creating a belief that the ends of 
such actions will out weight the means.  Compellence is an action taken to create awareness 
that the outcome of an action or lack of action by an actor may have grievous consequences 
(Till, 2009:257).    
In South Africa’s context, however, maritime coercion should be comprehended against the 
backdrop of the country’s foreign policy, which seeks to pursue its objectives using amicable 
means such quiet diplomacy and the non-use of coercive force (as discussed in the previous 
section).  The use of force or the threat of the use of force is not at the forefront of South 
Africa’s foreign policy priorities and national interests (Department of Foreign Affairs, 
1996:27).  Maritime coercion of the SAN against any external threat, mainly from the sea, in 
a quest to secure South Africa’s geostrategic and territorial integrity, national interests and 
commercial interests at and from sea, is dealt with in chapter three.  In addition, piracy has 
become endemic off the Somali coast and the SAN is the only navy with a sea going 
capability in Southern Africa (Wilson, 2009:488).  To be able conduct successful deterrence, 
naval coercive capabilities ranging from resources to skills are prerequisite, and naval 
cooperation is instrumental in developing such capabilities.   
2.4.2 Naval Cooperation 
Naval cooperation encompasses picture and coalition building.  Picture building is also 
known as intelligence gathering and is defined as an act of collecting, processing and 
disseminating information about actions and policies of naval allies and potential adversaries 
in order to be prepared for the unexpected in time of need.  In essence, it is a process of 
collecting intelligence to ensure overall pictures of allies and adversaries.  Coalition building 
may be defined as a range of activities that are performed by navies in a quest to secure 
foreign policy objectives by influencing the actions and perceptions of allies.  The essence is, 
alliance building which is achieved through naval cooperation (Till, 2009:264-275). Scarlett 
(2009:1) states that navies exercise naval influence through cooperative naval diplomacy or 
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naval cooperation.  It is important to note that naval cooperation is a peaceful function of 
naval diplomacy, which belongs on the peaceful, cooperative and persuasive, extreme as 
shown in Figure 2.  According to Sokolsky (1991:2), naval cooperation became more formal 
and structured after the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949.  
This is evident in the current international system where more naval cooperative programs 
have replaced Cold War rivalries between navies.  The SAN is involved in naval cooperative 
programs at the international and continental levels with other navies and is steering naval 
cooperation in SADC as discussed in chapter four.  Naval cooperation comprises of activities 
such as common and collective security building, confidence-building, training and 
exercising, and relations with other naval forces (Till, 2009:257).  Naval cooperation is 
closely related, but not similar, to international maritime assistance.  The former only concern 
navies and the latter include other maritime concerns and responsibilities. 
2.4.3 International Maritime Assistance 
International maritime assistance is an increasingly important function of naval diplomacy 
according to scholars such as Geoffrey Till (Till, 1993:6; Till, 1995:67).  International 
maritime assistance falls within the scope of policing functions of navies and includes 
monitoring cease-fire or embargoes, caring for refugees, providing assistance, protecting 
merchant shipping, humanitarian relief as well as search and rescue operations at sea (South 
African Navy, 2006:34; Till, 1993:6; Till, 1995:67).  Till (1995:67) also states that some 
international maritime assistance roles require special platforms such as sea lift capability for 
humanitarian relief missions where numerous people requiring medical assistance need to be 
accommodated.  In chapter three, assets of the SAN are outlined and the gaps such as the lack 
of special platforms for international maritime assistance are noted.  The SAN’s role in 
international maritime assistance is dealt with in chapter five.  Closely related to international 
maritime assistance is international conflict resolution and management. 
2.4.4 International Conflict Resolution and Management 
Although it can be argued that international conflict resolution and management is part of the 
policing roles of navies as shown in Figure 2, it is extremely difficult to ignore the role of the 
SAN as part of naval diplomacy given the fact that South Africa’s foreign policy is extremely 
committed to conflict resolution in Africa as stipulated in several policy documents.  In 
addition, it was mentioned that the boundaries between the different functions of navies are 
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nebulous.  Consequently, conflict resolution and management is the last function of South 
African naval diplomacy, which is peaceful, cooperative and persuasive in nature as shown in 
Figure 2.  It includes those activities performed by the SAN in order to advance the interest of 
the country, especially relating to the maintenance of peace and security in the international 
system.  These activities include peacemaking, peace-building, and peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement, in which naval components and equipment are deployed in various UN and AU 
missions as discussed in chapter five.     
In order to perform the above functions of naval diplomacy, navies use five basic tactics.  The 
first is standing demonstrations of naval power intended to deter adversaries and promote 
interests of the deploying state and its allies.  Standing demonstrations are important for naval 
coercion because they show the adversaries or allies the assets the engaging state possesses.  
The second tactics are specific operational deployments, which involve a deliberate 
deployment of one or more warships (Booth, 1977:43) as illustrated by Operation COPPER in 
chapter three.  The third is naval aid, which includes the sale and donation of warships as well 
as naval advisers, as illustrated by naval assistance, particularly donations of boats to Malawi 
and other countries by the SAN, in chapter five.  The fourth tactics are operational calls, 
which include port visits for the purposes of replenishment during deployments (Booth, 
1977:44).  The last tactics are specific goodwill visits, which vary from hosting cocktail 
parties to ceremonial visit by government officials.  The last two tactics are illustrated by a 
synopsis of South Africa’s grey diplomats docking in international waters as well as naval 
exercises discussed in chapter four.   
The above tactics of naval diplomacy yield intended and unintended outcomes (Booth, 
1977:45). For instance, superpowers employed naval diplomacy during the Arab-Israeli war 
of 1973 and achieved both intended and unintended outcomes (Weinland, 1978:2).  The 
essence is that there is a difficulty in observing the outcomes because influence is an 
incremental process and may sometime culminate in a war.  In addition, several factors such 
as skill and suitability of naval tactics as well as the perceptions of others have impact on the 
outcomes (Booth, 1977:46).  Perceptions are unpredictable and uncontrollable and may yield 
both positive and negative results irrespective of the type of naval diplomacy utilised whether 
peaceful or coercive in the form of gunboat diplomacy.  Nonetheless, warships have certain 
advantages that enable them to perform these various tactics.      
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2.5 ADVANTAGES OF SOUTH AFRICAN WARSHIPS AS DIPLOMATIC 
INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 
Till (2009: 260-1) states that warships offers diplomats a range of options they can employ to 
achieve political objectives.  Booth (1997:33-6) and Bull (1980:8) concur and identify several 
factors that make warships appropriate instruments of diplomacy, namely; strategic reach, 
symbolism, controllability, strategic mobility, independence, versatility and durability. 
2.5.1 Strategic Reach, Symbolism and Controllability 
Bull (1980:8) refers to the strategic reach as the universality or pervasiveness of navies due to 
their ability to reach greater distances.  Booth (1997:34) supports this view by stating that the 
freedom of the seas enables warships to move freely as compared to continental forces.  He 
further states: “a country with a navy is potentially a neighbour to all countries with coasts” 
(Booth, 1997: 34).  In addition, Schäfer (1998:55) argues that warships at times are the only 
option that makes a state become a military power in a distant region.  By implication, 
warships, with the exception of air forces, have strategic reach to any coastal state, and 
technological developments have increased the ability to reach (Luttwak, 1985:79). Till 
(2009:260) states that age of ballistic and cruise missiles for warships enable them to 
influence political decisions on land.   
The reach of warships enables them to be symbols of their states and governments at a distant 
region.  Flying the flag at sea is a symbol of a country’s presence (Booth, 1997: 35).  The 
SAN (2006:37) states that presence of naval forces in international waters is advantageous 
compared to land and air forces.  Till (1993:5) shares this view and further states that the 
presence of naval forces in international waters has no political and military complications, 
and likely yield positive outcomes.  Naval presence is very significant and advantageous as 
compared to land forces as diplomatic instruments.  Firstly, warships have escalatory potential 
in their missions, as they possess numerous advantages over armed forces such as increasing 
the use of force gradually, and absence of populations at sea.  Secondly, warships have 
withdrawability as they can easily withdraw with more speed and limited casualties as 
compared to ground forces.  Strategic mobility and independence of warships as 
representatives of states advance the withdrawability of warships (Booth, 1997:33).    
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2.5.2 Strategic Mobility and Independence 
Although warships are slow as compared airplanes, they have strategic mobility.  Whereas air 
forces spend most of their time on the ground, ships spend most of their time at sea.  The 
ability of ships to deploy for longer periods in international waters enables them to have 
strategic mobility.  Ships can perform patrols for longer periods as compared to land force and 
air force platforms (South African Navy, 2006:37).  Till (2009: 115) states that the capacity to 
employ navies at a distance illustrates influential strength of naval forces to events on land.  
Embedded in strategic mobility is the independence on warships.  Unlike air and land forces, 
larger ships are able to self sustain for longer periods.  The independent vessels of the SAN, 
the SAS Drakensberg and SAS Protea (The White Lady), are able to deploy for extended 
period of time as well as replenish smaller vessels because of their independence, versatility 
and durability.   
2.5.3 Versatility and Durability 
Warships are versatile and have the ability to perform different roles ranging from diplomatic 
to military (Booth, 1997:33).  In addition, warships have an ability to perform several tasks 
concurrently as well as changing their postures swiftly (South African Navy, 2006:37).  In 
contrast to land forces, warships are highly flexible (Bull, 1980:8).  This view is supported by 
Booth stating: “warships can be adjacent but removable, but they can also be removed but 
remain committable” (Booth, 1997:35).  The durability of warships enables them not only to 
be committable, but also reliable. 
The designs of warships enable them to be resilient to endure harsh conditions at sea (South 
African Navy, 2006:37).  The capacity to withstand damage makes warships instrumental in 
performing their tasks. Till (2009:169) points out that the durability of German warships 
during World War I and II enabled them to withstand British naval power.  Some warships 
such as the decommissioned SAS Outeniqua have ice-breaking ability and can deploy to the 
high seas for extended periods (Booth, 1997:35).  Such deployments are important for naval 
diplomacy as the warship can poise for their states.   
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Foreign policy is a multifaceted concept that is defined differently by several authors.  Each 
of the definition, however, illustrates that it is the province of states that guide them in their 
relations with other actors in the international system.  Foreign policy is formulated according 
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to national objectives and implemented by various instruments or techniques namely; the 
diplomatic, economic, psychological and military instruments.  Navies world-wide, as part of 
the military instrument, are significant role players in supporting their foreign policies 
thorough naval diplomacy, which can range from peaceful means in the form of naval 
cooperation and assistance, to coercive means in the form of gunboat diplomacy.   
As a state, South Africa has foreign policy that informs its interactions with both state and 
non-state actors in the international system.  The country’s foreign policy underwent 
evolutionary transformation during the different eras that began with Mandela era in 1994, 
through Mbeki, to the current Zuma era commencing in 2009. Although priorities differed 
from one administration to the other, the principles remained constant. The SANDF as the 
military instrument has been utilised, in several cases, peacefully to fulfil the ends of foreign 
policy.  The SAN, which plays the policing, military and diplomatic roles, is part of the 
SANDF and has been instrumental in foreign policy through naval diplomacy.  South African 
naval diplomacy may be defined as the use of maritime coercion, naval cooperation, 
international maritime assistance and methods for international conflict resolution and 
management to support the country’s foreign policy objectives.   
Since 1994, the SAN began cooperating with other navies.  In this regard, it hosted several 
conferences, fleet reviews and exercises.  In 1997, SAS Outeniqua became instrumental in 
conflict resolution and management in the Great Lakes as a platform for negotiations.  During 
the Zuma era, the SAN is utilised in maritime coercion in the Mozambique Channel and off 
the coast of Tanzania to fight piracy.  These are some of the highlights of how the SAN, 
through naval diplomacy, has supported foreign policy since 1994.  The subsequent chapters 
of this study deal with South African naval diplomacy during the three eras of the country’s 
foreign policy, using the modified theory of naval diplomacy, consisting of maritime 
coercion, naval cooperation, international maritime assistance and methods for international 
conflict resolution and management.  In this regard, chapter three commences with maritime 
coercion.                             
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CHAPTER 3 
MARITIME COERCION  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Maritime coercion, as outlined in chapter two, belongs on the coercive extreme of the 
spectrum of naval diplomacy, and consists of deterrence and compellence.  It is instrumental 
in the realisation of foreign policy objectives.  The foreign policy of the state is backed by its 
navy (Graham, 1978:415).  Consequently, the SAN, particularly its coercive capabilities, is 
instrumental in pursuing South Africa’s foreign policy through the threat of use or limited use 
of naval force.   
The aim of this chapter is to describe maritime coercion in South Africa’s context.  It briefly 
outlines the need for coercive capabilities of the SAN with specific reference to South African 
naval ships and the MRS, followed by an exposition of the gaps in the combat readiness of the 
SAN.  The chapter then focuses on maritime deterrence and compellence ability of the SAN 
in a quest to influence other actors at and from sea.     
3.2 CONTEXTUALISING MARITIME COERCION IN THE SAN 
The Maritime Doctrine of the SAN (SANGP 100) in Chapter Three makes references to 
maritime coercion and deterrence.  It states that naval diplomacy ranges from “being benign 
(disaster relief) to developing to the more forceful function of [coercion]” (South African 
Navy, 2006:33).  In addition, it is stated that one of the attributes of maritime forces is poise, 
meaning that 
Once in theatre, maritime forces can remain on station for an extended 
period of time both covertly and overtly, depending on the requirements. In 
that time on station they have the option to do what is best in the particular 
scenario, they can seize the initiative, act as a force for [coercion] or 
[deterrence]. The ability for forces to poise in international waters gives 
them an added advantage over land and air forces in that the political 
complications and military risks are avoided. It thus gives the political 
leadership many choices as well as time to deliberate (South African Navy, 
2006:37-8).   
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SANGP 100 may be the only official document explicitly making references to maritime 
coercion; but the mandate of the SAN as derived from the Defence Review requires naval 
forces with maritime capabilities  
to counter an attack from seaward and on shipping; to provide for interdiction 
of the maritime battle space once hostilities have begun; to provide for 
counter-offensive actions to drive the enemy from own or friendly sea-space; 
to ensure that naval units have the inherent ability to function within the 
SANDF command and control system at the required joint levels; to 
continuously prepare such naval forces to act for the defence of the country; to 
prepare specified naval units to participate in operations other than war; and to 
maintain effective support capabilities to support all naval forces (South 
African Navy, 2006:42). 
The above mandate clearly demands the availability of coercive capabilities, which are called 
combat capabilities in the SAN.  Although the country currently faces no conventional 
military and maritime threat (South African Navy, 2006:41), and has no intention to 
aggressively attack or invade any state, the “SANDF has to maintain a core defence capability 
because of the inherent unpredictability of the future.  Such capability cannot be created from 
scratch if the need suddenly arises” (Department of Defence, 1996:21).   
Vice-Admiral J. Mudimu, C Navy, emphasise that “(t)he role of the (SAN) is the protection 
of the territorial integrity and sovereignty and the people of RSA” (Sverdloff, 2003:36).  
Subsequently, the SANDF should be equipped and ready for its primary function as well as 
secondary collateral tasks and other constabulary and diplomatic functions (Edmonds & 
Mills, 1998:vii; Bennett, 1998:28).  It is a well-established assertion that South Africa is a 
land power, although most of its territorial boundary is surrounded by the sea (Campbell, 
1984:1; Edmonds & Mills, 1998:67; Hauter, 2003:24).  The sea is very important for the 
country.  Consequently, maritime coercive capabilities to ensure the protection of territorial 
integrity, national, commercial and other interests are prerequisites, as articulated below.    
3.2.1 Protecting South Africa’s geostrategic position and territorial integrity 
South Africa is located in a geostrategic position which requires naval power, particularly 
coercive maritime capabilities.  Three oceans surround the country; South Atlantic Ocean on 
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the west, Southern Ocean on the south and Indian Ocean on the east (Bennett & Söderlund, 
2008:1; De Wet, 2009:57).  The South Atlantic Ocean is the only natural sea lines of 
communications (SLOCs) between Europe and North American west coast connecting the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans (Du Plessis, 1987:17).  This geostrategic position, in which the 
Cape Sea Route is located, is perhaps the greatest Southern Hemisphere’s maritime choke 
point (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:1; Gray, 1998:47).  The Cape Sea Route is one of the most 
important trading routes internationally and South Africa is situated in the strategic location 
for replenishing and protecting ships crossing from the Indian to the Atlantic Ocean or vice 
versa (see Figure 3).     
  
 
The Constitution mandates the SAN to defend the country against any aggression, and to 
implement and maintain authority and integrity over all national oceans.  SANGP 100 clearly 
states that the most significant circumstance in which the SAN can be deployed is the defence 
of South Africa (South African Navy, 2006:51).  In order to protect the territorial integrity of 
the country, the SAN’s vision is to be unchallenged at sea, which demands winning 
capabilities at sea (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:9).  This vision demands an effective maritime 
SOUTH AFRICA
CAPE SEA ROUTECAPE SEA ROUTE
Figure 3: Cape Sea Route (Adopted from Worldpress.org, 2012) 
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capability to deter and defend the country against any threat, and South Africa “must retain 
the capability for independent action to meet the national obligations at home and abroad” 
(South African Navy, 2006:52).  The 3000 km coastline of the country, the 370 km EEZ as 
well as Prince Edward and Marion Islands, as shown in Figure 4, create a territorial area of 
over 1.1 million km², which need protection (Edmonds & Mills, 1996:19).   
 
 
According to Heitman (1995:38), the 3000 km coastline is the country’s longest border and 
Prince Edward and Marion Islands are located in some of the rough seas of the world. 
Subsequently, a vibrant but limited blue water navy to protect the coastline and other interests 
as well as patrol the EEZ is a prerequisite.  Campbell (1984:24) compared the Israeli Navy 
with the SAN versus the coastline of each country.  For instance, in 2012, the Israel Navy had 
three Dolphin Class Submarines, ordered another two and considering a sixth submarine, 
whilst the SAN only had three submarines (Sobelman, 2012:Online).  Considering the fact 
that the Israeli Navy only has 300 km coastline to protect, whereas the SAN has 3000 km, it 
can be concluded that the SAN is relatively small (Campbell, 1984:24).  Nonetheless, the 
Figure 4:  South African Coastline, EEZ and Islands (South African Navy, 2012) 
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SAN has significant roles to play in protecting South Africa’s geostrategic position.  In 
addition, the SAN ensures the protection of the territorial integrity and national interests of 
the country.       
3.2.2 Protecting South Africa’s national interests 
Although the concept national interest suffers from definitional clarity, South Africa’s 
national interests are those values and objectives enshrined in major policy documents 
including the Constitution, the South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document of 1996, 
and various White Papers to name but few.  The principles of South Africa’s foreign policy 
during the different eras, as outlined in chapter two, are based on national interests.  The 
White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (1999) outlines 
South Africa’s national interests as encompassing the security of the state and citizenry, the 
promotion of social and economic well being of the citizens, encouraging global peace and 
stability, and participating in the process of ensuring regional peace, stability and 
development (Department of Defence, 1999:19-20; Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999:14). 
Following from the above outline, it can be deduced that it is in South African national 
interests to assist people who suffer from famine, political repression, natural disasters, and 
the scourge of violent conflict, as depicted in chapter five.  In addition, the diplomatic role of 
the SAN can be used to support South Africa’s neighbours and regional interests given the 
fact that some states in the region lack navies and those that posses navies have greater 
challenges with regard to naval resources (Edmonds & Mills, 1998:viii).  In fact, the SAN is 
instrumental in assisting these states to establish their own vibrant navies as explained in 
chapters four and five.  SANGP 100 states that “[a] credible maritime capability is important 
for the promotion of the wider interests, to confer influence and to underpin diplomacy” 
(South African Navy, 2006:52).  Through the use of naval diplomacy, the SAN is 
instrumental in achieving national, regional and commercial interests.    
3.2.3 Protecting South Africa’s commercial interests 
The safety of SLOCs is extremely crucial to South Africa’s commercial interests and those of 
the region.  The geostrategic location of the country makes it a maritime nation with most of 
its trade occurring through the sea.  In 1995, South Africa’s maritime trade was more than 90 
percent of the total trade (Heitman, 1995b:38; Heitman, 2009:44).  The majority of exports 
and imports pass through South African major ports on an annual basis (Edmonds & Mills 
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1996:19).  In 2005, 98 percent of the country’s exports were conveyed through the sea (Ncube 
& Baker, 2011:62).  Apart from trade, the country has a vibrant fishing industry accounting 
for about one percent of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employing numerous 
people (Edmonds & Mills, 1998:68; Roux, 2009:24).   
The fishing industry has a potential of expanding provided South Africa has the ability to 
protect and harvest natural resources such as the Patagonian toothfish found in Prince Edward 
and Marion Islands.  The two islands are some of the only few places in the world inhabited 
by the Patagonian toothfish or the Chilean seabass, as affectionately known in fish markets 
and restaurants (Littoral Society, nd:1).  The Patagonian toothfish, which has a potential of 
greatly contributing to the South African economy, suffers enormously from poaching and 
over fishing, and faces imminent danger of extinction.  In addition, landlocked neighbouring 
states such as Zimbabwe, Botswana and Lesotho depend on the country’s ports for their trade.  
Without access to South Africa’s ports, it is extremely difficult for the landlocked states to 
function economically. In terms of international sea trade, it is worth noting that South Africa 
belongs on the top 12 countries (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:5).   
South African infrastructural development including commercial ports facilitates the trade.  
There are eight major commercial ports, namely; Richards Bay, Durban, East London, Port 
Elizabeth, Cape Town, Saldanha Bay, Mossel Bay and Ngqura  (Government Information and 
Communication System, 2005b:625).  In 2009, more than 3 million containers passed through 
South African ports (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2011:95). These 
ports not only contribute greatly to the country’s GDP, but also to the rest of the continent.   
It should be noted that maritime trade may be one of the major centripetal factors to maritime 
security threats that are currently ravaging Africa such as piracy.  Consequently, the 
commercial interests need to be protected against any threat from and at sea, particularly 
piracy and other illicit activities in the absence of any conventional sea-based threat.  
Unfortunately, most African states lack the ability to patrol their territorial waters (Potgieter, 
2012a:9).   Protection against any threat requires patrol vessels with adequate coercive 
capabilities to compel and deter aggressors at and from sea.  Currently, South Africa lacks 
adequate patrol vessels to protect its commercial interests and those of the region, as outlined 
in the next section.  
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3.3 COERCIVE NAVAL DIPLOMACY CAPABILITIES OF THE SAN 
It is often argued that navies have an inherent capability to be utilised in coercive roles (Du 
Plessis, 1987:6).  The coercive capabilities of navies rely on resource allocation and 
employment.  Prior to 1990, the President Class frigates, SAS Vrystaat (Type 15 frigate), and 
other vessels became obsolete. Subsequently, the SAN decommissioned the President Class 
frigates, SAS President Steyn and SAS President Pretorius, before the end of apartheid while 
SAS President Kruger sunk in 1982 in a collision with SAS Tafelberg (Bennett, 2009:19; 
Gounden, 2004:17; Wessels, 2005:1-15).   
Following the end of apartheid and defence budget cuts, the SAN was faced with a gigantic 
challenge of maintaining its operational capabilities amid deteriorating naval platforms. 
Consequently, its operational vessels encompassing submarines, patrol craft as well as 
destroyers became obsolete.  As such, the political use of the sea by South Africa at the time 
had dual characteristics.  Firstly, the SAN lacked coercive naval diplomacy capability on 
active mode to actively deter adversaries or assure allies and potential friends of its support.  
Secondly, the SAN performed naval diplomacy on the latent mode by mainly showing the 
flag and port visits (Du Plessis, 1987:71).  Since 1994, the situation has undergone 
evolutionary transformation as illustrated by the requisition of frigates and submarines.   
During the first post-1994 Defence Review process, the Parliament of the Republic of South 
Africa (hereafter Parliament) proposed a navy with four submarines, four corvettes, six strike 
craft, one combat support vessel, eight mine counter measures vessels, two inshore patrol 
vessels, and 39 harbour patrol vessels (Mills, 2000:123).  The SAN modernised and acquired 
new vessels to maintain the combat readiness (as officially known) to execute its core 
business, mission and vision (Department of Defence, 2003a:87).  Combat readiness refers to 
the coercive capability and operational readiness of surface warships, submarines and combat 
support vessels to conduct operations in support of foreign policy objectives.  Since 1994 the 
fleet of the SAN consisted of submarines (Daphné Class and Type 209) and surface warships 
namely; the Valour Class frigates, the Warrior Class Strike Craft, the Rivers Class 
minehunters, the Ton Class minesweepers, the City Class Mine Countermeasures, the T-Craft 
Inshore Patrol Boats and support vessels.   
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3.3.1 The Valour Class Frigates 
Frigates or corvettes are the ideal vessels suited for patrolling South African seas.  This 
epiphany dates back to apartheid years when the SAN failed to deliver on the planned 
corvette project in the 1970s.  These corvettes where intended to patrol both the South African 
and Namibia coasts, as well as safeguarding the Cape Sea Route during the Cold War era 
(Potgieter, 2004a:95-9).  In the post-1994 settlement, the epiphany of frigates or corvettes as 
ideal vessels for the country became a reality.  The SAN successfully procured four Valour 
Class frigates, SAS Amatola (F145), SAS Isandlwana (F146), SAS Spioenkop (F147) and 
SAS Mendi (F148).   
These vessels are considered the work horse of the SAN (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:81; 
Edmonds & Mills, 1998:96).  They are a resultant of the Defence Review’s Growth-Core 
Force Design option submitted to the Cabinet on 04 May 1997 (Cilliers, 1998:2).  The 
Cabinet approved R30, 3 billion (US$5, 5 billion) defence spending between 2002 and 2009 
on the controversial modernisation programme known as the Strategic Defence Packages 
(SDP) - which included the frigates, 26 Gripens from Sweden, 24 Hawks from Britain, 30 
Agusta A109 light helicopters from Italy, three Type 209 submarines and four Super Lynx 
Mk 64 helicopters (McGowan, 2006:316; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008:64; Wessels, 2005:1).   
SAS Amatola and SAS Spioenkop were built in Hamburg by Blohm and Voss GmbH under 
the management of the German Frigate Consortium and commissioned on 23 September 2003 
and 15 March 2004 respectively (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:81; Department of Defence, 
2004:89; South African Navy, 2003:10).  SAS Amatola was the first ship amongst the four to 
become operational on 19 February 2006 and SAS Spioenkop was the third to be operational 
on 16 February 2007 (Department of Defence, 2005:106).  SAS Isandlwana and SAS Mendi 
were built in Kiel by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft GmbH and commissioned on 19 
December 2003 and 15 June 2004 respectively.  They became operational on 27 July 2006 
and 20 March 2007, respectively (Ports & Ships, 2007:1; Potgieter, 2004a:115; Stockton, 
2003:12).   
The four frigates are top of the range in their MEKO Class and are fitted with weapons and 
weapons control systems by TNA, a joint venture of Thales Naval France and African 
Defence Systems.  They are fitted with Eight Exocet MM40Z Block Two Missiles (surface to 
surface missiles), 16 (+16) Denel Umkhonto Vertical Launch Missiles (surface to air), One 
OTO Melara 76/62mm Compact Dual Purpose Gun (main gun), One Denel Twin 35mm Dual 
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Purpose Gun (Dual purpose gun), Two SAN Mk 120mm Close Range Guns and Two 
Browning 12,7mm Machine Guns (close in guns), Two Grintek Multiple Rocket Launchers, 
African Defence Systems Combat Management System, One Reutech Optronic Radar 
Tracker, One Reutech Electro Optical Radar Tracker, Thales Naval France Multi Role Radar 
3D, Tellumat, M-Tek Target Designator Sights, and hull mounted Thales Underwater 
Systems Sonar (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:86; Gounden, 2004:18-9, 2004:15; Retief, 
2004:18-20).   
The frigates perform a diplomatic role, which is the most important function during a period 
of relative peace (Bennett, 2007:15).  The design of the combat system enables these frigates 
to perform various roles and functions such as patrolling both coastal and deep oceans to 
ensure naval presence and confirm sovereignty of the country over its EEZ; deterring illicit 
activities and piracy (as discussed later); conducting sea surveillance operations with the 
assistance of onboard helicopters, the Super Lynx Mk 64 (to dealt with in the next section); 
performing peace missions; assisting and supporting allies and act as a general deterrence 
mechanism for Southern Africa; showing the flag in support of foreign policy in foreign ports 
and waters; and providing naval gunfire support to land forces when required (Bennett & 
Söderlund, 2008:86; Letaoana, 2007:13).  In short, the combat system of the four frigates, 
accompanied by their strategic reach, controllability, independence, strategic mobility, 
flexibility, durability, and symbolism, enables them to conduct South African naval 
diplomacy in support of foreign policy (Booth, 1997:33-6; Edmonds & Mills, 1998:72; 
Haydon, 2007:6; Letaoana, 2007:12).  Put differently, the recent acquisitions enable the SAN 
to perform its roles adopted as strategic profile namely; regional reach, balance of forces 
capabilities, interoperability, information superiority, quality, will and respect, as reported in 
the 2002/2003 Annual Report of the DOD (Department of Defence, 2003a:87).  The Super 
Lynx assist the frigates in performing the above mentioned roles. 
3.3.2 Super Lynx Helicopters 
Each of the frigates houses a Super Lynx 300 Mk 64 maritime patrol helicopter operated by 
the SAAF (Government Information and Communication System, 2002d:460; Department of 
Defence, 2004:89).  There are four helicopters in total and are some of the best naval 
machines in the international market used widely by some of the prominent navies of the 
north such as the British Royal Navy (Navy International, 1990a:376).  The Royal Navy uses 
the Super Lynx on its frigates, class carriers, fleet auxiliaries and shore bases (Scott, 
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1993:306).  According to Lieutenant Colonel Rob Sproul, the project officer, the Super Lynx 
helicopters of the SAN are “the world’s most modern maritime version of the Super Lynx 
300” (Du Plessis & Jacobson, 2008:12).   
Musioua Lekota, then Minister of Defence, has reiterated that the helicopters extend the 
ships’ capabilities for surveillance beyond the horizon which elevate the tactical awareness of 
the frigates to a higher level.  These helicopters are equipped with the latest technology in 
engines, rotor design and avionics, consequently making them the best multi-role helicopters 
in their class worldwide.  They have proven successes in roles such as maritime surveillance, 
patrolling the EEZ, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare as well as search and rescue.  
Minister Lekota stressed in his speech during the commissioning of the Super Lynx that the 
frigates assisted by the helicopters will be crucial in South African waters as well as 
furthering the African Agenda in both SADC and the continent (Du Plessis & Jacobson, 
2008:12).  The frigates and their Super Lynx helicopters with the assistance of the submarines 
and other vessels keep Southern African waters safe above and below the surface.   
3.3.3 The Submarines of the SAN 
In his early publications Cable (1981:152) was pessimistic about the utility of submarines in 
naval diplomacy.  He argued that submarines cannot convey coercive threats without losing 
their tactical advantages.  He further argued that deploying submarines in attempt to use or 
threat of use of limited force may not succeed or result in a shooting war.  Simply put, 
submarines were ill-suited for limited naval force in gunboat diplomacy according to Cable 
(1981:153).  Contrary to this view, submarines remain some of the most effective 
instrumental in naval diplomacy.  According to Roberts (1979:211), submarines were the best 
weapons of Soviet naval diplomacy during the superpower confrontations of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s.  He concludes by stating that Cable’s view that submarines are “inherently 
ill-suited to the exercise of limited naval force" (Cable, 1981:152) seems to lack foundation.  
He also states that submarines applied to Soviet naval diplomacy when confronted by a strong 
naval power (Roberts, 1979:212).  Cable later conceded a legitimate, although limited role of 
submarines in naval diplomacy (Ditzler, 1989:12). 
Despite the argument that submarines are less effective in political confrontation, their 
coercive abilities in naval diplomacy are unrivalled and cannot be underestimated (Moore, 
1983:13; Cable, 1984:14; Ditzler, 1989:14).  The advantages of submarines enabling them to 
be instrumental in naval diplomacy, particularly gunboat diplomacy, include stealth, mobility, 
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firepower, endurance, survivability and effectiveness (Lautenschläger, 1988:241; Patton, 
1987:23).  According to Bennett and Söderlund (2008:105), submarines are instrumental in 
denying any potential adversaries to use territorial waters in time of conflict, and form part of 
a balanced navy.  Edmonds and Mills (1998:97) and Heitman (2005a:15) concur and further 
state that submarines offer more than deterrence because of their ability of conducting 
surveillance and gathering intelligence.  Additionally, submarines are advantageous because 
of their invisibility to surface ships and aircraft.  Consequently, they are excellent platforms 
for deterrence and compellence (Ditzler, 1989:13; Heitman, 2005a:15).  There is no doubt that 
submarine’s high underwater speed, formidable weaponry and acoustic discretion among 
other capabilities, make them enormously powerful weapon systems for many years to come 
(Navy International, 1992:311).   
With the realisation that submarines are extremely significant, the SAN established a 
submarine flotilla that began operating on 18 March 1969.  Since then, South Africa is the 
only state in Sub-Saharan Africa with submarine capability (Edmonds & Mills, 1998:97).  
The fact that country has submarines makes it the most powerful state in the region.  
Submarines, as conceded by Rear-Admiral (Junior Grade) D.J. Christian, a senior submariner 
currently Chief Director Naval Logistics at the Navy Headquarters in Pretoria, are South 
Africa’s ultimate strategic weapon (Christian, 2012).  This fact put the country in an 
advantageous position in case of a conventional military threat.  The SAN utilised two types 
of submarines, the Daphné Class and Type 209, during various periods since the 
establishment of the submarine flotilla. 
The SAN procured three Daphné Class submarines from France in the late 1960s (Potgieter, 
2004b:129).  SAS Maria van Riebeeck (commissioned on 24 July 1970), SAS Emily 
Hobhouse (commissioned on 26 February 1971) and SAS Johanna van der Merwe 
(commissioned on 27 August 1971), Daphné Class submarines, have been operational since 
1969.  These submarines were similar to those operated by Portugal, Pakistan, Spain and 
France in the early 1990s (Du Plessis, 1987:65; Navy International, 1990b:437).  The 
isolation faced by apartheid South Africa made it difficult to acquire new submarines due to 
arms embargoes.  Despite their obsolescence, the submarines remained operational for more 
than 30 years (Navy Public Relations, 2005:13).  In 1993, SAS Maria van Riebeeck 
participated in ATLASUR I (as discussed in chapter four), and later exercised with the 
Kenyan, Tanzanian and Mozambican navies (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:108; Edmonds & 
Mills, 1998:43).  The three submarines were renamed SAS Spear, SAS Umkhonto, and SAS 
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Assegaai in 1999, 30 years after the establishment of the submarine flotilla (Bennett, 
2009:31).   
Despite their major combat systems upgrade to second-generation commercial-off-the-shelf 
technology in the mid 1990s, the SAN decommissioned the Daphné Class submarines 
(Heitman, 1995a:15; Department of Defence, 2003a:88; Thaver, 2002:9).  Although SAS 
Spear and SAS Umkhonto were withdrawn from service in 1996 and 2002, they were only 
scrapped in 2003 and 2008 respectively.  Before SAS Assegaai was withdrawn in 2003, she 
remained in service and conducted patrols in the EEZ such as Operation SPOOK from 29 July 
to 07 August 2002 as well as Exercise RED LION from 14 to 24 October 2002 (Department 
of Defence:90; Tshabalala, 2003:24).  The submarine, however, was later transformed into the 
SAN Museum in Simon’s Town.  According to Edmonds and Mills (1998:43), the Daphné 
Class submarines were compatible with Southern African waters due to their miniature 
design.  Some of the drawbacks, however, were that they lacked quietness of modern boats, 
towed array sonar and missiles (Edmonds & Mills, 1998:43).  The versatile Type 209 
submarines replaced the three Daphné submarines (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:107; Navy 
Public Relations, 2005:13).   
According to Heitman (2005a:15), the Type 209 submarine is the most successful to be built 
since the end of the Second World War.  This type of submarine has been produced since the 
late 1960s and used by states such as Greece, Argentina, Peru, Columbia, Turkey, Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Chile, India, Brazil and the Republic of Korea.  In 2012, Egypt announced its plans 
to acquire Type 209 submarines for its navy (Naval-technololgy.com, 2012:Online).  Based 
on the success of this type of submarine, South African decision-makers sought it necessary 
to acquire three Type 209 submarines to replace the obsolete Daphné class submarines.  As 
part of the SDP the SAN procured SAS ‘Manthatisi, SAS Charlotte Maxeke and SAS Queen 
Modjadji I, diesel powered submarines constructed in Germany by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche 
Werft GmbH  and Noordseeweke Emden GmbH.  SAS ‘Manthatisi was commissioned on 3 
November 2005 and arrived in South African waters on 7 April 2006 (Letaoana, 2006:16; 
Tshabalala, 2007:14).   
SAS Charlotte Maxeke and SAS Queen Modjadji I were commissioned on 14 March 2007 
and 22 May 2008 respectively, and arrived in the country’s waters in 2007 and 2008 (African 
Armed Forces Journal, 2007:15; Naval Public Relations, 2005:13; Pale, 2008:16).  The 
submarines are highly capable and have demonstrated their capabilities during different 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
49 
exercises, most notably, NATO’s Standing Naval Maritime Group held in 2007 where SAS 
‘Mathatisi managed to sink eight units of the surface force undetected (Bennett & Söderlund, 
2008:109; Ndaba, 2003:15; Department of Defence, 2005:102).   
The submarines are very sophisticated with diesel engines powered by Main Propulsion 
Motor in order to minimise noise, making them difficult to detect.  According to Buff 
(2007:40), diesel powered submarines are preferred than their nuclear counterparts on littoral 
waters due to their manoeuvrability, quietness, and affordability.  The SAN submarines are 
also fitted with four batteries of 120 cells each.  A fully charged battery can run all systems of 
the submarine while proceeding at four knots for 100 hours, covering a distance of about 400 
nautical miles (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:111).  The combat and operation systems of the 
submarines consist of underwater sensors, namely: Cylindrical Array Sonar, Intercept Passive 
Sonar, Flank Array Sonar, Passive Ranging Sonar, Active Operating Sonar, and Own Noise 
Analysis System.  Electronic support measures include periscopes, namely: SERO 400 Attack 
Periscope and OMS 100 Optronic Mast (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:114; De Wet, 2009:59; 
Heitman, 2005a:15).   
The abovementioned features make submarines the best deterrence and compellence 
instruments of the country.  Acquiring the Type 209 has not only elevated the status of the 
SAN as the only submarine operator in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also internationally because it 
can now compete with other submarine operating navies (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:11).  
When faced with opponents during the different exercises conducted in South African waters 
in the Cape Coast, the submarines have often managed to defeat advanced warships of NATO 
states.  However, the success of submarines can only be sustained by effective training, 
maintenance and sustainability as well as combat support vessels.    
3.3.4 Combat Support Vessels 
Although combat support vessels are not fighting ships for navies, they form an integral part 
of navy’s fighting capabilities. Without combat support vessels, “ships cannot operate in an 
intense combat arena for more than several days without running low on fuel and 
ammunition” (Grimes, 1991:376).  This is the challenge faced by navies including the SAN.  
Without support vessels, the combat ships of the SAN do not stand a chance of fighting and 
winning at sea (Department of Defence, 2003a:87).  Certainly, combat support vessels are an 
integral part of the coercive capabilities of the SAN.  
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In the early 1990s, the SAN had two combat support vessels, the SAS Drakensberg and SAS 
Outeniqua.  SAS Drakensberg is a proudly South African constructed vessel launched in 
1986 and commissioned in November 1987 (Heitman, 1995b:42).  SAS Outeniqua was an 
ice-breaking ship formerly known as Juvent, a Ukrainian polar supply vessel (African Armed 
Forces Journal, 2004:28; Lenton, 1993:299).  The SAN procured the ship from Ukraine in 
1993 and renamed her SAS Outeniqua (Edmonds & Mills, 1998:44; Heitman, 1995b:42).   
The role of combat support vessels is logistical support for all SAN ships on operations.  They 
are also instrumental in showing the flag as grey diplomats in continental and international 
ports as discussed in chapter four.  SAS Outeniqua was instrumental in the Great Lakes 
region as a platform for negotiations away from the hostilities before its decommissioning, as 
discussed in chapter five.  Currently, apart from the limited role of  SAS Protea, SAS 
Drakensberg is the only active combat support vessel responsible for transporting land forces 
when required by the SANDF, supporting any state department such as the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), and conducting diplomatic missions, to name 
but few (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:115).   
Another important vessel that is often utilised as a support ship is the SAS Protea, the 
hydrographic survey vessel.  Although her primary role is hydrographic survey, SAS Protea 
supports other small vessels and submarines during long deployments (Bennett & Söderlund, 
2008:121; Edmonds & Mills, 1998:44; Naval Digest, 2000:19).  Prior to decommissioning, 
SAS Fleur, diving support vessel, also played a support role for divers particularly during 
search and rescue operations (Department of Defence, 2002:87).  The SAN decommissioned 
SAS Fleur, together with other vessels such as SAS Outenigua, the two Daphné submarines, 
seven strike craft and minesweepers, to give way to the new frigates and submarines 
(Department of Defence, 2004:90).      
3.3.5 The River and Ton Class Mine Hunters and Sweepers 
Mines are some of the cheapest but deadliest weapons which can cause both physical and 
psychological effect to humans (Navy International, 1991a:407).  To effectively counter 
mines, mine countermeasures vessels are a prerequisite.  Mine countermeasures vessels have 
two main groups; minesweepers and minehunters (Navy International, 1991a:409).  Although 
ageing, the SAN has mine countermeasures capabilities provided by minehunters and 
sweepers vessels previously housed in the now decommissioned, Mine Countermeasures 
Flotilla of the SAN based at SAS Chapman (Du Plessis, 1987:65; Heitman, 1995b:41).    
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The SAN procured four coastal minehunters, classified as Research Vessels, in the mid 1970s 
under secrecy due to arms embargoes against the country during the apartheid years 
(Edmonds & Mills, 1998:44).  The vessels, painted blue and white, forming the First Research 
Squadron were commissioned and named Navors I, II, III & IV in 1981 (South African Navy, 
2011b:Online).  In 1982, however, they were painted grey and fitted with 20mm guns, 
transforming them into warships.  They became known as the River Class minehunters 
following their renaming into SAS Umkomaas, SAS Umgeni, SAS Umzimkulu and SAS 
Umhloti.  Only SAS Umkomaas and SAS Umzimkulu were operational by the year 2011; the 
SAN decommissioned the rest (South African Navy, 2011b: Online; Department of Defence, 
2004:90).    
In March 2001, South Africa procured pre-owned six Type 35 minesweepers with R31 
million from Germany, which were renamed Ton Class minesweepers in the SAN 
(McGowan, 2006:316).  Their acquisition began in 1998 when Vice-Admiral R. Simpson-
Anderson, then C Navy, visited Germany to finalise the acquisition.  The minesweepers 
departed from Germany on board the submersible barge UR-161 towed by tug Fairplay XIV 
and arrived in Simon’s Town on 9 March 2001.  The rationale for acquiring the minesweepers 
was to strengthen maritime safety and security in South African waters by increasing offshore 
patrols as well as conducting search and rescue operations (Sverdloff, 2001:15).  According to 
McGowan (2006:316), the minesweepers improved the SAN’s coastal patrol capabilities by 
assisting the strike craft vessels.      
3.3.6 Warrior Class Strike Craft 
The failure of Project Taurus aimed at procuring ships from Portugal in the early 1970s led to 
procurement of the strike craft from Israel in a highly classified Project Japonica during the 
apartheid era (Edmonds & Mills, 1998:41; Potgieter, 2004a:106; Potgieter, 2004b:131-3). The 
SAN procured nine Minister Class (currently known as Warrior Class) strike craft constructed 
between 1976 and 1985 (Edmonds & Mills, 1998:41).  The names of the vessels were SAS 
Jan Smuts (P1561), SAS P.W. Botha (P1562), SAS Frederick Creswell (P1563), SAS Jim 
Fouche (P1564), SAS Frans Erasmus (P1565), SAS Oswald Pirow (P1566), SAS Hendrik 
Mentz (P1567), SAS Kobie Coetsee (P1568), and SAS Magnus Malan (P1569).  
Following name changes in the SANDF and broader South Africa, the strike craft vessels, 
except SAS Jan Smuts (P1561), were changed to SAS Shaka (P1562), SAS Adam Kok 
(P1563), SAS Sekhukhune (P1564), SAS Isaac Dyobha (P1565), SAS Rene Sethren (P1566), 
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SAS Galeshewe (P1567), SAS Job Masego (P1568), and SAS Makhanda (P1569) (Bennett, 
2009:29-42).  The first strike craft was commissioned on 08 July 1977, and the last was 
commissioned on 4 July 1986.  Prior to its decommissioning, the strike craft served in SAS 
Scorpion.  Fitted with surface to surface missiles, the strike craft remained credible deterrent 
vessels until 2007 before becoming Offshore Patrol Vessels.  Only SAS Isaac Dyobha, SAS 
Galeshewe and sometimes SAS Makhanda were operational in 2011, the rest have either sunk 
as targets, or sold for scrap or waiting for disposal (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:95; Engledow 
& Gounden, 2001:24; Gounden, 2003b:38).   
The deficiency in size and endurance made the strike craft ill-suited for South African seas 
(Potgieter, 2004a:95).  Regardless of their shortcomings, strike craft vessels filled the vacuum 
resulting from the lack of frigates in the SAN, and have performed important functions such 
as rescue missions, exercises; with Chile, Brazil and Taiwan; and keeping South African 
waters safe.  They have also performed their naval diplomacy roles (Heitman, 1995b:41) 
during the Bush War as discussed under naval deterrence in chapter three.  In addition, the 
vessels visited several states as discussed in chapter four.  The strike craft, however, had a 
number of operational problems including the ten year life span design for utility in the 
Mediterranean (Edmonds & Mills, 1998:43, 89).  One of the important features of the strike 
craft is reaching beyond the horizon where the inshore patrol vessels and harbour patrol boats 
(HPB) cannot reach.   
3.3.7 Inshore Patrol Vessels and Harbour Patrol Boats 
The main roles of inshore patrol vessels (IPV) and HPBs are to prevent illegal importation of 
illicit goods such as drugs and other substances, deterring piracy and other illegal activities in 
the EEZ (Navy International, 1991b:67).  There are three IPV vessels in the SAN namely, 
SAS Tobie, SAS Tekwane and SAS Tern.  These vessels belong to the T-Craft Class and have 
a complement of 16 personnel. They are fitted with two ADE 444 Tl 12V diesels and two 
Hamilton water-jets, which produces a speed of 32 knots. They can also be fitted with 7,62 
mm Machine Guns (South African Navy, 2011b:1).   
The three vessels are currently assisted by about 26 HPBs, popularly known as Namacurras 
with a complement of four and may be armed with one 12,7 mm and two 7,62 mm Machine 
Guns.  These are small vessels which have been used in the Great Lakes region as part of the 
patrolling segment of the SANDF as discussed in chapter five (South African Navy, 
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2011b:Online; Van der berg, 2006:16; Zambodla, 2004:10).  Some HPBs have been donated 
to Namibia, Malawi and Mozambique, and have been instrumental in the respective states’ 
naval harbours as elements of coercive naval diplomacy, particularly naval deterrence in the 
non traditional sense (Ministerial Directorate of Communications, 2004:13; Nomtshongwana, 
2008:14).  One of the major drawbacks of HPBs is that they are limited in range and can only 
carry limited number of personnel.  Hence, HPBs can only be effective in patrols when 
supported by a larger vessel capable of carrying large quantities of fuel.  The HPBs are 
manned by the members of the Protection Force and form part of the Operational Boat 
Squadron deployed to the Great Lakes (see chapter five), which became part of the MRS. 
3.3.8 The Maritime Reaction Squadron  
The SAN established the MRS on 1 September 2006 (Combrink, 2012), which marked the 
resurrection of the Marine capability in the SAN as well as the SANDF.  The SAN, however, 
only commissioned the MRS on 9 December 2008 (Public Relations Department, 2008:1).  It 
is commanded by a Captain (SAN) and the Officer Commanding in 2008, Captain (SAN) S.F. 
Petersen, is a former Marine who served in the Marine Branch before its disestablishment.  
Headquartered at Scala formerly used by Marines until 1990, the MRS is an official unit of 
the SAN with the aim of imbuing the SANDF with peacekeeping capabilities in Africa’s fresh 
water lakes and rivers, as well as amphibious operations, boarding operations at sea, 
humanitarian operations and disaster relief (Janse van Rensburg, 2009:27; Malepe, 2012).   
According to SANGP 100, which guides naval forces in pursuit of both national and military 
objectives in support of South Africa’s foreign policy, there are ten main tasks of the MRS.  
These tasks include conducting inland water patrols, in lakes, waterways and riverine; 
conducting search and seizure operations during inland water patrols; executing boarding 
operations in national and international waters; providing defensive deployable small craft, 
both inshore in the littoral and on inland waters; protecting SAN and visiting vessels in 
national and international harbours and anchorages; conducting ship-to-shore and shore-to-
shore operations;
 
ferrying limited personnel in the inshore littoral and the inland waters; 
providing operational small craft support services to other state departments, for example to 
conduct non-combat evacuation operation; and establishing a Forward Deployable Base 
(FDB), procured as part of Project Xena, from which operations may be conducted (South 
African Navy, 2006:57-58).  These are the same tasks contained in the Concept of Operations 
(CoO) of the MRS approved in 2007, a year after its official establishment and a year prior to 
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its official commissioning, as well as other documents such as SANGP 1, SANGP 15 and 
SANGP 40 outlining the different roles of the SAN (Combrink, 2012).   
The CoO, however, is out of date because the MRS is currently conducting tasks which were 
not initially envisioned such as anti-piracy operations.  Subsequently, the MRS is in a process 
of revising and updating the CoO, but its approval date has yet to be determined (Malepe, 
2012).  The contents of the new CoO remain classified; but it seems it will be more suited for 
the current operational environment.
9
  One can postulate that anti-piracy operations will 
feature prominently in the new CoO.  The most pertinent argument that transpired during 
some interviews with anonymous participants include the fact that the current CoO lacks 
provision for Force Protection and Reaction Teams from the MRS to deploy with each and 
every sea going ship at any given time.  This renders the ships vulnerable, especially in the 
current environment where piracy is rife at sea.  Currently, only divers deploy with sea going 
ships at all times.  Another argument was that members of the MRS should be highly trained 
in order to withdraw Special Forces elements operating with them.  Special Forces are 
strategic assets which should only be employed in severe circumstances such as anti-piracy.  
Regardless of the revealed issues, it is absolutely clear that the MRS is more than a Marine 
force because it consists of four interconnected components, namely Operational Boat 
Division (OBD), Operational Diving Division (ODD), Reaction Force Division (RFD) and 
the Maintenance Division (Department of Defence, 2009a:61).    
3.3.8.1 Operational Boat Division 
Prior to the establishment of the Operational Boat Squadron in 2005 HPBs and similar small 
craft resorted under Protection Units at Simon’s Town and Naval Station Durban (Bennett & 
Söderlund, 2008:146).  Some HPBs were attached to Naval College Gordon’s Bay and 
President Jetty at the Naval Gymnasium, SAS Saldanha.  Owing to the need for operational 
boat crews and protection contingents at the Great Lakes and other areas pursuing South 
Africa’s interests, Vice-Admiral Mudimu, commissioned the Operational Boat Squadron.  
The decision was to ensure that the SAN contributes meaningfully to South Africa’s 
commitments at the Great Lakes.  Members of the squadron served in Burundi and other areas 
in the continent as well as when requested to assist other departments and the South African 
Police Service (SAPS) as discussed in chapter five (Malepe, 2012). 
                                                          
9 Author’s reminisces during interviews with relevant naval officers.   
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Following the formation of the MRS, the Operational Boat Squadron was upgraded to the 
OBD and became part of the new unit.  The Operational Boat Squadron, however, can be 
regarded as the genesis of the MRS (Malepe, 2012).  The SAN equipped the OBD with six 
Lima Craft capable for beach landing.  The Lima Craft have a high speed of 29 knots, a range 
of 120 nautical miles, and a complement of 20 (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:146).  The highly 
capable and versatile HPBs are also housed in the OBD.  Lima Craft can be launched from 
larger platforms such as SAS Drakensberg or the frigates.  Similarly to the Delta Boats 
utilised by the Marines, the Lima Craft carry members of the RFD and ODD during 
operations.   
3.3.8.2 Operational Diving Division 
In 1957, the SAN established its diving capability at the West Yard in Simon’s Town, and the 
Diving Centre is still housed in this location as part of SAS Simonsberg.  The amalgamation 
of ODTs East and West formed the ODD in the post-1994 settlement as part of the 
transformation processes in the SAN.  The main functions of the ODTs include mine 
identification, mine avoidance, mine clearance, beachhead clearance, and explosive ordnance 
disposal (South African Navy, 2006:57).  The divers regularly participate in DIVEX, which is 
a diving exercised envisioned in 1984 but only came to existence in 1998.  The aim of 
DIVEX include encouraging cohesion and to refresh diving theory and practice.  Since 1994, 
the ODTs are instrumental in operations as part of the South African international maritime 
assistance.   
Following its incorporation to the MRS, the ODD conducts domestic diving, search and 
rescue, deep diving at 54 meters, mine hunting and mine clearance, underwater device 
disposal, underwater salvaging, underwater drilling and welding, as well as other tasks (Du 
Plessis, 2012). The equipment of the ODD includes a compression chamber for divers, six 
and four meter boats, as well as normal diving equipment.  One of the major challenges facing 
the OOD is the four meter boats which have surpassed their 16 year life span in 2008.  The 
only serviceable boats currently available are the six meter boats which are difficult to 
transport using the four-wheel-drive vehicles of the MRS (Anonymous Interviews, 2011).  
Despite these challenges, the ODD has completed various operations under the banner of the 
MRS.  Some of the operations include deployment with SAAF, humanitarian relief in 
Mozambique, and assisting Tanzanian authorities as part of South African naval cooperation 
with the region as discussed in chapter five.   
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3.3.8.3 Reaction Force Division 
The RFD is a brainchild of Vice-Admiral Mudimu and is crucial in projecting South Africa’s 
foreign policy objectives with regard to bringing peace to the African continent as well as 
African waters (Janse van Rensburg, 2009:27).  Although it is still in its infancy, it should be 
understood as the main component of the Marine force that resurrected the capability lost 
when the Marine Branch was disestablished in 1990.  Members of the RFD require both 
mental and physical strength as well as tenacity and fortitude to successfully complete the 
rigorous selection process (Kalake, 2010:8).   
The RFD is an important component in anti-piracy operations given the fact that South Africa 
recently illustrated its political will to eradicate the scourge of piracy, or at least prevent it 
from reaching Southern African waters.  The RFD began as a Reaction Force in 2005 when 
former members of the Marine Branch trained 109 members from the Military Skills 
Development System intake.  Their training commenced at Saldanha.  Both RFD and OBD 
members receive the same training and are deployed to the various divisions in terms of need 
(Combrink, 2012).  These members also receive motorised infantry training, which make 
them versatile.  They are able to serve in both infantry and amphibious roles.   
The Reaction Force, before the inception of the MRS in 2006, was commonly known as the 
MRS.  This is, however, not surprising given the fact that it is the core of the new unit.  Prior 
to the establishment of the Reaction Force, the various divisions (now part of the MRS) 
existed as separate entities.  They were only amalgamated to augment the capabilities of the 
Reaction Force by forming part of the MRS in 2006.  The Reaction Force participated in 
various operations and has assisted other State Departments as discussed in chapter five.   
Initially, the RFD consisted of a full-time company and a reserve company.  Currently, it has 
three companies which are rotated during operations (Malepe, 2012).  The companies have 
the leadership element, a motor section and rifle platoons.  The leadership element, made of 
selected Junior Officers in the SAN, receives its training from Infantry School in Oudtshoorn.  
Some of these officers studied at the Military Academy such as Lieutenant (SAN) P.P. 
Hlungwani, Sub Lieutenant D.S. Thukani and Sub Lieutenant R.O. Letsoalo (current Platoon 
Commander in the MRS).  The mustering of some of the Senior Officers and Junior Officers 
is Combat Officer (Marine), which was approved recently following years of the precarious 
label of Combat Officer (Dry), which was inconsistent with the amphibious environment.    
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In 2009, the MRS was equipped with a deployable base and support equipment for 
operational deployments in Africa (see Project Xena) (Janse van Rensburg, & Stone, 
2009a:12).  Between 2009 and 2010, a total of 50 members of the SAN were deployed in 
peace missions in the DRC, Burundi, Sudan, Central African Republic and Ethiopia 
(Department of Defence 2010:60).  Some of these members were from the MRS as discussed 
in chapter five.  
It is important to note that RFD members face various challenges.  The first challenge relates 
to the promotion of members.  As a recently established unit headed by a Captain (SAN), the 
promotion of Combat Officers (Marine) is very slow.  The second challenge, similar to those 
faced by other units of the SANDF, is ageing equipment.  For instance, the boarding 
equipment used for fast roping is a few years old and needs to be replaced.  The third 
challenge is combat boots worn by the MRS.  These boots are hard and suited for normal 
infantry soldiers that operate on land (Anonymous Interviews, 2011 & 2012).  They are 
certainly not conducive for the amphibious environment in which the Marines operate.  The 
boots should be replaced by a softer design suited for both the amphibious environment as 
well as land. These challenges impact on the morale of the Marines and require an urgent 
resolution to enable the members to perform their duties diligently.  The equipment also 
require maintenance; hence the creation of the Maintenance Division    
3.3.8.4 Maintenance Division 
According to Captain (SAN) S.A. Malepe, Officer Commanding MRS, the Maintenance 
Division is a very recent development created out of need.  It should be emphasised that it is 
not a fighting division, but a support one.  It is charged with keeping all equipment of the 
MRS in their optimum operational condition.  The MRS is equipped with tantalising 
equipment procured under Project Xena which needs special care.  Project Xena was first 
introduced to the public on 9 December 2008 when the MRS was commissioned (Public 
Relations Department, 2008:1).  The project was the inshore and riverine equipment 
acquisition programme for the MRS aimed at providing a fully integrated, balanced and 
deployable system (Janse van Rensburg, 2009:27).  Captain (SAN) N. Marais, project officer, 
explained that a rapid capability required not only boats, but a system that can sustain the 
boats (Engelbrecht
 
, 2008:Online).  Consequently, it was necessary to acquire the boat system 
(including their trailers and a floating jetty); a FDB; command, control and communications; 
and transport.  Project Xena was an R89 million project spanning from 2005 to 2009 
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(Engelbrecht, 2009b:Online).  The equipment acquired through the project enable the MRS to 
participate meaningfully in exercises and operations.   
The MRS revealed its FDB on 25 November 2009 at SAS Saldanha Sports Field.  Members 
present included a delegation from the Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans, Defence 
Related Industries, Senior Officers from the SANDF as well as the media.  The Base Camp 
Segment, dubbed home away from home, is geared to accommodate 150 sailors.  It is made of 
33 six meter containers and 22 (five by ten meter) tents (Maleka, 2010b:28).  There are four 
sub-systems of the camp.  The first is composed of accommodation, gym, dining hall, 
refrigerators and ablution.  The second is composed of laundry, sewage, water purification, 
generators and armoury.  The third is composed of administration tent, command control and 
communication and intelligence, workshop tent and caisson walls.  The last sub system is 
composed of a floating jetty, riverine patrol boats and landing craft (Wingrin, 2009:Online).  
It is worth noting that the camp is one of the best in the world.  In fact, the USA and NATO 
forces use similar camps to the Base Camp Segment in Iraq and Afghanistan (Maleka, 
2010b:29).   
It is important to note that frigates, submarines, support vessels, minehunters and sweepers, 
IPV, strike craft and the MRS are tools that enable the SAN to conducts its business.  Without 
these tools, it is impossible for the SAN to perform any of its roles from the policing and 
military roles, to naval diplomacy.  Hence, it is important that these tools remain in their 
optimum operational condition.  As precisely pointed out by Booth (1997:33-6) regarding 
navies and foreign policy, having these tools enables the SAN to be a valuable instrument in 
foreign policy because it can swiftly switch from being a benevolent bystander to becoming 
an active combatant within a limited time frame.  Although the frigates, submarines, support 
vessels, minehunters and sweepers, IPV, strike craft and the MRS make the SAN the only 
vibrant navy in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to note that there are gaps in its coercive 
or combat readiness.    
3.4 GAPS IN THE COERCIVE OR COMBAT READINESS OF THE SAN 
At the turn of the 21
st
 century, Vice-Admiral Simpson-Anderson, articulated a number of 
vulnerabilities of the SAN in the maritime domain emanating from decisions made regarding 
budget allocation for maritime defence.  These vulnerabilities, amongst others, included the 
state of the SAN vessels at the time (Simpson-Anderson, 2000:72).  The SDP, as previously 
stated, has eradicated some of the vulnerabilities by equipping the SAN with submarines, 
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frigates and helicopters.  There are still, however, vulnerabilities or gaps in the coercive or 
combat readiness of the SAN.  To be unchallenged and to win at sea are the vision and 
mission of the SAN that require the ability to obtain and retain command and control of the 
sea, maintaining good order at sea, sea denial and maritime power projection (Department of 
Defence, 2003a:87; Till, 2007:571-2; Till, 2009:7-19).  The question may be asked; can the 
SAN be unchallenged and win at sea?  The answer to this question does not only relate to the 
coercive or combat capabilities or lack of, as discussed, but also to the required skills to 
operate naval platforms.   
In attempt to answer the question, it is necessary to critically focus on some of the factors 
affecting the capabilities of the SAN.  Firstly, the ageing strike craft vessels, which were built 
for a ten year life span, are ill-suited for patrolling South African waters as they were built for 
the Mediterranean.  Additionally, only SAS Isaac Dyobha and SAS Galeshewe, and 
sometimes SAS Makhanda (strike craft), were operational in 2012 (SAN, 2011:1).  Secondly, 
the four frigates and the strike craft have to perform the primary and secondary functions of 
the navy as contained in the Constitution.  Thirdly, the SAN, just like the rest of the country, 
is suffering from the brain drain as numerous engineers and combat officers are seeking 
opportunities in other sectors.  About 55 combat officers and 18 engineers left the SAN 
between 1997 and 1998 (Edmonds & Mills, 1998:46).  In 2011, the SAN had a shortage of 
engineers and combat officers (Anonymous Interviews, 2011).  These are some of the factors 
affecting the coercive readiness of the SAN, which include naval and maritime deterrence.   
In the light of the above highlighted factors, it is undeniable that the SAN lacks adequate 
coastal patrol capabilities.  As Buthelezi (2010:28) put it:   
The SA Navy has too few vessels to adequately protect the South African 
territorial waters (oceans) and high seas against a maritime enemy, piracy, 
illegal fishing, mining, and illegal dumping of waste.  The Strategic Defence 
Package(s) marginally improves this situation, but it does not amount to an 
adequate maritime capability; and (r)estructuring has caused the SA Navy to 
lose a combat support ship that was better suited for strategic sea-lift purposes.   
Sea lift capability is extremely important for the transportation of naval forces and equipment, 
such as the FDB of the MRS, for the success of operations at distant regions.  While there 
may be lack of questions for acquiring the FDB; however, one may question the suitability of 
the system procured.  The fact that other developed nations such as the USA are utilising a 
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similar camp might not be the sole centripetal factor to incline South Africa towards a similar 
system.  Other considerations are also very much important.  For instance, the USA and other 
developed countries such as France have unquestionable air and sea lift capability to transport 
their FDB to any place where their forces are deployed.  In the case of South Africa, there is 
currently a lack of sea lift capability to transport the FDB to spheres of operations and to 
conduct operations such as diplomatic missions, fleet in being, landing operations, littoral 
operations, evacuation operations, search and rescue, and development support and post 
conflict reconstruction (African Armed Forces Journal, 2008:10-3; Heitman, 2009:52).  As 
acknowledged by the SAN in SANGP 100 
The SA Navy does not have a suitable platform to carry out the missions 
described above. By acquiring a suitable platform to project forces ashore, 
and to provide the necessary medical and logistic support in times of 
disasters mentioned above, the SA Navy will be in a better position to 
satisfy the Military Strategic objective to promote peace, security and 
stability in the region. For this reason the acquisition of a Landing Platform 
Dock or Landing Helicopter Dock is planned for (the) future (South African 
Navy, 2006:99). 
It is undeniable that road transport in the form of heavy load trucks may be used to transport 
the FDB as witnessed when the base was displayed in SAS Saldanha.  The following 
question, however, can be posed: can the SAN operate the FDB in places such as the South 
African islands of Marion and Prince Edward or any other place accessible through the sea?  
The current answer to the question is absolutely negative, unless a private sea lift capability is 
chartered or assistance is rendered by friendly international forces possessing the capability 
such as the USA or France.   
Following the decommissioning of SAS Outeniqua, SAS Drakensberg remains the only 
support vessel, apart from the limited role of the aged SAS Protea, supporting seagoing ships 
and transporting other South African forces and departments.  It seems that the problem 
might be solved in the future through Project Millennium aimed at acquiring sea lift 
capabilities for the SANDF in the form of Mistral Class LHD (Heitman, 2009:53).  It should 
be noted; however, that Project Millennium seems to have lost momentum and currently its 
completion date is unknown.  Some postulate it might only be completed by the year 2025 or 
2030 (Anonymous Interviews, 2011).  Despite these challenges, the SAN has managed to 
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deploy to various multi-national and national exercises as well as operations.  The gaps in the 
readiness of the SAN impact on naval and maritime deterrence and failure to address these 
gaps might result in the navy failing to provide effective naval and maritime deterrence for 
South Africa.   
3.5 NAVAL AND MARITIME DETERRENCE OF THE SAN 
The distinction between naval deterrence and maritime deterrence is that the former (naval 
deterrence) mainly pertains to the use of naval (military) assets to deter other naval (military) 
threats whereas the latter (maritime deterrence) encompasses the use of naval (military) assets 
to deter non-military threats. The notion of deterrence is based on the prospective instead of 
the definite use of force (Cable, 1971:27; Gray, 2000a:256; Huth, 1988:424).  According to 
Till (2009:271), two forms of deterrence exist.  The first is general, passive and implicit in 
nature whereas the second is specific, active and explicit in nature.  The former may refer to 
the deployment of capable naval force in international waters adjacent to the area of interest, 
such as the deployment of SAS Drakensberg near Cote d'Ivoire (to be discussed later), and 
the latter may refer to the deployment of naval force in an area visible to the potential 
adversary to deter particular actions or inactions from occurring. 
Naval and maritime deterrence is a province of gunboat diplomacy using the threat or limited 
naval force to achieve political results.  The definitive, purposeful, catalytic and expressive 
forces are significant in achieving the political ends (Cable, 1971:27-60). Within the context 
of South Africa, the expressive force is applicable given the country posture and foreign 
policy objectives.  The Constitution and other South African policy documents explicitly 
indicate that the country abide by international law and has no intention of using force against 
the territorial integrity or independence of any state.  Accordingly, the focus is mainly on 
deterrence rather than compellence.  The White paper on Defence states that “[t]he SANDF 
shall have a primary defensive orientation and posture” (Department of Defence, 1996:6).  On 
her Department of Defence Budget Vote of 13 April 2011, Dr. Lindiwe Sisulu, then Minister 
of Defence and Military Veterans, stated that  
Being a littoral country, South Africa needs to have a balanced maritime 
capability to effectively respond to arising maritime security threats affecting 
South Africa. This will focus on deterring piracy and other maritime illegal 
activities along the Southern Africa Coast on the Indian Ocean, in particular 
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the Mozambique Channel, following reports of piracy activities off the 
Mozambique coast and parts of Tanzania (Sisulu, 2011:7). 
Evidently, this illustrates that the SAN focuses on maritime and naval deterrence rather than 
compellence.  According to Cohen (1981:87) and Till (2009:265), deterrence aims at 
influencing the perceptions of the other party to do the actor’s will.  Deterrence rarely has 
lethal consequences and it is the most accepted and often effective strategy in the post-Cold 
War environment (Gray, 2000b:20).  It is extremely significant to comprehend that deterrence 
is only possible and useful if credible defensive and offensive capabilities to deter potential 
enemies exist (Department of Defence, 1996:27).  The SAN is required to protect offshore 
resources, prevent maritime terrorism, drugs smuggling, human trafficking and other 
activities regarded as policing function of navies as outlined in chapter two (Edmonds & 
Mills, 1998:73; Sverdloff, 2002a:19).  Heitman (1995a:38) argues that the SAN has 
demonstrated its deterrence capabilities at the peak of the southern African conflict before 
1994 during Exercise MAGERSFONTEIN in Walvis Bay, which occurred between 
September and October 1988.   
During the negotiations on Angola and Namibia, South Africa convinced the Cubans that it 
has a navy to back its foreign policy.  In other words, the navy supported the political ends of 
the government.  The SAN was able to project Special Forces and Marines undetected. Earlier 
in 1986 there is a belief, although debatable, that the strike craft sank cargo vessels in 
Namibia and Angola and destroyed a fuel farm of the People’s Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola (MPLA).  This limited the offensive of the MPLA, which supported the military 
wings of the liberation movements (mainly the African National Congress), against the 
National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) supported by apartheid South 
Africa (Heitman, 1995b:38; Haydon, 2007:2). 
At the turn of the 21
st
 century, naval and maritime deterrence capability of the SAN was 
insufficient given the obsolescence of vessels versus the coast and the EEZ as well as other 
interests in need of protection.  The arrival of frigates and submarines has imbued the 
country’s naval and maritime deterrence, and enabled the navy to be the only Southern 
African naval force with the capabilities to keep the waters safe from potential sea-based 
threats such as piracy.  Submarines of the SAN play vital roles in deterrence due to their 
stealth and advancement in technology (Heitman, 2005a:15). Since 1994, the SAN has been 
instrumental in naval and maritime deterrence operations such as expressive force and 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
63 
evacuative operations; anti-piracy operations through Operation COPPER; the prevention of 
illicit fishing, human, drugs and arms trafficking; and keeping the territorial waters safe 
through Operation KGWELE in 2010. 
3.5.1 Expressive force and non-combatant evacuation operations 
One of the purposes of foreign policy is to protect the country’s citizens abroad.  This ranges 
from legal issues to evacuation during crisis in receiving states.  The Indian government 
deployed naval warships off Colombo in 1987 on an evacuation operation for the members of 
the Indian High Commission.  It was feared that Indian nationals faced imminent danger 
given the predisposing conditions for civil war in the region (Ghosh, 2001:2014).  In February 
2011, the South African government undertook a similar operation deploying the SAS 
Drakensberg which was planned to participate in the 2011 Cape to Rio Yacht Race as a 
communication and guard vessel.  While en route, the government rerouted the ship to the 
Gulf of Guinea (GoG) in the midst of the looming Cote d'Ivoire conflict following the 
elections.  The media reported that this might be perceived as an action to deter the Ivorian 
decision-makers from certain actions.  In actual fact, James Victor Gbeho, Economic 
Community of West African State (ECOWAS) president asserted that the presence of SAS 
Drakensberg near Cote d'Ivoire complicated the matters.  Gbeho argued that South Africa did 
not endorse Alassane Ouattara as president and this weakened efforts by ECOWAS to force 
Laurent Gbagbo to relinquish power (Radio Africa Worldwide Africa Desk, 2011:1). Graeme 
Hosken (2011:4) of The Mercury reported that the presence of SAS Drakensberg in the GoG 
may have been part of the AU military build-up as efforts for conflict prevention in the 
region. 
DIRCO, however, reassured the international community that SAS Drakensberg is a support 
vessel with no intention to interfere in the internal matters of Cote d'Ivoire and the aim of 
sending the vessel was to assist in evacuating the diplomats, designated personnel and South 
Africans in that country (Department of International Relations & Cooperation, 2011c:1).  
The presence of SAS Drakensberg in the GoG illustrated the application of expressive force 
in gunboat diplomacy.  Although, the ship is a support vessel, its presence sent a clear 
message from the South African government to achieve political outcomes on land.  It is clear 
that South Africa has naval assets and is willing to deploy them where necessary to achieve 
political outcomes on land.  Failure to resolve political pandemonium on land may lead to 
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lawlessness in the region which may extend to sea creating maritime insecurity due to piracy 
and related activities such as the Horn of Africa. 
3.5.2 Operation COPPER: Deterrence against Maritime Piracy in Southern African 
Waters 
Operation COPPER is an anti-piracy operation off the coast of Mozambique and Tanzania 
that began in January 2011 following the call for South Africa to begin playing a meaningful 
role in eradicating piracy at sea (Hough & Kruys, 2009:92-97).  The operation may be 
comprehended as a maritime deterrence operation by the SAN to supports the ends of the 
country’s policy.  After all, Operation COPPER is conducted in the waters of Mozambique 
and Tanzania following a formal request, which makes it part of South African naval 
diplomacy.  The hijacking of the Vega 5, a Spanish fishing trawler, in the Mozambique 
Channel on 28 December 2010 sparked the operation.  Mozambican authorities requested 
assistance from South Africa and the government responded by authorising naval 
deployments to the Mozambique Channel (Murtin, 2012: Online).  Operation COPPER is the 
SAN’s first standing commitment since the end of the Second World War (DeSilva-
Ranasinghe, 2012:34). 
Although some operations of elements of the SANDF remain classified, some information 
regarding several operations is released to the media.  Very limited information, however, is 
released to the public with regard to Operation COPPER due to issues relating to security.  
Hence, the exact nature of the anti-piracy operations assets composed of the MRS and the 
Special Forces onboard the SAN vessels during the operation is highly classified.  The first 
deployment for Operation COPPER occurred in February 2011 when SAS Mendi commanded 
by Captain (SAN) J. Schutte with the members of the MRS and Special Forces onboard was 
deployed to the Mozambique Channel on anti-piracy operations (Baker 2012:152).   
During the deployment SAS Mendi conducted anti-piracy patrol in Mozambique Channel and 
off the coast of Tanzania.  Five officers from the Mozambican Navy deployed with the ship 
for the duration of the deployment (Walker, 2011:24).  President Zuma informed Parliament 
that he extended the “the employment of the South African National Defence Force for 
service in Mozambique waters and in international waters to monitor and deter piracy 
activities along the Southern African Coast of the Indian Ocean” (Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa, 2011:1).  SAS Mendi returned from the first deployment which took 115 
days on 19 May 2011 (Walker, 2011:25).   
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SAS Amatola conducted a four month long second deployment for Operation COPPER which 
ended on 19 September 2011 (Baatjies, 2011a:23).  Concurrently as SAS Amatola returned 
from anti-piracy patrol, SAS Mendi headed for Pemba to take her second anti-piracy patrols 
for the operation (DefenceWeb, 2011: Online).  The other two frigates, SAS Isandlwana and 
SAS Spioenkop, are also involved in the operation.  At anytime since the beginning of the 
operation early in 2011, one of the four frigates is conducting anti-piracy operations off 
Mozambique Channel and off the coast of Tanzania (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, 
2012b).   
SAS Drakensberg is also involved in the patrols following the absence of frigates as they 
were undergoing scheduled repair and maintenance.  The MRS has been involved in 
Operation COPPER since its commencement.  The teams serve onboard frigates during anti-
piracy patrols (Baker, 2011:152), and it can be argued that they are very instrumental in 
fighting piracy during the operation as they are the anti-piracy assets onboard the ships. These 
teams are responsible for boarding operations as one of their main roles.  
According to Lieutenant (SAN) F.M. Rossouw, Operation COPPER Boarding Officer in two 
rotations, there are two types of these kinds of operations, namely compliant and non-
compliant boarding.  The former is conducted when the vessels in question give their consent 
for the MRS to board and the latter involves vessels refusing to comply with boarding 
requests.  During compliant boarding, the crew of the vessels are informed of the 
requirements.  For instance, fishing vessels are required to have all their permits in a central 
place such as the bridge.  Cargo vessels that have onboard private security personnel to 
protect themselves against pirates are advised to store away all weapons onboard (Rossouw, 
2012).   
Non-compliant boarding operations entail vessels, particularly fishing vessels, which refuse 
granting access to the MRS to conduct search operations onboard.  These types of operations 
are divided into two subgroups, namely; opposed and unopposed boarding operations 
(Rossouw, 2012).  Opposed non-compliant boarding operations include a threat of use of 
force as members board the ships with weapons ready to return fire if attacked.  These are 
dangerous operations which may often be performed under fire from the opposing forces.  
Unopposed non-compliant boarding operations do not necessary include the threat of force.  
They may be a consequence of lack or failure of communication between the MRS and the 
crew of the vessels due to technical failures.  When members board the vessels during these 
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operations, they are unopposed by the crews on board.  The MRS has conducted unopposed 
non-compliant operations during Operation COPPER.  The crew of vessels, fishing vessels in 
particular, often cite the issue of time as the reason for their refusal.  Time is of essence for 
fishing trawlers and inspection of a vessel implies that the crew has to stop its duties for the 
duration of the boarding operation.  Nonetheless, boarding operations are conducted as long 
as the vessel is deemed suspicious.   
Suspicious vessels include those not responding to radio contact and those identified by 
intelligence services as having connections to piracy and other illicit activities.  Since the 
beginning of Operation COPPER there have been more than two rotations of members of the 
MRS responsible for boarding (Malepe, 2012).  It was in a boarding operation where the 
MRS lost one of its members, Able Seaman T.E. Mbuli, on 23 May 2012.  While conducting 
a boarding operation on the Iranian dhow Hoane, a vessel of interest during the operation, 
Mbuli lost his footing and fell into the sea during the disembarkation (Zulu, 2012b: Online).  
Boarding operations are some of the dangerous tasks which the MRS conducts in Operation 
COPPER.  In case they intercept a pirate vessel, it should be noted that most pirates of 
Somalia are armed with AK-47s, handguns, heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled 
grenades (Potgieter, 2008b:10).   
The IMB states that Somali pirates are armed and dangerous, and do not hesitate to fire at 
ships using AK-47s and RPG in order to force them to come to halt (International Maritime 
Bureau, 2011:22).  The 68 crew of MT Irene SL, a super tanker hijacked by Somali pirates in 
February 2011 can attest to the ferocity of Somali pirates.  The crew spent 58 days in captivity 
prior to their release in April 2011 and recalled the traumatic experienced they underwent 
amidst their captors armed with the cited weapons (Meyer & Fouché, 2011:8-11).  Regardless 
of the danger and other challenges facing the MRS, its members continue to play a role in 
Operation COPPER. 
In April 2012, more than a year since the commencement of Operation COPPER, the impact 
of the SAN in anti-piracy was realised during a multinational anti-piracy operation including 
SAS Drakensberg, Tanzanian forces and the European Union forces.  The operation followed 
an unsuccessful pirate attack on a Filipino merchant vessel in Mozambique Channel.  
Concurrently, the Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Tanzania issued a 
safety warning of the Dandelion, a South African owned yacht en route from Mayotte, French 
Island, to Pemba in Mozambique (Daily News Correspondent, 2012:Online).  On Sunday 15 
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April 2012, the French Navy responsible for patrolling the area requested assistance from the 
SANDF with regard to search efforts.  Being at the right place at the right time, SAS 
Drakensberg with the MRS onboard commenced searching for the Dandelion.  When the 
yacht was spotted off the coast of Pemba on Monday morning, 16 April 2012, the pirate 
mother ship was also identified as Nimesha Duwa, a Sri Lankan fishing trawler captured by 
pirates in November 2011.  The search and rescue mission was then transformed into piracy 
interdiction operation and SAS Drakensberg was responsible for forcing the Nimesha Duwa 
to escape to the north of the Mozambique Channel towards Tanzanian and European Union 
forces (South African Navy, 2012:1).  By the afternoon of Wednesday, the pirates had felt the 
pressure of hot pursuit and decided to split up, leading to five of them located and arrested on 
Songo Songo Island by the Tanzanian authorities.  In the evening, SAS Drakensberg, and the 
Tanzanian and European forces closed on the pirates’ mother ship and the Spanish ship 
captured the vessel at 20:30 military time.  Seven pirates were arrested and six hostages of the 
Sri Lankan fishing trawler were rescued. 
Conducting anti-piracy operations show South Africa’s commitment towards maritime 
security in African waters.  Some analysts, however, such as Heitman believe that the 
deployments to the Mozambique Channel should have commenced ages ago because piracy is 
threatening South Africa’s commercial interests (Hosken, 2011:4).  Other analysts concur 
with Heitman’s statement.  In the light of the aforementioned, Professor H. Fouché, a piracy 
expert, states that the SAN may assist in preventing piracy as part of its constabulary 
functions; however, anti-piracy is a function of law enforcement (Fouché, 2012).  It is 
regrettable that African states lack both capacity and resources to ensure law enforcement at 
sea; hence the call for navies to intervene.  Although the SAN is Africa’s naval power, it 
should be considered that combating piracy off east African coast is not the sole responsibility 
of South Africa.  Although most states in the region lack naval assets, they are also 
responsible for resolving the situation and deterring piracy.  There are two pertinent questions 
regarding anti-piracy operations.  Firstly, is South Africa capable for conducting such anti-
piracy operations at a greater scale or not?  Secondly, is Operation COPPER, from its 
commencement in 2011 to 2012, successful or not?  
The answer to the first question may be attributed to resources.  The defence budget cuts are 
limiting the SAN’s operational capabilities.  The government reduced the sea going hours to 
8000 for 2011 and 2012, from 9000 in 2010.  Given this reality, the SAN can only afford to 
deploy one frigate and, perhaps, a support vessel on each rotation for Operation COPPER.  
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The four frigates and SAS Drakensberg rotate deployments to the Mozambique Channel.  
Engaging in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia may be unproductive for the SAN 
given the fact that approximately 30 other foreign naval vessels are engaged in anti-piracy 
operations in the area.  Thus, it is justifiable that the SAN concentrate its operations in SADC 
waters to avoid overstretching its capabilities (Kruger, 2011: Online).  Failure to concentrate 
in SADC waters may not only result in the inability to perform the primary and secondary 
functions of the SAN as provided in the Constitution, but also Operation COPPER.  In 
attempting to answer the second question, the success of Operation COPPER and the 
contribution of the MRS should not be judged by the number of pirates apprehended.  In 
actual fact, the SAN has not yet apprehended any pirates except contributing to those 
apprehended in April 2012 as cited.  The successes, however, should be judged by the fact 
that suspicious activities in the Mozambique Channel and off the coast of Tanzania have 
decreased in the past two years.   
Various sources have reported a plunge in piracy off the east African coast in the recent past.  
The 2011 Annual Report of the IMB states that the number of successful hijackings by 
Somali pirates has decreased from 49 in 2010 to 28 in 2011 (International Maritime Bureau, 
2011:24).  As reported by The New York Times, statistics released by the United States Navy 
(US Navy) revealed that only nine pirate attacks have been successful this year compared to 
34 in 2011 and 68 in 2010 (Shanker, 2012:Online).   
Regardless of the flaws in 2010 and 2011 numbers, the trend is that piracy around Somalia 
has declined.  This decline can be credited to aggressive anti-piracy patrols by international 
navies operating in the area as well as measures taken by commercial shipping companies 
such as employing private security personnel onboard ships (Shanker, 2012). The fact that no 
vessel has been hijacked since Operation COPPER commenced in the Mozambique Channel 
illustrates the success of the operation.  Although there are reports of piracy descending from 
the Horn of Africa towards Southern Africa, as indicated by Minister Sisulu and Vice-
Admiral Mudimu during IONS 2012, the region has not yet experienced major challenges 
(Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, 2012b).  Subsequently, it may be argued that the SAN in 
general, and the MRS and the elements of Special Forces in particular, together with other 
elements involved in the operation have successfully conducted maritime deterrence in the 
region.  Without naval anti-piracy patrols, the region would be experiencing piracy as 
illustrated by the cited piracy cases, and other maritime insecurity threats. 
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3.5.3 Deterrence against other sources of Maritime Insecurity 
Piracy and other threats constitute what Vreÿ (2009:17) calls bad order at sea in the waters of 
African coast.  Maritime security is important for the success of African states and the 
realisation of the African Renaissance.  The sea has the resources necessary for the 
development of the continent, and is also instrumental in providing SLOCs.  Consequently, 
maritime insecurity must be eliminated in order to secure SLOCs. Without a vibrant political 
will and leadership in dealing with maritime issues, Africa will forever experience maritime 
insecurity (Ncube & Baker, 2011:68).  Threats such as piracy, drug trafficking and illegal 
fishing require multilateral cooperation between states on naval matters (Mshumpela, 
2006:14; Rao, 2010:131).  Some of the omnipresent maritime security threats other than 
piracy include illicit fishing, human, drug and arms trafficking.   
In terms of preventing illicit fishing, the SAN assists the DEAT.  It is in fact one of the 
operational commitments of the SAN (Department of Defence, 2002:454).  Following the 
arrival of the new submarines, the SAN has launched a deterrence campaign against foreign 
vessels conducting illicit fishing in the waters of Marion and Prince Edward Islands.  SAS 
Charlotte Maxeke, made her debut patrol of the islands in late May 2008 and was a major 
achievement in collecting intelligence in the area using the advanced technology to assist the 
Marine and Coastal Management.  This was a ground-breaking achievement as the area has 
rough seas coupled with stormy weathers.  The Director of Fleet Force Preparation, Rear-
Admiral (Junior Grade) H. Teuteberg, admitted that previous patrols were unsuccessful owing 
to the lack of advanced technology before the arrival of the submarines (Samodien, 
2008:Online). 
In terms of deterrence against human, drugs and arms trafficking the SAN is committed to 
assisting states lacking the abilities to police their waters.  Human trafficking is one of the 
serious issues in southern Africa.  In June 2004, the Southern African Regional Interpol 
Office reported that numerous people were trafficked for cheap labour and sexual exploitation 
(Allais, 2009:71).  However, it is difficult to determine the numbers due to unavailability of 
data.  The essence is that women and girls are trafficked for prostitution, pornography, and 
other forms of exploitation (United Nations Children’s Fund, 2003:9).  South Africa is 
regarded as a primary destination for humans trafficked from Mozambique, Uganda, the 
DRC, Angola, Zambia, Senegal, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Swaziland, Namibia, Botswana, 
Nigeria, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Sudan, Malawi, Thailand, Taiwan and China 
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(Allais, 2009).  The UN, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the Convention Against Transnational 
Organised Crime of 2004, provides for the prevention and punishment of people involved in 
human trafficking (Hough & Kruys, 2009:31).  The prevention and punishment of human 
traffickers can only be done if they can be apprehended, and can only be achieved with more 
naval presence in South African waters.  Given the coast of the country and the available 
vessels, it is impossible to police all ships coming to South Africa.   
The lack of sufficient naval presence enables criminal organisations to traffic arms.  The UN 
Protocol Against the Illicit manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition prohibits arms trafficking (Hough & Kruys, 2009:51).  Yet 
several criminal elements are involved in these illegal activities at sea.  Arms and drug 
trafficking are serious problems facing Africa.  Some narcotics are dropped off Africa’s coast 
by aircraft and transported ashore by speed boats for shipment into Europe (Heitman, 
2009:52).  The only way to deal with maritime insecurity is to initiate and strengthen 
cooperation among states in terms of patrolling, intelligence sharing, and amalgamating naval 
resources (Fouché, 2009a; Fouché, 2009b).  Cooperation among states, particularly naval 
cooperation (to be dealt with in the next chapter), enables navies of states to provide 
deterrence and compellence in their waters. 
3.5.4 Operation KGWELE: Maritime Deterrence for the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
President Zuma instructed the SANDF to assist the SAPS in securing the country during the 
2010 FIFA World Cup.  The World Cup is one of the biggest sporting events that attract 
people from all walks of life.  The country and the world were excited knowing that it was for 
the first time the event was hosted in the African continent.  The event such as the 2010 
World Cup did not only bring excitement and opportunities, but also threats or potential 
threats.  In order to rid of these threats the SANDF initiated Operation KGWELE 
(Oosthuizen, 2010:18-22).  Brigadier General J. Liebenberg was the Joint Task Force 
Commander for the operation and had emphasised the importance of amalgamating the 
country’s resources to ensure safety and security (Rakoma, 2010:18).  Minister Sisulu visited 
the National Joint Operations Centre (NATJOC) at the SAAF Headquarters in Pretoria on 9 
June 2010 to evaluate combat readiness with regard to Operation KGWELE.  Brigadier 
General Liebenberg assured the Minister that the SANDF was geared and ready for the 
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operation.  He also provided a concise presentation to the Deputy President, Kgalema 
Motlanthe, during his visit at the NATJOC on 9 July 2010 (Sibanyoni, 2010:14).  
During the operation, the SAN’s main task was to ensure the safety of the three coastal host 
cities; Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town (Stone, 2010:26).  Each of the harbours in the 
three cities was provided with one ship and crew. In addition, 78 members were deployed in 
each harbour comprising; a 22 member ODT responsible for underwater demolitions; a 38 
member MRS Platoon for security and harbour protection; a medical team; a communications 
team to ensure communication between the ships; a protection platoon from the Protection 
Force for harbour protection and security;  an HPB to conduct harbour and coastal patrols; 
Survey motor boats to conduct underwater surveys; Picture Processing Element for 
underwater security and assessment; and an underwater sabotage device disposal team for 
bomb disposal by ODT (Maleka, 2010a:27). 
The SAN commenced deploying its members for the operation as early as 24 May 2010, 
which was combined with Operation CORONA aimed at deploying over 3000 soldiers for 
border control by 2014 (Baker, 2012:156).  The elements of the SAN participating in 
Operation KGWELE included frigates, submarines, a hydrographic survey ship, the MRS, 
two Strike Craft, two counter measure vessels, and Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear 
and Explosives teams.  SAS Amatola was deployed in Port Elizabeth, while SAS Spioenkop 
and SAS Mendi were deployed in Durban and Cape Town respectively (Baker, 2012:155-6).  
SAS Protea was deployed in Port Elizabeth for the duration of the tournament to ensure the 
safety of the harbour and the stadium (Kampfer, 2012; Stone, 2010:26).   
Hydrographic Survey Team equipped with Sonar motor boats conducted sonar detection and 
sent the information to be processed onboard SAS Protea. SAS Umkomaas and SAS 
Umzimkulu conducted underwater security in Durban and Cape Town harbours (Maleka, 
2010a:27).  Three platoons (one per stadium) of the MRS were deployed as observers around 
the Stadia and were ready for rapid deployment wherever they would be needed (Anonymous 
Interviews, 2011).  The role of the SAN in expressive force and evacuative operations, 
Operation COPPER, Operation KGWELE as well as other operations relating to maritime 
security illustrate that the country has naval assets capable of providing naval and maritime 
compellence in support of foreign policy. 
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3.6 NAVAL AND MARITIME COMPELLENCE OF THE SAN  
Naval compellence is “specific, active and is intended to [oblige] an adversary to do 
something, or maybe to stop doing something” (Till, 2009:265).  Compellence persuades an 
adversary to undertake a desired action (Cohen, 1981:87).  This implies that compellence 
may, often than not, have lethal consequences (Broderick, 2000:23).  As outlined in the 
previous section, the SAN has coercive capabilities which can perform naval and maritime 
compellence; however, using force is not advocated by the country’s interests as outlined in 
the principles of South Africa’s foreign policy discussed in chapter two.  Consequently, naval 
compellence operations of the SAN lack emphasis on the use of force.   
More importantly, for successful naval compellence operations, certain conditions must be 
met.  Firstly, naval forces must have sufficient naval coercive capabilities for the intended 
operations and the adversary must be informed about these capabilities.  Secondly, clear and 
precise picture building of the adversary’s disposition must be known in order to determine 
his reactions and perceptions.  Thirdly, rules of engagement must be used by the naval force 
engaged in compellence operations.  Lastly, the use of force in compellence operations must 
be appropriate and justified in order to keep allies onboard (Till, 2009:268-9).  Two main 
types of naval compellence operations can be said to exist, namely: lethal and non-lethal 
compellence operations (Cable, 1971:27-30; Till, 2009:267). 
3.6.1 Lethal compellence operations of the SAN 
Lethal naval compellence operations involve the use of limited force to achieve political ends.  
Positioning these operations within Cable’s gunboat diplomacy, it is apparent that these 
operations employ definitive and purposeful force because they have limited aims and are 
intended to influence decision-makers (Cable, 1971:27, 39; Haydon, 2007:6).  It is important 
to comprehend that the boundaries between naval compellence operations and small war are 
intrinsically nebulous (Till, 1995:65; Till, 2009:267).   
A classic example of naval compellence occurred during the Dominican crisis of 1961 when 
the USA positioned two aircraft carriers, USS Franklin D. Roosevelt and USS Valley Forge 
with more than 1000 marines and helicopters onboard and support vessels, three miles off the 
Dominican coast to respond to the looming crisis which later manifested into the Dominican 
civil war in 1965 (Cohen, 1981:87; Time Magazine, 1961: Online).  Another example of 
naval compellence operations is Operation DESSERT FOX of 1998 by the US Central 
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Command and Britain to compel Saddam Hussein to accept the conditions contained in the 
UN Security Council Resolution 687 and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) inspectors to enter Iraq for inspection (Global Security, 2000: Online; Youngs & 
Oakes, 1999:25).   
Other examples include the Argentine’s Operation ROSARIO of 22 April 1982 which 
sparked the Falklands campaign resulting from the failure of definitive act of naval 
compellence by the Argentineans (English & Watts, 1982:3; Heitman, 2005a:15).  In the case 
of South Africa, circumstances of lethal compellence operations by the SAN are very rare.  
This is not alarming given the foreign policy stance of the country.  Thus, coercive naval 
diplomacy in the SAN mainly relates to naval and maritime deterrence and non-lethal 
compellence operations. 
3.6.2 Non-lethal compellence operations of the SAN 
Non-lethal naval compellence operations are known as Maritime Interception Operations 
(MIOPS) which exclude the explicit use of force such as stopping, probing, capturing and 
diverting suspect ships.  The advantages of MIOPS include their acceptance to the 
international community due to lack of violence (Till, 2009:269).  One of the MIOPS 
conducted by the SAN is Operation LARIAT I which occurred in April 2001.  This was the 
first time the SAN and the Australian Navy ever cooperated in an operation (Wessels, 
2010:121).  The operation enabled the SAN to illustrate its diplomatic role, publicly due to 
media coverage, in support of South Africa’s foreign policy.   
The Australian government requested its South African counterpart to assist in capturing a 
trawler under hot pursuit, the South Tomi, suspected of conducting illicit fishing in Australian 
territorial waters.  Two SAN vessels, SAS Galeshewe and SAS Protea with a SAAF Alouette 
III helicopter onboard, were instructed by the government to execute an MIOPS to assist 
Australia to apprehend the culprits (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:61; Potgieter, 2012b:293; 
Potgieter, 2012c:10).  The Australian team and observers from the South African Maritime 
and Coastal Management were onboard SAS Protea when she departed for the operation 
(Katzenellenbogen, 2005:22).  On 12 April 2001, 260 nautical miles south of Cape Agulhas, 
the SAN task group intercepted and apprehended the vessel, making Operation LARIAT a 
success (Brett, 2007:78).  Wessels (2010:121) states that the enormous success of the 
operation provided proof of Commonwealth naval cooperation in solving maritime and 
related challenges.  The success of the operation should be attributed to the coercive 
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capabilities of the SAN, particularly the strike craft in this case.  Bennett and Söderlund 
(2008:63) elucidate that the skipper of the South Tomi had no intension for stopping as 
evidently illustrated by the fact that the Southern Supporter, unarmed Australian civilian 
patrol ship, maintained continuous hot pursuit for 14 days across the Indian Ocean.  The 
reluctance of the skipper was only overcome when he noticed the two 76 mm Otto Melara 
Dual Purpose Guns and the two single 20mm and two 12,7mm Machine Guns of SAS 
Galeshewe; he then brought the ship to a halt (Le May, 2001:1). 
Although not in the classical sense of the theory, the execution of the operation has illustrated 
the use of gunboat diplomacy by the SAN.  It is undeniable that the action was not directed at 
another navy, but the threat of use of force was utilised during the operation.  In Luttwak’s 
theory of naval suasion, the actions of the SAN constituted active suasion (Luttwak, 1985:80).  
In addition, the actions of SAS Galeshewe belong with the definitive force category of 
Cable’s categories of limited naval force (Cable, 1971:27).  In this regard, the actions met all 
the requirements associated with definitive force.  Firstly, the threat of force was visible to the 
skipper of the South Tomi.  Secondly, the force applied was not only tolerable but also 
limited.  Only four guns were ready to be used; no missile systems were activated.  Thirdly, 
the capabilities of the guns were accepted by the skipper.  And lastly, only minimum force 
was applied, both the SAN and the Australian Special Forces on board Protea did not initiate 
any lethal action. 
The DFA (before name change to DIRCO) and DOD received complimentary messages from 
Australia regarding the operation.  Following from the success of Operation LARIAT I, the 
SAN and the Australian Navy conducted Operation LARIAT II in August 2003 to capture 
another fishing boat.  The successes of both operations have illustrated to the world the 
importance of naval cooperation, especially between coastal and blue water navies.  It has 
also undeniably illustrated the capabilities of the SAN in enforcing laws in territorial waters 
despite the obsolescence of ships.  With the arrival of the four frigates and three submarines, 
the coercive naval diplomacy capabilities of the SAN have been elevated to a higher level, 
which helps in deterring threats at sea. The frigates have made the SAN a credible player in 
the international maritime field. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
Maritime coercion requires effective and efficient coercive naval diplomacy capabilities.  The 
SAN’s capabilities have improved since 1994 with the acquisition of frigates and submarines.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
75 
These capabilities are necessary for the protection of South Africa’s geostrategic position and 
territorial integrity as well as national and commercial interests.  Although the coercive 
capabilities have improved since 1994, gaps exist in its coercive readiness which may hinder 
maritime coercion, particularly gunboat diplomacy.  It is extremely pivotal for the SAN to 
maintain its coercive readiness at all times regardless of South Africa’s foreign policy 
priorities and defence posture, which may change due to the unpredictability of the future.  
Subsequently, the SAN must remain unchallenged and be able to win at sea.   
Taking into cognisance foreign policy priorities and defence posture, the use of gunboat 
diplomacy in its traditional sense to influence events on land and at sea is not prominent in the 
current environment.  Maritime deterrence, in the form of expressive force and non-combatant 
evacuation operations, anti-piracy operations in the form of Operation COPPER, security 
South African waters for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, and other sources of maritime insecurity, 
is preferred and has been conducted in the post-1994 period.   
Naval non-lethal compellence operations have also been conducted by the SAN, particularly 
Operations LARIAT I and II which illustrated the coercive capabilities.  No lethal 
compellence operations were conducted due to foreign policy posture and priorities.  It seems 
that the focus of the SAN in terms of maritime coercion is mainly on anti-piracy operations in 
the absence of any conventional sea-based threat.  The recent deployment of the SAN by the 
government on anti-piracy operation off the coast of Tanzania and Mozambique Channel, 
illustrates the future sphere of engagement for the SAN.  Accordingly, more resources and 
vessels to replace the ageing ships are needed to execute these operations.  The frigates and 
submarines cannot effectively deal with all maritime challenges facing the region.   
The successful acquisition of strategic sea lift capability, OPVs and IPVs will increase naval 
presence at sea and maritime deterrence through anti-piracy operations.  It should be 
cautioned, however, that extending anti-piracy operations beyond SADC waters, given the 
current capabilities, may have devastating ramifications for the country.  Acknowledging that 
the permanent solution may only be found on land, the best option to effectively deal with 
threats facing Africa at and from sea, is through naval cooperation with other states and 
maritime actors.  South Africa has already illustrated its willingness to cooperate with other 
states in the region by signing the trilateral agreement on Maritime Security Cooperation as 
discussed in chapter four. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NAVAL COOPERATION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter four of this study explicates South African naval cooperation efforts, which are 
located in the peaceful, cooperative and persuasive extreme of naval diplomacy.  It is 
essential to reiterate that naval cooperation is non-coercive in nature (Du Plessis, 
2008:95).  As outlined in chapter two, naval cooperation comprises activities such as 
common and collective security building, confidence-building, training and exercising, 
and general relations with other naval forces (Till, 2009:257).   
The aim of this chapter is to analyse South African naval cooperation as a function of 
naval diplomacy at the international, continental and regional levels.  The chapter 
begins with an exposition of the reasons for naval cooperation, followed by 
international naval cooperation between South Africa and other states.  It then discusses 
both continental and regional naval cooperation as well as various exercises and 
goodwill visits by grey diplomats and dignitaries as part of South African naval 
cooperation.   
4.2 REASONS FOR NAVAL COOPERATION 
The 75
th
 Anniversary celebrations of the SAN in 1997 created a massive platform for 
naval cooperation in the post-1994 period.  One of the most memorable events of the 
celebrations was the Presidential Fleet Review (PFR) held in April 1997 (discussed 
later), in which Nelson Mandela, then South African president and Commander-in-
Chief of the SANDF, stated that 
Just as we believe that all people should be free-so too, as a Nation, we 
believe in the freedom of the seas.  We accept our obligation to combine 
with other maritime nations to uphold the freedom of the seas and protect 
our interests through maritime power. We also undertake to manage the 
reserves of our huge [EEZ] wisely for the benefit of the people of the 
region (Werkman, 1999b:14). 
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Since then, the SAN strove to increasingly succeed in instituting maritime and naval 
cooperation with other international and regional navies.  The main reason for naval 
cooperation is to create an understanding between navies to enable them to fight 
together in war.  Although naval cooperation mainly occurs during peace time, it is 
intended to prepare navies to be more successful in a potential war.  In this regard, 
Schäfer (1998:62) identifies various significant factors constituting the rationale or 
reasons for maritime and naval cooperation, which are relevant in the current 
international system due to the phenomena of interdependence and globalisation.  Some 
of the pertinent reasons include reassuring allies and friendly bystanders of the 
intensions of the SAN, combating threats at and from sea, improving the 
interoperability of navies, as well as building and strengthening institutions to ensure 
maritime security.   
Reassuring allies and friendly bystanders are some of the most important reasons for 
naval and maritime cooperation.  The current international system is characterised by 
uncertainty and the emergence of new security threats, particularly human insecurities, 
that are cross border in nature and require states to amalgamate their resources in order 
to obliterate such threats.  The SAN, as an instrument of foreign policy, welcome navies 
of other nations to build and reassure allies and friendly bystanders that South Africa is 
a friend to all and an adversary to none.  The international, continental and regional 
communities are always welcomed in South African waters and some have participated 
in presidential reviews and naval exercises (to be dealt with later).  It is through 
cooperation that sea-based threats can be obliterated.   
Sea-based threats are difficult and even impossible to combat unilaterally due to the 
vastness of oceans as well as their unconventional and cross border nature.  Some of 
these threats include piracy; arms, drug and human trafficking, illicit fishing; and other 
threats as discussed in chapter three (Kempf, 2000:2).  Mills (1997:50) uses the 
Southern African-Brazilian-Nigerian drug traffic nexus to illustrate the need for regional 
cooperation.  He also mentions that reports suggests that Nigerian nationals were 
responsible for more than half of the 1997 seized cocaine in South Africa (Mills, 
1997:50).  Although other modes of transportation are used by drug trafficking 
syndicates, the sea is mostly utilised due to its affordability and difficulty in policing.  
Combating threats and working together enhances navies’ interoperability, which is a 
necessity in the formation of alliances.   
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Navies, in time of peace and crisis, are expected to deploy with their allies.  Without 
efficient and effective naval cooperation such deployments will not yield any positive 
outcomes.  The SAN has partnered with both international and regional navies in order 
to improve interoperability.  Such initiatives include exchange training programmes and 
conducting naval exercises (to be dealt with later).  Navies are instrumental in building 
and improving institutions of maritime significance in the world.  Without naval 
cooperation, it can be argued that the SAN cannot be effective in building and 
strengthening institutions.  Taking this assertion into cognisance, a question may be 
posed: what is the role of the SAN in international, continental and regional naval 
cooperation?  This chapter attempts to answer this question as discussed in the 
following sections.   
4.3 INTERNATIONAL NAVAL COOPERATION 
In terms of strategic location, South Africa is part of the coastal region of the South 
Atlantic and South Indian Oceans (Simpson-Anderson, 1994:1).  The reacceptance of 
country into the international system of states  
Open(ed) up exciting prospects for trade in the Indian Ocean Rim… A 
similar prospect for trade exists with the establishment of a South 
Atlantic Rim which would encompass Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay on 
the western side of the rim, with the littoral states on the western 
seaboard of Africa as the eastern side (Simpson-Anderson, 1994:2).  
 
It is imperative to comprehend that naval cooperation is an extension of the 
government’s cooperation, and the SAN does not cooperate with any navy outside the 
scope of political authority (Simpson-Anderson, 1994:2).  This emanates from the fact 
that navies are instruments of their states’ foreign policies (Mahan, 1899:463).  The 
SAN is a regular participant in some of the world’s most significant platforms for 
international naval cooperation such as the International Seapower Symposium (ISS), 
the newly formed Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), and other forums. 
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4.3.1 International Seapower Symposium 
The US Navy instituted the biennial ISS at its Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, 
Rhodes Island in 1969.  During ISS-17, held over the period 19 to 23 September 2005, 
Vice-Admiral Mudimu participated in the South Africa/West Africa Seminar Working 
Group.  He reported that during the Sea Power for Africa Symposium (SPAS) held in 
Cape Town, South Africa, over the period 29 to 31 August 2005, it transpired that 
Africa faced numerous maritime challenges.  He then articulated that these challenges 
require maritime cooperation and coordination amongst navies.  It was also reiterated 
that African states, within their regional groupings, are responsible for building regional 
maritime organisations based on the SADC model of the Standing Maritime Committee 
(SMC) (to discussed later) (Mudimu, 2006:160). 
During ISS-18 in 2007 Rear-Admiral Higgs, then FOF, reiterated that cooperation is the 
pathway towards solving problems faced by states.  He also stressed that IONS, SPAS, 
the Australian Sea Power Symposium, the Colombia-Caribbean Conference, the North 
Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, to name but few, are significant initiatives which breed 
greater collaboration and cooperation among navies (Higgs, 2009:182).   
During ISS-19 in 2009, Rear-Admiral Teuteberg, Chief Director Maritime Strategy of 
the SAN, made a presentation titled Bridging Regional Maritime Domain Awareness 
Initiatives in Support of Partnership Panel Discussion.  He focused on Maritime 
Domain Awareness, stressing that Africa follows a regional approach to identify threats, 
such as piracy and illicit looting of maritime resources in the EEZ, to enable appropriate 
response to these threats (Teuteberg, 2010:1).  The 20
th
 symposium, ISS-20, was held 
between 18 and 21 October 2011 with a specific focus on Security and Prosperity 
through Maritime Partnerships (United States Naval War College, 2011:Online).  Up to 
date (2012) 20 symposiums have been held and the SAN has been part of the 
proceedings, and is one of the most active participants in IONS. 
4.3.2 Indian Ocean Naval Symposium 
The Indian led initiative, IONS, was established in February 2008, in New Delhi, by 
more than 26 littoral states in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).  The primary aim of 
IONS is to “attain mutually beneficial outcomes within the Indian Ocean” (Indian 
Ocean Naval Symposium, 2011:1).  In addition, it seeks cooperation at the level of 
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Naval Chiefs of IOR states to ensure maritime security (Indian Navy, nd: Online).  
Australia, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, France, Indonesia, 
India, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Madagascar, Myanmar, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Maldives, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen are 
part of IONS (Indian Navy, 2010:1).  All African states located on the eastern seaboard 
from Egypt to South Africa are members of IONS. The exception is Somalia which is 
the main source of maritime insecurity off the Horn of Africa (Van Rooyen, 2011:22)   
The objectives of IONS include the promotion of shared understanding of maritime 
security concerns in the region; strengthening the capacity of IOR states to deal with 
maritime insecurity; instituting and advancing maritime consultative and cooperative 
apparatus; and developing interoperability regarding doctrines, strategies, procedures, 
operational processes of navies in order to achieve swift, responsive and effectual 
assistance during crises in the IOR (Indian Navy, nd:1; Indian Ocean Naval 
Symposium, 2011:2).  Since its inception, IONS held various conferences and a series 
of seminars.  The first conference, IONS-2008 with a theme Contemporary Trans-
national Challenges – International Maritime Connectivities was held in India during 
its tenure as the leadership of IONS.  The second conference with a theme Together for 
the Reinforcement of Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean was held in Abu Dhabi, 
UAE, from 10 to 12 May 2010 (Indian Navy, 2010:2).   
Between 2008 and 2010 IONS held other activities namely; two essay competitions, 
coordinated by the Indian Navy and the SAN in 2008 and 2009 respectively, as well as 
a technical seminar coordinated by the Sri Lanka Navy in May 2009 and a preparatory 
workshop coordinated by the Kenyan Navy in October 2010 (Indian Navy, 2010:2).  
More importantly, South Africa has taken up leadership of IONS for the period 2012 to 
2014.  Subsequently, IONS-2012, with a theme Regional Maritime Security Initiative 
Aimed at Reducing Modern Maritime Threats was hosted in South Africa, at the Cape 
Town International Convention Centre, from 10 to 14 April 2012 (Indian Ocean Naval 
Symposium, 2012b).  Vice-Admiral Mudimu, during his opening remarks elucidated the 
need to combat piracy and other maritime security threats (Mudimu, 2012).  IONS-2012 
provided the SAN with a vital opportunity to strengthen its international naval 
cooperation efforts.  The conference was attended by delegates from different state’s 
departments in South Africa and IONS Chiefs of navies or their representatives.  
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Although President Zuma did not deliver the opening key address as initially planned 
(Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, 2012a:1), Minister Sisulu delivered the key note 
address.  She reiterated that political support is a necessity in dealing with maritime 
security threats, which are broader than piracy.  Additionally, Minister Sisulu pledged 
political support for the SAN in dealing with maritime challenges (Sisulu, 2012).     
The outgoing chair, Staff Naval Brigadier I.S.M. Al Musharakh, commander of the 
UAE Navy, informed the delegates that the IONS Charter of Business has been 
completed.  He emphasised the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean and the major 
role of IONS in maritime cooperation (Al Musharakh, 2012). It became apparent that 
reliable dialogue and maritime cooperation are required during a speech by Vice-
Admiral Mudimu.  He also stressed the need for a comprehensive Maritime Security 
Strategy for Africa (Mudimu, 2012).  From the first day of the conference to the last, 
piracy dominated discussions.  During his presentation, Rear-Admiral H. Chan of the 
Singapore Navy and Commander of Task Force 151 in the Gulf of Aden, emphasised 
that piracy can only be resolved by solving the situation on land (Chan, 2012).  It was 
clear that the political support is instrumental in resolving piracy and other issues.  
Other speakers at the conference such as Professors T. Potgieter and J. Gibson from 
South Africa concurred that the political situation on land is important for maritime 
security at sea (Potgieter, 2012c; Gibson, 2012).  While the navies fight piracy at sea, 
political leaders should resolve political pandemonium on land.  Failure to do so with 
result in the escalation of maritime insecurity, as discussed in chapter three. 
During the discourse it became apparent that there are tensions amongst the members of 
IONS.  These tensions seem to be an extension of political tensions of the different 
member states.  The tensions manifested in the form of comments and questions when 
the audience was given a platform.  It is clear that some of IONS members do not trust 
each other.  For instance, it was clear that there were tensions between members from 
India and Pakistan.  Perhaps the reasons for the tensions include the Indo-Pakistani wars 
and conflicts, as well as the allegations that Pakistan provided safe havens for terrorists 
involved in the Mumbai bombings of 2008 (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, 2012b).  
Failure to address the tensions may reduce IONS to nothing but an unproductive 
platform, culminating in naval cooperation and maritime security in the IOR being 
jeopardised.  In order to address some of the tensions, members should continue 
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cooperating with one another, using platforms such as staff talks, attending naval 
reviews as well as conducting goodwill visits.   
4.3.3 International and Presidential Fleet Reviews 
After South Africa’s reacceptance into the international community of states, the SAN 
became instrumental in representing the country in International Fleet Reviews (IFR).  
At the 50
th
 Anniversary of the Battle of the Atlantic in 1993, SAS Drakensberg 
represented South Africa during the IFR (Navy News, 1995a:21; Wessels, 1997:94).  
This was followed by several other reviews.  For instance, SAS Drakensberg, with 26 
other warships, participated in the IFR commemorating the 224
th
 Anniversary of the 
independence of the USA in 2000 (Bennett, 2011:95).   
The following year on 17 February 2001, SAS Drakensberg participated in the IFR held 
in Mumbai to commemorate the Golden Jubilee of the Republic of India (Bennett, 
2011:22; Coetzee, 2001:14; Gounden, 2001:22).  South African warships were also 
invited to the IFR in Sydney, Australia in 2001.  Regrettably, the IFR was cancelled due 
to the attacks on 11 September 2001 in the USA (Wessels, 2010:121).  Between 1994 
and mid 2000s, with the exception of SAS Drakensberg, SAS Outeniqua and the SAS 
Protea, the SAN lacked vessels capable for long deployments performing goodwill 
visits and naval exercises.  The situation changed with the arrival of frigates as 
discussed in chapter three.   
In Africa, the most memorable IFR in which the SAN participated was in early June 
2006 in Lagos, celebrating the 50
th
 Anniversary of the Nigerian Navy (Bennett, 
2011:78).  It was for the first time that one of the new frigates, SAS Amatola, deployed 
to an African port for an IFR.  The same month in 2006, SAS Drakensberg with Vice-
Admiral Mudimu onboard represented South Africa during the Trafalgar Day 
Bicentennial IFR in Portsmouth, UK (Bennett, 2011:88).   
Apart from participating in IFR, the SAN also hosted a few PFRs since its genesis.  The 
first ever PFR was hosted on 3 February 1988, honouring President P.W. Botha.  The 
PFR coincided with the 500
th
 centennial celebrations of Bortolomeu Dias docking at 
Mossel Bay (Bennett, 2011:16). In April 1997, few years following the dawn of 
democracy, the SAN hosted its second PFR.  This review, however, was the first in the 
post-1994 period and was omnipotent for three reasons.  Firstly, it marked the 75
th
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Anniversary of the SAN since its inception in 1951.  Secondly, it celebrated South 
Africa’s return to the international community.  Lastly, it honoured Nelson Mandela as 
the first democratically elected president of South Africa and the Commander in Chief 
of the SANDF (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:53).  Onboard the SAS Protea Mandela 
reiterated that other navies and naval personnel were envoys of peace and were always 
welcomed in South African waters (Werkman, 1999c:13). 
A total of 36 states were represented by their high-ranking representatives, warships and 
auxiliaries making the PFR a great success (Greyling, 1997:4).  Argentina, Brazil, 
France, Kenya, Malaysia, Russian Federation, Singapore, Britain, Uruguay, the USA 
and the People’s Republic of China, were among the represented states (Greyling, 
1997:18-19).  There were 36 ships and one submarine from 14 navies of countries in 
Europe, North and South America, Africa and Asia participating in the PFR in Table 
Bay (Söderlund, 2008:8).  According to Bennett and Söderlund (2008:53), the review 
reflected a truly international gathering.  Participating ships and aircraft included ARA 
Parker and ARA Rosales from Argentina; Constituicao, Almirante and Inhauma from 
Brazil; Garonne and  La Rieuse from France; INS Tir from India; KNS Nyayo and KNS 
Umoja from Kenya; KD Hang Tuah from Malaysia; SAS Drakensberg, SAS 
Outeniqua, SAS Protea, SAS Adam Kok, SAS Rene Sethren and others.   
The success of the 1997 PFR symbolised that the reacceptance of the country into the 
international community has not only opened doors for the SAN, but for the country as 
well.  The 1997 PFR was followed by another successful PFR in 2008 exhibiting the 
new state-of-the-art platforms of the SAN, namely frigates and submarines (see chapter 
three).  It also illustrated that South Africa was geared to extract Africa from the malaise 
of underdevelopment to the realisation of the African Renaissance.  Thabo Mbeki, the 
Commander-in- Chief of the SANDF from 16 June 1999 to 24 September 2008, utilised 
SAS Protea as his flag ship.  During his address, Mbeki reiterated that he witnessed “a 
Fleet which comprises some of the very best technology in the world, and whose crews 
are some of the finest among South Africa’s young men and women” (Mbeki, 2008:28).  
The technological advantages of the newly acquired platforms and skills of the 
personnel enable the SAN to cooperate with other navies.     
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4.3.4 Cooperation with Non-African Navies  
The SAN has long standing relations with navies of states such as the USA, Germany, 
India and Australia, to name but a few.  It has signed the Memoranda of Defence 
Cooperation with the Indian Navy in 1999 and 2000 which enabled training SAN 
combat officers to operate SAS Manthatisi, SAS Charlotte Maxeke and SAS Queen 
Modjadji I (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:53).  Eleven combat officers successfully 
completed the Submarine Basic Course at INS Satavahana in October 2005.  This 
illustrated a new chapter in the domain of bilateral naval cooperation between South 
Africa and India, as well as between SAN and other navies (Navy News, 2006a:13).  
In 2006, the SAN participated in the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Conference 
attended by 1200 delegates from 32 states.  The theme of the conference was 
Challenges Old and New.  This was a broad theme focusing on maritime challenges in 
the 21
st
 century (Navy News, 2006b:16).  Some of these challenges included dealing 
with maritime threats facing merchant shipping.  It is the cooperation with other navies 
that assist and prepare the SAN to effectively engage in continental and regional naval 
cooperation.    
4.4 CONTINENTAL AND REGIONAL NAVAL COOPERATION 
The African continent is surrounded by oceans with more than 25 states having the sea 
as their border.  The sea is very important in terms of providing SLOCs and maritime 
resources; yet, Africa lacks vibrant navies, except South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria, to 
effectively ensure maritime security.  Despite the lack of vibrant navies in the continent, 
maritime security may be achieved through continental and regional cooperation.  As 
Potgieter articulates: “Much can be gained from a cooperative regional approach 
between states that emphasize and promote consultation not confrontation, reassurance 
not deterrence, transparency not secrecy, prevention not correction, and interdependence 
not unilateralism” (Potgieter, 2011:50).   
Since 1994, evidently in foreign policy goals as outlined in chapter two, South African 
decision makers have conceded that cooperation is the only path towards the 
development of the continent.  For Africa to develop, the eradication of threats and the 
achievement of security, including maritime security, is a necessity.  Subsequently, 
continental and regional naval cooperation are the only options towards maritime 
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security.  With this epiphany, African naval chiefs have instituted platforms for naval 
cooperation such as the SPAS, bilateral and multilateral cooperation and other 
initiatives within the region.   
4.4.1 Sea Power for Africa Symposium 
Having its genesis from the US Navy ISS, SPAS may be regarded as the most 
comprehensive continental platform for naval cooperation.  The chiefs of the navies of 
South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya proposed a continental version of the ISS after 
ISS-16 in 2003 (Wiedemann, 2009:4). The SAN inaugurated the symposium by hosting 
the 1
st
 SPAS in August 2005 (Stone, 2009a:12; Van Rooyen, 2011:23).  Heitman 
(2005b:16) states that several naval persons will question the heading of Sea Power for 
Africa by petitioning ‘what sea power?’ This petition may seem relevant because a 
paradox exists between the name and Africa’s realities in terms of sea power.  Sub-
Saharan Africa has a coastline of about 18180 km, and most states depend on the sea for 
trade and resources such as diamonds, fish, gas, offshore oil, to name but few; yet these 
states lack the capacity to protect SLOCs and resources (Heitman, 2005b:16-17).  With 
the exception of Egypt, and Nigeria to some extent, only South Africa, as previously 
articulated, has a vibrant navy.  Subsequently, naval cooperation in the form of sea 
power conferences is a necessity.   
During the inauguration of SPAS, Ronnie Kasrils, then Minister of Intelligence 
Services, delivered the opening address.  After thanking the dignitaries for their 
attendance, Kasrils reiterated that maritime and naval power is pertinent in the current 
international system than any other time in history.  He stressed that Africa heavily 
depends on seaborne trade and the oceans are great sources of resources for the 
development of the continent in order to realise the African Renaissance (Ministry of 
Intelligence Services, 2005:1).  The main themes of the 1
st
 SPAS were; the importance 
of the sea to Africa, African cooperation, African hydrographic challenges, and policing 
maritime interests.  Professor R. Christie from the University of the Western Cape 
focused on the issue of oil that flows from the Gulf, around Africa into the USA.  He 
stressed that African navies needed to expand and adapt their strategies to sea change in 
demand and supply of oil.  Rear-Admiral H. Mameesh, Egyptian Chief of Naval Staff, 
focused on African maritime choke points, emphasising naval cooperation to secure 
choke points.  Rear-Admiral (Junior Grade) B. Teutenberg, the SAN Director Maritime 
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Plans, focused on cooperation in the field of maritime training.  Commodore O. 
Ibrahim, Nigerian Navy Secretary, focused on piracy and maritime crime.  He further 
argued for the establishment of sub-regional maritime crime reporting centres (Heitman, 
2005b:16-18).   
Nigeria hosted the 2
nd
 SPAS in May 2006 (Van Rooyen, 2011:23).  It should be noted 
that financial constrains and other challenges facing the continent are hindrances to the 
success of SPAS.  Owing to financial constraints, the 3
rd
 SPAS only occurred in 2009 
from 9 to 11 March at the Cape Town International Convention Centre hosted by the 
SAN (Bennett, 2011:32; Van Rooyen, 2011:23).  There were 31 states represented 
including India and Brazil, making it a necessity to translate English into French and 
Portuguese due to the presence of Francophone and Lusophone countries.  A total of 
eight papers were delivered focusing on the establishment of a collective approach to 
collaboration and cooperation to eradicate the maritime challenges facing Africa (Stone, 
2009a:12).  It was emphasised that landlocked African states also need to contribute 
financial resources in order to secure harbours and SLOCs.  It is cogent for landlocked 
states to contribute because their trade depend on the sea (Wiedemann, 2009:4).   
It was evident during this symposium that African navies participating have increased 
since its inauguration in 2005. After all papers were presented, a feedback on Maritime 
Progress in Respective Areas of Interest was disseminated.  Admiral M. Fitzgerald of 
the US Navy stated that the SAN has the capability to lead the fight against piracy and 
other illegal activities off the African coast.  The SAN, through Rear-Admiral R. Higgs, 
concurred that it has the capability; but the ultimate decision on anti-piracy lies with the 
political decision makers as mentioned in chapter three.  Dr. P. Wambua from Kenya 
emphasised the need for regional cooperation in order to eradicate piracy.  He reiterated 
that the lack of instability in the region, particularly the Horn of Africa, creates breeding 
grounds for piracy and other illegal activities.  Based on number of delegates and issues 
deliberated, it is safe to state that the 3
rd
 SPAS was successful (Stone, 2009a:13).   
Libya offered to host the 4
th
 SPAS in 2011 but the civil war prevented the country from 
hosting the event.  The failure of Libya to host the 4
th
 SPAS led to members identifying 
Ghana and Senegal as possible hosts at the end of 2011 (Standing Maritime Committee, 
2011:10). Senegal was chosen as the host of 4
th
 SPAS at the end of 2012.  The 
conference, however, failed to manifest due to resources.  The failure of SPAS from 
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occurring consistently as per agreement is a major drawback for African navies dealing 
with various challenges.  Instead of progressing, SPAS seems to be regressing.  The 
conferences are not occurring biennially as initially planned, and it seems the SAN is 
the only navy spearheading SPAS.  It has already hosted SPAS in 2005 and 2009.  
Other African states, except Nigeria, are yet to host SPAS.  This begs the question: 
should the SAN continue spearheading SPAS or should it concentrate mainly in SADC?  
It is very difficult to find the answer.  What is apparent, however, is the fact that the 
SAN has other bilateral and multilateral cooperation with other African navies as 
discussed in the next section.   
4.4.2 Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation with African Navies 
Bilateral and multilateral cooperation with African navies is important for African 
maritime security.  Without South African involvement, most African states lack naval 
power to ensure the safety of their waters as illustrated by the recent deployments under 
Operation COPPER, discussed in chapter three.  The SAN has assisted various navies. 
Since 1994, the relationship between the SAN and the Marine Unit of the Malawian 
Defence Force has evolved.  Vice-Admiral Mudimu visited Malawi in 2006 to establish 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two countries’ navies (Van 
Rooyen & Ngwenya, 2006:11).   
The same year Rear-Admiral M. Magalefa led the SAN delegation to Ghana to 
participate in the workshop on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea 
(GoG), hosted by the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana, from 
19 to 22 March 2006.  The purpose of the workshop was to identify maritime security 
challenges at the GoG and strategise on the solutions to those challenges to be tabled at 
the GoG ministerial conference in 2007.  Participants included government officials and 
naval representatives from almost 20 African and European states (Navy News, 
2006c:17).  The maritime security challenges are rife in Africa and need urgent attention 
by regional bodies such as SADC.   
4.4.3 Southern African Development Community Standing Maritime Committee 
Following the country’s transition, South Africa became a member of SADC.  As an 
effort to promote peace and security in the region, SADC created the Organ on Politics, 
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Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) in 2001, which has various sub-
committees including the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) with the 
membership composed of Ministers of Defence, Public Security and State Security of 
SADC states (Department of Defence, 2003b:1).  The Defence Sub-committee within 
the ISDSC has various work groups and standing committees such as the SMC 
established in 1995 in Gaborone, Botswana (Uys, 1995:2).     
The SADC SMC’s vision is to promote peace and prosperity in the region through 
maritime military cooperation (Southern African Development Community, 2002:1; 
Department of Defence, 2003b:1).  Vice-Admiral Simpson-Anderson was elected the 
first chair of SMC (Heitman, 1995b:40).  He once reiterated that the SAN does not wish 
to be big brother for Africa; but seek to cooperate with other navies in the SMC and 
other initiatives (Heitman, 1995b:40).  The objectives of the SMC include the provision 
of mutual maritime security to ensure the freedom of seas, developing and maintaining 
maritime capability in SADC as well as developing maritime capability to ensure rapid 
reaction to maritime contingencies (Navy News, 1996b:19; Southern African 
Development Community, 2002:1).   
The functions of the SMC are; to promulgate common doctrine and standard procedures 
for the conduct of combined maritime exercises and operations; to support regional 
strategic maritime military planning; to facilitate training, mutual logistic support and 
utilisation of facilities; to coordinate maritime military activities in the functional areas 
as identified; to coordinate the exchange of maritime military expertise, information and 
technology; and to ensure the rights, privileges and obligations of land-locked and 
transit states in accordance with United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) (Southern African Development Community, 2002:1).   
According to Captain (SAN) P.J. Eldon, the SAN is the major role player in terms of 
regional naval cooperation within SADC, and the SMC in particular (Eldon, 2012).  
This sentiment is shared by other senior officers in the SAN such Captain (SAN) L. 
Fourie, the secretary for the SMC (Fourie, 2012).  The SAN has extended naval and 
maritime cooperation since the 1994 democratisation, by initiating naval chief’s 
conferences attended by the DRC, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Kenya.  It is 
vigorously involved in the SMC (Uys, 1995:2).  Between 2002 and 2003, as part of the 
SMC, the SAN trained personnel from Angola, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
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Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Swaziland and Tanzania (Department of Defence, 
2003a:94).  In 2004, seven Namibian students participated in the Military Training for 
Officers Part 1 in the South African Naval College in Gordon’s Bay (Department of 
Defence, 2005:109).  Some of the seven students also completed their Combat Officer 
Qualifying certificates in Simon’s Town.  In addition, the SAS Protea completed 
surveys between 2004 and 2006 as part of the obligations emanating from the SMC 
(Department of Defence, 2003a:94).   
In 2005, a week following the inauguration of the SPAS, members of the SADC SMC 
converged in Simon’s Town. The aim of the meeting was to deliberate on issues 
pertaining to maritime protocol and mutual cooperation.  Countries represented included 
Angola, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.  Botswana and Mauritius were unable to attend.  
Areas for discussing included the roles of navies in law enforcement at sea; expanding 
the naval hydrographic roles and encouraging other SADC littoral states to join by 
applying for membership in the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO); Naval 
Co-ordination and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) cooperation; incorporating 
landlocked states in SADC SMC exercises; contributions to the Maritime Component of 
the SADC Brigade (SADCBRIG) of the ASF officially launched 17 August 2007 in 
Zambia’s capital, Lusaka, which was later renamed SADC ASF; establishing SADC 
Centre of Excellence for Naval Training; and establishing a single SMC Database for 
Force Support and Search and Rescue (Heitman, 2005b:19).   
Since its inception, the SMC hosts regular conferences and meetings.  It held a 
conference themed Emerging Maritime Concepts in June 2007 in Simon’s Town 
(Mudimu, 2007:1).  The conference focused on four areas, namely; the establishment 
the Centre of Excellence for maritime training in South Africa; NCAGS regional 
cooperation; SADC ASF Maritime Component; and the need for sea lift capability for 
peace missions and other operations.  The latter featured prominently in the discussion 
beginning with Minister Lekota stating that a sound sea lift capability is a necessity.  
Heitman’s paper argued for LHD vessels rather than the rigid Landing Platform Dock 
(Heitman, 2007a:20).  The French and Spanish delegates provided details of their newly 
commissioned Mistral LHDs, which visited South Africa (Heitman, 2007b:1).  It 
became clear in this conference that Africa is in dire need for LHDs.  It is for this reason 
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that the SAN is strongly pursuing Project Millennium (see chapter three).  Whether this 
pursuit will bear fruits in the near future remains uncertain.   
In 2011, the 11
th
 meeting of the SMC was held in Namibia.  The deliberations included 
reporting on different exercises and planned future exercises such as Exercise 
CUTLASS to test the Maritime Co-ordination Centres of Tanzania, Kenya and 
Seychelles with regard to fighting piracy.  Other exercises included those at Lake 
Malawi between Mozambique, Tanzania and Malawi.  Other issues included 
deliberations on the SADC ASF Maritime Component (Department of Defence, 
2008a:89).  It is in this area in which the SAN is potentially the leading contributor 
given the fact that other SADC navies are regrettably very small and most depend on 
South Africa for assistance in the maritime domain, especially the provision of maritime 
security by naval deterrence and compellence (see chapter three).  The SAN has vowed 
to contribute five HPBs, a support vessel, a RFD platoon and an ODT from the MRS 
(Yekelo, 2007:1).   
During the 11
th
 meeting South Africa was tasked to host the training element of 
Exercise FAIRWAY BUOY, a NCAGS exercise envisioned to be hosted by Angola in 
2012 as part of regional naval cooperation (Standing Maritime Committee, 2011:1-7).  
The leadership role of the SAN in the SMC is important for SADC’s maritime security.  
Members of SADC are regularly assisted by South Africa.  For instance, the recent 
pirates’ activities in Southern African waters have resulted in members from SADC 
requesting South Africa to intervene.  Accordingly, the SAN has been involved in anti-
piracy operations as discussed in chapter three.  Thus, South Africa is a major partner in 
dealing with piracy.   
4.4.4 Dealing with Piracy: Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding on 
Maritime Security Cooperation 
Piracy has been a problem facing the world for many years.  Recently the coast along 
the Horn of Africa has been one of the areas gravely affected by piracy.  Yet African 
states seemed to lack a political will to devise strategies and resources to deal with 
piracy.  But what is piracy?  Piracy and armed robbery are defined by the International 
Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) as “an act of 
boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any 
other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of 
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that act” (International Maritime Bureau, 2008:3). The United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines piracy in terms of the unlawful acts stipulated in 
article 101 of 1982, which includes violence or detention directed towards a ship, crew, 
aircraft or property at sea  (Gibson, 2009:67; Hough & Kruys, 2009:85-6; United 
Nations, 1982:60-1).  Over the past two decades, piracy became blatant and more 
vicious with the utilisation of handheld military hardware such as AK-47s and rocket-
launch grenades (Murphy, 2011a:2; Murphy, 2011b:18).  McNicholas (2008:162-7) 
highlights recent cases from the hijackings of Hawk and Falcon, America Transport 
Barges, to the attack of the UAE freighter IBN Younos off the coast of Somalia en route 
from South Africa to Dubai.  Following these and other similar incidents, piracy became 
an issue of international concern.  In actual fact, African waters are some of the world’s 
dangerous waters in terms of piracy (Dillon, 2005:158; Onuoha, 2009:31; Swart, 
2009:47).  Off the African coast, Potgieter (2008a:5) states that piracy is a serious 
concern which needs immediate attention. 
Evidently, during various meetings and conferences such as the 3
rd
 SPAS in 2009, 
piracy topped the agenda and the SAN and its African counterparts have appreciated 
that piracy need to be eradicated (Engelbrecht, 2009a:Online; Tlhaole, 2009:14).  These 
sentiments correspond with those of analysts such as Heitman (1995b:40) who stated 
that the expanding role of South Africa, as a regional power in quest for international 
peace and security, would likely extend the role of the SAN to anti-piracy operations to 
enhance maritime security in Southern Africa.  However, it seemed that the political 
will on the part of African decision-makers was lacking with regard to conducting anti-
piracy operations.  Kruger (2010:8) argues that there has been an increasing pressure on 
South Africa to join anti-piracy operations off the east African coast.  In addition the 
European Union has requested the country to joint the task force on anti-piracy.   
The reasons for this reluctance then remained open-ended.  It can be postulated that it is 
perhaps due to lack of resources as most African states have relatively small, regrettably 
insignificant navies, which rely on South Africa for assistance in the maritime domain 
(Onuoha, 2009:32).  These are sentiments amongst Flag Officers and other high ranking 
officers from different navies around the world as reflected during IONS 2012 (Indian 
Ocean Naval Symposium, 2012b).  They believe that the SAN is powerful and can play 
a leading role in combating piracy, because it has modern equipped frigates and the 
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MRS which can be adapted to anti-piracy operations (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, 
2012b; Kruger, 2010:8).    
However, dealing with piracy and other maritime challenges require political will and 
resources (Ibrahim, 2009:127; Ncube & Baker, 2011:67).  For few years following the 
upsurge of piracy off the Horn of Africa, South Africa made no commitments to anti-
piracy operations.  The SAN declared its readiness to embark on anti-piracy operations; 
however, only the president and Parliament could make the final decision.  By 
implications no political will at that moment emanated from the government to 
authorise naval deployments to deal with piracy off the Horn of Africa or anywhere 
else.  In addition to the lack of political will, it can be argued that it was impractical 
given the available naval resources to deploy the SAN off the Horn of Africa.  
Nonetheless, the SAN declared its readiness to deploy whenever needed and has always 
sent its members on special courses and missions to acquire more knowledge on piracy.   
In 2010, for instance, the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia offered 
the SAN an opportunity to deploy officers as observers to some of their operations 
(Mons, 2010:30).  Consequently, Lieutenant Commander M. Morgan (Operations 
officer onboard SAS Mendi) and Lieutenant (SAN) S.M. Matabane (then Second in 
charge of the OBD, and now RFD commander at the MRS) from the SAN and 
Lieutenant M.P. Mosoeunyane from Special Forces were attached as observers to 
HNLMS Johan de Witt- a Dutch Landing Platform Dock.  Their deployment 
commenced on 28 May to 29 July 2010 and provided them with invaluable experience 
and information in the planning and execution of anti-piracy operations (Matabane, 
2012; Mons, 2010:30).  The three officers observed the planning and execution of anti-
piracy operations, which were later instrumental in Operation COPPER as discussed in 
chapter three.   
In January 2011, two cases of piracy off the Southern African coastline were confirmed.  
The first was a Taiwanese finishing trawler that went missing on 25 December 2010 
northeast of Madagascar and the second was a Mozambican fishing trawler that was 
reported missing between Mozambique and Madagascar.  The latter was spotted towed 
by pirates towards the Comoros.  In addition, there were confirmed cases of attempted 
piracy on ships in the vicinity of Beira port in Mozambique in December 2010. One of 
the reasons for piracy in Southern African waters includes the geography of the 
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coastline.  The Mozambique Channel is attractive to pirates because it forms a natural 
corridor separating Mozambique and Madagascar and reduces the manoeuvrability of 
vessels making them vulnerable to attacks.  The maritime traffic in the area is also 
dominated by unarmed vessels and is an alternative route for cargo and other 
commercial vessels avoiding the route near the Horn of Africa (Coetzee, 2011:Online).  
The lack, at that time, of anti-piracy patrol forces also made the area more attractive to 
pirates because countries in the region, with the exception of South Africa, lack naval 
assets to patrol the waters.   
The Horn of Africa, in contrast, is patrolled by naval deterrence forces from states such 
as Canada, Denmark, France, India, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, the UK and the 
USA since 2008.  The European Union commissioned Operation ATALANTA, a naval 
operation to deter piracy and related activities off the coast of Somalia, in December 
2008 (Rao, 2010:131; European Security & Defence Policy, 2009:Online).  Other 
operations include those conducted by the USA Combined Task Force 151, NATO’s 
Operation OCEAN SHIELD and other navies (Congressional Research Service, 2011).    
Since 2011, the situation with regard to political will has significantly changed in 
Southern Africa.  The first step in the right direction was the signing of the MoU on 
Piracy and Cross-Border Crime in Pretoria in June 2011 between South Africa and 
Mozambique, aimed at increasing cooperation on maritime security in the Indian Ocean, 
particularly the Mozambique Channel; and joint training exercises, information sharing, 
intelligence, joint patrols and military assistance between the two countries which are 
very important in Southern Africa (Department of Defence, 2011:1).  During the SADC 
defence meeting aimed at developing an anti-piracy strategy in July 2011, Minister 
Sisulu admitted that piracy was becoming a major concern for Southern Africa.  She 
added that military strategists were devising options to deal with piracy (Mail & 
Guardian, 2011: Online).  
Witnessing the propensity that piracy seemed to be moving towards Southern Africa, 
Parliament, after formal requests from Mozambique and Tanzania, approved naval 
patrols along the Mozambique Channel and off the coast of Tanzania to deter piracy.  
South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania have also entered into a MoU on Maritime 
Security Cooperation in February 2012, which strengthens anti-piracy efforts carried 
out under Operation COPPER as discussed in chapter three.  The aim of the MoU is to 
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eliminate piracy and ensure security and safety off east African coast from Tanzania, 
Mozambique to South Africa.  At the signing of the MoU, President Jokaya Kikwete of 
Tanzania expressed his appreciation to President Jacob Zuma, and President Armando 
Guebuza of Mozambique for joining hands in fighting piracy in Southern African 
waters (Department of Defence, 2012:Online).   
The MoU illustrates the seriousness of piracy and the political will to fight the 
phenomena.  Whether, anti-piracy operations can be sustained for a longer period and 
ultimately lead to the safety and security in Southern African waters remain to be seen.  
Currently, however, anti-piracy operations are continuing under Operation COPPER 
(discussed in chapter three).  Nonetheless, it is clear that continental and regional 
cooperation efforts such as the SPAS, SADC SMC, bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation to ensure maritime security are bearing fruits.  These efforts have 
culminated in the SAN continuing to organise as well as participate in several naval 
exercises as discussed in the next section.   
4.5 COMBINED NAVAL EXERCISES AS PART OF NAVAL 
COOPERATION 
Within naval diplomacy, naval exercises are part of naval cooperation and fall within 
the domain of benevolent naval presence (Booth, 1977:18). They are also part of what 
Luttwak (1985:80) calls latent suasion in the application of naval force and what Cable 
(1971:63) calls the expressive mode of limited naval force as outlined in chapter.  These 
exercises are aimed at confidence-building, encouraging naval interactions and 
cementing ties as well as creating and gaining influence within a sphere of operations 
(Alily, 2000:59; Booth, 1977:27; Till, 2009:287).  Since 1994, the SAN participated in 
various exercises including ATLASUR, GOOD HOPE, IBSAMAR, GOLFINHO, 
TRANSOCEANIC and BLUE CRANE, as discussed in the following sections.   
4.5.1 Exercise ATLASUR 
ATLASUR is a series of biannual, joint and combined maritime exercises between the 
SAN and the Brazilian, Argentinean and Uruguayan navies.  The objectives of 
ATLASUR are to build and develop interoperability and trust, respect and coordination; 
to improve professionalism and competency among the personnel; to develop and 
enhance tactics, doctrine and procedures, simulated offensive and defensive operations; 
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to exchange observers; to conduct anti-air, surface, sub-surface and asymmetrical 
operations; to test the supportability during operations; and to encourage comradeship 
and understanding (Gounden, 2010:Online).  The four navies held ATLASUR I in 
Argentina in 1993, which laid down the foundation for a combined maritime doctrine 
for the participating navies (Simpson-Anderson, 1994:2).     
Since 1993, the exercises continued with ATLASUR V commencing on 25 March 2002 
in Cape coast waters.  Brazilian participating vessels included BNS Niteroi, BNS Bosio, 
BNS Almiralte Gastao Motta, and BNS Tupi.  Argentinean vessels included ARA 
Robinsin and ARA Spiro, and the Uruguayan vessel was ROU Montevideo.  SAS 
Drakensberg, SAS Isaac Dyobha, SAS Galeshewe, SAS Makhanda, and SAS 
Umzimkulu represented the SAN (Sverdloff, 2002b:17).  In 2006, ATLASUR VI was 
held in South America and SAS Isandlwana represented the SAN (Engledow, 2007:23).  
South Africa hosted ATLASUR VII in 2008 and SAS Queen Modjadji I joined in the 
exercise after her arrival on 20 May 2008 in Simon’s Town (Bennett, 2011:72).  
In 2010 the Argentinean Navy hosted ATLASUR VIII.  Captain (SAN) A. de Wet was 
the SAN Task Force Commander comprising of SAS Drakensberg and SAS Charlotte 
Maxeke.  SAS Charlotte Maxeke managed to sink the ATLASUR fleet during the 
exercise.  This was a great achievement given the fact that it was only for the first time 
one of the new Type 209 submarines participated in the exercise.  Prior to the 
decommissioning of the Daphné Class submarines, only SAS Maria van Riebeeck 
participated in the exercise in 1993 (Söderlund, 2010:18).  This illustrated that the SAN 
is geared ‘to be unchallenged’ and ‘win at sea’ as contained in its vision and mission.  
Minister Sisulu, with Vice-Admiral Mudimu, joined the exercise to sign the MoU 
between Argentina and South Africa.  The MoU further cements relations between the 
two states in areas of Defence Cooperation and Military Development (Söderlund, 
2010:18-21).   
ATLASUR IX was held in the waters of Hout Bay, False Bay and Hermanus from 24 
September to 10 October 2012, prior to the commencement of IBSAMAR III.  The 
major difference between this exercise and the preceding ones is that the public was 
allowed to view some of the demonstrations including medical emergencies and Very 
Important Persons (VIP) rescue operations during the exercise at Hout Bay harbour.  
Participating SANDF elements included SAS Amatola, which just returned from 
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Operation COPPER, SAS Queen Modjadji I, the MRS, Hawks and C-47TP maritime 
surveillance aircraft from SAAF, the Special Forces and SAMHS.  Argentinean 
elements included ARA Spiro, a MEKO Class frigate, while Brazil and Uruguay sent 
BNS Barroso and ROU 1 Uruguay, respectively for their representation (Wingrin, 
2012a:Online). 
4.5.2 Exercise GOOD HOPE 
GOOD HOPE exercises are joint and bi-national naval and air exercises between 
Germany and South Africa which began after 1994 with the first exercise.  The second 
exercise, GOOD HOPE II, held from 20 February to 10 March 2006 by the German and 
South African naval and air forces, was aimed at improving combat readiness of the two 
countries (Bennett, 2011:25).  The interoperability of the navies of the two states 
improved since the inception of GOOD HOPE.  German ships, namely; FSG 
Rheinland-Pfalz, FSG Hamburg, FSG Berlin, and SAS Amatola and SAS Isaac Dyoba 
participated in the exercise with over 1000 sailors and airmen (Du Plessis, 2006:28). 
Exercise GOOD HOPE III was held between 18 February and 18 March 2008 (Herne & 
Grant, 2008:18).  Germany was represented by FGS Westerwald, FSG Hamburg, FSG 
Berlin, and FGS Koln, while SAS Amatola, SAS Spioenkop, SAS Isaac Dyobha, SAS 
Galeshewe, and SAS Umzimkulu and SAAF aircraft were among South African 
representatives (Herne & Grant, 2008:18-19;Wingrin, 2008:Online).  Mini-soccer 
tournament between the SAN and German forces at Glencairn Sports Field followed the 
exercise (Linganiso, 2008:45).   
Between 15 February and 15 March 2010 the two states held GOOD HOPE IV in South 
African waters, the Cape waters in particular.  FGS Brandeburg, FGS Niedersachen, 
FGS Frankfurt am Main, FGS Westerwald as well as aircraft represented Germany.  
SAS Amatola, SAS Spioenkop, SAS Queen Modjadji I, SAS Isaac Dyobha, SAS 
Umzimkulu, SAS Umkomaas, SAS Tern, and SAS Tobie, as well as two Super Lynx 
helicopters, two Hawk fighters, two Pilatus Astra, Cessna Caravan, two maritime patrol 
aircraft, and three Orynx helicopters represented South Africa (Wingrin, 2010:Online).  
The objectives of GOOD HOPE IV were to enhance and maintain defence capabilities 
of the two countries, and to enhance interoperability, mutual trust, respect and 
cooperation between Germany and South Africa.  GOOD HOPE exercises cement 
relations between the two countries.   
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4.5.3 India, Brazil and South Africa Maritime Exercise 
The India, Brazil and South Africa Maritime Exercise (IBSAMAR) initiative is an effort 
directly linked to South African foreign policy initiatives, particularly the South to 
South cooperation.  The three states have entered into an agreement in 2003 to create 
the IBSA dialogue forum.  IBSA aims to promote the South to South dialogue, 
cooperation and common positions on issues of international significance; trade and 
investment in each other’s economies; exchanges of information, technologies and 
skills; and cooperation in other areas including defence.  Since its inception, two 
maritime exercises have been held, namely IBSAMAR I and IBSAMAR II.  IBSAMAR 
I commenced on 7 May 2008 in the waters of False Bay and coincided with the 2008 
IBSA Ministerial Trilateral Commission meeting held in South Africa (Bennett, 
2011:66; Herne, 2008:18).   
All three states’ navies participated in IBSAMAR I with the following objectives, 
namely; improving common understanding and fostering mutual trust, respect and 
cooperation; developing and improving naval tactics, doctrine and procedures for the 
deployment of surface platforms and defence against land platforms; and conducting 
simulated offensive operations against any threats, surface or sub-surface.  The Indian 
Navy was represented by INS Mumbai (destroyer) and INS Karmuk (corvette), with 
Brazil represented by BNS Indepencia and BNS Defensora (frigates) and South Africa 
by two frigates, a support vessel, a strike craft and a minehunter, namely; SAS 
Isandlwana, SAS Amatola, SAS Drakensberg, SAS Galeshewe and SAS Umkomaas 
(Department of Defence, 2010:1; Herne, 2008:18).  The exercise began on 7 May and 
continued for nine days.  Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, hosted a cocktail function at the end of the exercise onboard Isandlwana to 
celebrate a successful completion of the first of its kind naval exercise as part of the 
South to South objective of South Africa’s foreign policy (Herne, 2008:20).     
IBSAMAR II was held from 6 to 27 September 2010 off the South Coast of South 
African waters.  It was the biggest naval exercise of the SAN conducted off the South 
Coast.  Unlike the first exercise, IBSAMAR II was larger and complex (Potgieter, 
2012b:288; Zulu, 2010:23).  India, Brazil and South Africa contributed a total of nine 
surface warships, two submarines, seven helicopters and five aircraft.  Some of the 
vessels participating included INS Adyita, INS Ganga, INS Tabar, INS Mysore from 
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India; BNS Niteroi from Brasil; and SAS Drakensberg, SAS Amatola and SAS 
Spioenkop from South Africa as well as Type 209 submarines from the three states 
(Zulu, 2010:23).  IBSAMAR II commenced in Durban and ended in Cape Town.  It 
created better opportunities for cooperation not only in the official interaction and 
procedures at sea, but also as a platform for practical experience and benchmarking for 
naval officers on the Combat Officer Qualifying Part II course.  Exercises conducted 
include anti-Fast Incoming Attack Craft and MIOPS at sea.  The two exercises focused 
on low level terrorist threat, piracy and smuggling at sea, which are major maritime 
insecurity challenges in African waters (Zulu, 2010:23).  
The planning and command of IBSAMAR rotate amongst the members.  India planned 
the exercise in 2010, while Brazil planned IBSAMAR III occurring in October 2012.  
IBSAMAR III was delayed due to rough seas and only concluded at the end of October 
(Wingrin, 2012b:Online; Zulu, 2010:23).  IBSAMAR exercises are very important and 
illustrate the importance of solidarity amongst the members. Unlike ATLASUR, these 
exercises are held in South African waters due to its geostrategic position.  In this 
regard, South Africa is the viaduct between India and Brazil.      
4.5.4 Exercise GOLFINHO 
Exercise GOLFINHO is a joint and combined multinational exercise held by SADC 
members aimed at testing the readiness of the regional forces in accordance with the AU 
roadmap towards establishing the SADC ASF (Department of Defence, 2009b:1; Stone, 
2009b:16).  GOLFINHO was a three phased exercise. The first phase focusing on 
tactical planning was held in Angola, Luanda in February 2009.  The second phase 
focusing on command post was held in Mozambique, Maputo in April 2009 (Bapela, 
2009:1).  The last phase was held from 1 to 26 September in South Africa, Lohatla, and 
Namibia, Walvis Bay.  Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles were the only SADC 
states not represented in the exercise (Boshoff, 2009:Online; Stone, 2009b:16). 
The SADC ASF Commander was Brigadier General L.R. Smith, based in Lohatla.  
Captain (SAN) S.F. Petersen was appointed the Maritime Task Group Commander 
responsible for the maritime forces of the exercise.  The South African maritime 
contribution included SAS Amatola, SAS Mendi, an OPV, SAS Galeshewe, SAS Queen 
Modjadji I, three riverine patrol boats, two landing craft, ODT and two Police Water 
Wings boats.  Namibia contributed NS Brendan Simbwaye, an IPV.  These elements 
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were supported by a platoon of the SAN MRS, a platoon of Angolan Naval Marines, a 
platoon of Namibian Naval Marines as well as members of the South African 4 Special 
Forces Regiment (Stone, 2009b:17).  The exercise was a success and illustrated that the 
SADC ASF was way ahead of the other regional standby forces.  In addition, it 
illustrated that the SAN is an important part of the SADC ASF maritime component.  
Apart from regional exercises, the SAN also conduct naval exercises with NATO 
forces.   
4.5.5 Naval Exercises with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Maritime 
Group  
The SAN has long standing relations with NATO.  SAS Drakensberg participated in 
Operation UNITAS in 1996 (Jacobson, 1996:13).  After the arrival of the new ships, the 
SAN has conducted an exercise with NATO forces off the Cape Coast.  The USA, 
Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and Germany sent their ships to the 
exercise.  SAS Amatola, SAS Isandlwana, SAS Galeshewe and SAS Mathatisi 
represented South Africa, and their performance was outstanding.  The relationship with 
NATO has afforded the SAN an opportunity to host some of the most significant naval 
gatherings in the world.   
For instance, between 25 and 29 May 2009 the SAN hosted the NATO Submarine 
Escape and Rescue Work Group (SWERWG) conference at the Cape Town 
International Convention Centre.  It was a significant historic moment as the SAN 
hosted this event for the first time.  The SWERWG was initiated as an exclusive NATO 
work group, but is currently open to all submarine operating navies.  Initially, South 
Africa had an observer status but participated in various exercises. More than 20 states 
were represented in the conference (Navy News, 2009a:11).  The fact that the SAN 
hosted the SWERWG conference shows that South Africa is a recognised submarine 
operator in the world.    
4.5.6 Naval Co-ordination And Guidance For Shipping Exercises 
In order to remain at the cutting edge of NCAGS the SAN participates in various 
exercises such as DEEP BLUE, BELL BUOY and TRANSOCEANIC exercises.  BELL 
BUOY exercises are an initiative of the Pacific and Indian Oceans Shipping Working 
Group (PACIOSWG) founded in 2000 and aimed at promoting regional cooperation.  
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These are paper exercises involving Naval Reserve force personnel.  Following South 
Africa’s membership of PACIOSWG, the SAN participated in Exercise BELL BUOY 
05 between April and May in 2005 held in Chilean waters (Von Zeil, 2006a:32).  Two 
officers participated in the exercise.  In 2006, BELL BUOY 06 was hosted by the USA.  
From 20 April to 1 May 2009, the SAN conducted Exercise BELL BUOY.  States 
participating included Australia, Canada, Chile, Britain, the Republic of Korea, the 
USA and South Africa.  The objectives were to exercise the interoperability of multi-
national personnel; evaluate systems in facilitating a computerised plot; integrate 
personnel in a foreign environment; and provide South African stations with 
international exposure and learning opportunities (Stone, 2009e:30).   
Within SADC, Exercise DEEP BLUE is an initiative to assist members in harnessing 
skills and expertise in NCAGS (Eldon, 2012).  It also prepares members to participate 
in TRANSOCEANIC exercises (Von Zeil, 2006a:15).  South Africa also exercises with 
other states from outside Africa in TRANSOCEANIC exercises.  These are NCAGS 
exercises conducted with Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, and the USA, which are the states that signed the Inter-American 
Agreement.  The SAN hosted TRANSOCEANIC IX from 15 to 26 August 1994 in the 
country’s waters.  The exercise provided the country with the opportunity to welcome 
the world into the new South Africa.  Other countries participating included Uruguay, 
Argentina, Chile, Peru and Ecuador (Napier, 1994:18).  In 2006, South Africa 
participated in TRANSOCEANIC XX aimed at testing communications (Von Zeil, 
2006a:32).  Apart from NCAGS exercises, the SAN participates in peacekeeping 
exercises such as BLUE CRANE.   
4.5.7 Exercise BLUE CRANE 
Exercise BLUE CRANE is a brigade level multinational peacekeeping exercise, in line 
with South Africa’s foreign policy priorities, conducted under the auspices of the 
ISDSC of SADC involving the members (Berman & Sams, 2000: 170; De Coning, 
1999:19; Ministries of Foreign Affairs & Defence, 1998:1). The exercise emanates from 
the need to build peace mission capacity within the region.  BLUE CRANE follows 
similar exercises namely BLUE HUNGWE hosted by Zimbabwe in April 1997 and 
BLUE GUIDEMAKHA held in Senegal in 1998 (Cilliers, 1999:47).  BLUE HUNGWE 
was aimed at enhancing “regional African liaison, cooperation, military skills and 
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interoperability by means of a multinational joint field training exercise” (Berman & 
Sams, 2000:169-170) in peace missions.   
South Africa’s plans to conduct its first ever biggest joint exercise with other countries 
in the region in 1998 were postponed due to Operation BOLEAS in Lesotho, when the 
SANDF led an operation amid reports of loaming insurgency emanating from electoral 
disputes.  The operation was viewed by several scholars and governments as an 
unlawful invasion of an independent territorial entity and subsequently tarnished South 
Africa’s image and the much anticipated positive role in conflict resolution and 
management (Barrell, 1998:Online; Neethling, 1999:2-3). Accordingly, BLUE CRANE 
of 1998 was postponed to the following year. 
In 1999, the SA Army Combat Training Centre in Lohatla, Northern Cape hosted BLUE 
CRANE.  It involved more than 4000 defence personnel from Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa.  The maritime dimension of the exercise occurred at the end of April in Durban 
and involved naval embargo and refugee handling at sea (Berman & Sams, 2000:171; 
De Coning, 1999:19).   
Although BLUE CRANE is intended for SADC, other navies outside the region are 
welcome to participate for obvious reason; the SAN is the only vibrant navy in SADC.  
The Indian Navy was represented by INS Sujata and FNS La Boudeuse represented the 
French Navy.  Observers from Britain and India were also present making BLUE 
CRANE a huge success (Werkman, 1999a:10-15).  BLUE CRANE has illustrated that 
within Southern Africa, the SAN is the only vibrant navy capable of providing maritime 
defence for the region.  It is thus the only regional navy with platforms that can engage 
in interoperability exercises such as Exercise SHARED ACCORD with the forces of the 
USA 
4.5.8 Exercise SHARED ACCORD 
SHARED ACCORD Exercises are initiatives of the USA Africa Command (US 
AFRICOM) aimed at assisting African armed forces, including those of landlocked 
states, to deal with current African challenges.  Each year, since its inception, an 
exercise is held with one African country.  The USA and Niger forces held Exercise 
SHARED ACCORD 2006 which was aimed at interoperability between the two forces 
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in March 2006 (McCarthy, 2007:7).  The following year, the USA and Senegalese 
forces held Exercise SHARED ACCORD 2007 which was concluded on 30 June 2007 
(Preston, 2007:1). The USA and Ghanaian forces held Exercise SHARED ACCORD 
2008 aimed at humanitarian relief.  In June 2009, the USA and Beninese forces held 
Exercise SHARED ACCORD 2009 aimed at conducting infantry and staff training.  
The success of the exercise was followed by another one with Mozambique in 2010.  
Exercise SHARED ACCORD 2010 was at Moamba district, in the southern 
Mozambican province of Maputo in August 2010 (Sleiman, 2010:1).   
The following year South Africa participated in Exercise SHARED ACCORD 2011, 
which took place in Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown from 18 July to 12 August 2011 
(Rambau, 2011:8).  Members of the MRS were part of the SAN contingent.  Before the 
commencement of the exercise, members of the MRS conducted combat readiness 
training between 30 May and 13 July 2011 at SAS Saldanha.  The training included 
patrol, navigation, night navigation, section platoon attacks, 10 km route march and 
pyro-techniques firing using live ammunition (Dimba, 2011:Online).   
The aim of SHARED ACCORD 2011 was to provide comprehensive training between 
the armed forces of South Africa and the USA, as well as building interoperability and 
mutual understanding between the two forces (Szabo, 2011:Online).  Rear-Admiral H. 
Teuteberg was the exercise commander.  Elements from the SA Army, SAAF, SAMHS 
and the SAN participated in the exercise.  The Grahamstown based 6 South African 
Infantry Battalion (6 SAI) exercised with a Marine contingent of the USA.  The SAAF 
and SAN conducted exercises at sea along the Southern Coast (Theunissen, 2011:1).  
Members of the MRS were also present; they contributed and benefited from the 
exercise as they interacted with more experienced Marines from the USA.  At the 
closing, the commander of the exercise stated that the exercise was very successful.  
Participating in SHARED ACCORD 2011 illustrate that the SAN has the ability to 
operate with forces of developed states such as the USA.  The SAN also participates in 
other exercises as described in the next section.   
4.5.9 Other Naval Exercises 
The SANDF and the USA forces held an exercise named Exercise RAMPION 
commencing on 28 October to 5 November 1999.  The aim of the exercise was to 
improve cooperation, interoperability and trust between the two forces.  A series of 
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exercises involving maritime movement at sea, cross deck exercises, beach landings, 
human relief and field training were held.  Two ships, USS Carter Hall and SAS 
Drakensberg were involved in the maritime dimension of the exercise by executing the 
transfer of personnel on the high seas (Stone, 1999:20).   
Other exercises include OXIDE with the French.  SAS Drakensberg, SAS Makhanda 
and SAS Galeshewe participated in Exercise Oxide II with the French in November 
2002 (Gounden, 2003a:16).  OXIDE II was a maritime rescue exercise designed to 
provide training, enhance interoperability and cooperation between the South African 
and French forces (Department of Defence, 2003a:91).  Other participating vessels 
included FNS La Grandiere, FNS La Jonquille and St Paul (Gounden, 2003b:16). 
Participation in various exercises, as described in the previous section, involving 
different nations does not only illustrate that South Africa is non-aligned, meaning that 
it is a friend to all and an adversary to none; it also signifies, despite the challenges it 
faces, the interoperability of the SAN.  Based on the exercises conducted, two 
deductions may be made.  Firstly, the SAN supports the country’s foreign policy efforts.  
South Africa has good relations with all the states whose navies exercise with the SAN.  
It seems foreign policy decisions are followed by naval exercises as illustrated by 
IBSAMAR following the country’s signatory into the forum with India and Brazil.  The 
recent addition of the country to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) 
partnership provides opportunities for the SAN.   
Secondly, it is safe to postulate that the SAN can operate with any navy in the world 
ranging from those of developed states such as the USA to African navies.  In 
ATLASUR, the SAN compete with navies of South America, while in GOOD HOPE it 
operates with the German Navy.  In IBSAMAR, the SAN is able to operate with navies 
of India and Brazil, while it led SADC navies in GOLFINHO.  The interoperability of 
navies is facilitated by naval training programmes.  The SAN sends its members to 
training programmes abroad.  It also receives and provides training for other states as 
discussed in the next section.   
4.6 NAVAL TRAINING PROGRAMMES 
The SAN engages in training exchange programmes with other countries in and outside 
the African continent.  In July 1994, South Africa and the USA signed an International 
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Military Education and Training Agreement.  The SAN proactively negotiated with the 
US Navy to secure two places for training at the US NWC.  The agreement resulted in 
Lieutenant Commander D. Thomson becoming the first SAN officer to attend the 
course for his rank group at the US Naval Staff College, attended by officers from 32 
states, from 14 July to 15 December 1994.  Then Commander R. Higgs (currently Rear-
Admiral and Chief of Naval Staff) attended the second course for Commanders at the 
Naval Command College from August 1994 to June 1995 (Navy News, 1995c:7).   
There are also other agreements between the SAN and other navies facilitating 
exchange training programmes.  In 1994, the French Navy’s Training Squadron trained 
Ensign D. Legg together with other 13 foreign officers from Cote d'Ivoire, Morocco, 
Benin, Belgium, Cameroon, Senegal, Singapore and Tunisia, onboard FNS Jeane dÁrc 
(Navy News, 1995b:4).  Sub Lieutenant T. Diseko was also trained by the squadron 
between 2005 and 2006.  The training encompassed theory of Anti-Submarine Warfare, 
Anti-Air Warfare, Anti-Surface Warfare, Central Operations and Bridge Watch Keeping 
(Diseko, 2006:20).   
One of the most important training programmes received by SAN officers was the Type 
209 Basic Submarine Course presented at INS Satavahana in Visakhapatnam in 2005.  
This was new chapter in the realm of bilateral cooperation between South Africa and 
India, and it was for the first time for the Indian Navy to offer the course to a friendly 
foreign navy.  Rear-Admiral R. Hauter, then Chief Director Maritime Strategy, attended 
the Valedictory Function on behalf of C Navy.  Representing the South African 
government at the function was the then High Commissioner to India, His Excellency 
Francis Moloi (Navy News, 2006d:13).   
The training programmes are not limited to officers; Non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) are also trained.  For instance, Warrant Officers Wilma Humphreys-Naidoo and 
Hercul de Goede attended an 8-week learning opportunity in the form of US Navy’s 
Senior Enlistment Academy Course at the US NWC in 2010.  The course included both 
physical and mental training; and communication skills, leadership, management and 
national security (Oosthuizen, 2010:16) 
Apart from the SAN’s officers and NCOs receiving international training, South Africa 
also trains naval and other military personnel from other states.  For instance, on 2 April 
2001, the Naval Staff College in Muizenberg commenced presenting the first SADC 
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Staff Methods Course to students from Zambia, Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles, 
Botswana, Namibia, Malawi and Angola as part of regional naval cooperation efforts.  
This was followed by the second similar course (Bennett, 2011:49, 93).  Other courses 
are conducted in the diving and other environments.  For instance, in 2003, five 
members of the Nigerian Navy participated in the 39 m Air Scuba Diving and 
Supervision Course that ran for 13 weeks in Simon’s Town (Harman, 2003:10).   
The SAN also trained four members of the Namibian Defence Force to serve as 
coxswains for the HPBs donated by South Africa to Namibia (Engledow, 2003:12).  In 
2008, two learners from the Lesotho Defence Force, Corporals L. Khang and T. 
Nkabinde, participated in Fire Fighting Part 1 at Naval Base Simon’s Town (Kilpatrick, 
2008:39).  In 2010, the SAN Diving Centre trained Seargent F. Muzila and Corporal T. 
Mhosva from Zimbabwe (Baatjies, 2011b:16).  
Based on the training received and offered, it is clear that the SAN has wide relations 
with both international and regional navies.  These relations are part of the country’s 
foreign policy efforts, and culminate in military and naval training exchange 
programmes between South Africa and other countries.  The main distinctive feature is 
that SAN personnel receive training from international navies such as the US Navy and 
Indian Navy.  Concurrently, the SAN offers training to regional naval and military 
personnel as illustrated by courses provided to naval and other military personnel from 
Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Nigeria,  Zambia, Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles, Botswana, 
Namibia, Malawi and Angola, to name but few.  The reason is not only the fact that the 
SAN is the most equipped African navy as evidently elucidated in the previous chapters 
by the recent addition of frigates and submarines to South African warships or grey 
diplomats; but because the SAN is a reputable professional organisation with 
institutional knowledge on training and operations.  
4.7 SOUTH AFRICAN GREY DIPLOMATS FLYING THE FLAG SINCE 
1994 
Since the beginning of naval power, navies have an important role of flying the flag or 
performing goodwill visits for their home states (Booth, 1997:35).  By flying the flag, 
navies convey messages of states and military chiefs.  Most certainly, goodwill visits 
are political in nature and have the propensity of generating great publicity for navies of 
states (Alily, 2000:53, 59).  Accordingly, the ships of the SAN are “instrumental in 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
106 
carrying [the South Africa’s] flag, as a symbol of peace and hope, into the region in the 
demonstration of [the country’s] collective resolve to protect [the] people and [the] 
resources” (Du Plessis & Jacobson, 2008:12).  The strategic reach, controllability, 
independence, strategic mobility, flexibility, durability, and symbolism of warships or 
grey diplomats enable them to be the best ambassadors for South Africa (Alily, 
2000:50; Booth, 1997: 33-6; Bull, 1980:8). 
During the apartheid era, regrettably, very few states in the international community 
welcomed South African warships in their waters (Bennett, 2011:68).  The few states 
having diplomatic relations with the country were like minded ‘pariahs’ such as Taiwan, 
which was isolated due to its differences with the People’s Republic of China.  Since 
the inception of democracy in South Africa, the situation has swiftly evolved.  South 
African warships have visited European countries, the USA, Canada, Arabian Sea 
states, India and Pakistan, Atlantic and Indian Ocean Islands’ states, as well as African 
states (South African Navy, 2011a:3).  Most of the voyages were part of the diplomatic 
role of the navy, showing the flag, which serve to guarantee states that the country is a 
friend to all and foe to none.  Some of visits are highlighted in this section.   
In 1993, SAS Drakensberg visited the UK and South America spreading a message of 
goodwill and symbolising that apartheid had fallen in South Africa (Bennett, 2011:3; 
Thiart, 1995:25).  After the elections in 1994, SAS Drakensberg visited Lisbon to 
participate in the 600
th
 celebration of Prince Henry’s birthday (Wessels, 1997:93).  
About 16 countries were represented by their navies. SAS Drakensberg proceeded to 
visit England and participated in the commemoration of SS Mendi.  South African 
delegates hosted onboard the ship included Thabo Mbeki, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 
Alfred Nzo and Kent Durr, then South African High Commissioner (Navy News, 
1994:12).   
The following year, SAS Drakensberg paid goodwill visits to India, Pakistan and 
Oman, while strike craft vessels visited Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and China, as well as 
Namibia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Kenya (Bennett, 2011:21, Heitman, 1995b:41).  
SAS Outeniqua, SAS Oswald Pirow and SAS Frederick Creswell visited Mozambique 
and Tanzania the same year.  President Joaquin Chissano was hosted onboard SAS 
Outeniqua during the visit (Carson, 1995:6).  
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In March 1996, SAS Walvisbaai and SAS Fleur visited Angola, Gabon and Namibia as 
part of showing the rainbow navy into Africa following the transition.  With the 
exception of Angola, Luanda in particular, the visits were successful.  The SAN was 
initially denied diplomatic clearance to visit Luanda and the reasons for the denial are 
unknown to the public domain (Bennett, 2011:36; White, 1996:17).  
Despite the fact that Luanda (Angola) initially denied the ships diplomatic clearance 
into the country’s waters, the visits were positively welcomed by the three states 
(White, 1996:17).  The ships provided platforms for various functions in order to 
advance South Africa’s diplomatic missions in Gabon. The same year, SAS 
Drakensberg visited the US NWC, after the completion of Operation UNITAS.  On her 
voyage back to South Africa, she docked in Dakar, Senegal and Tema in Ghana for 
goodwill visits (Jacobson, 1996:16-17).  
At the turn of the millennium, in April 2000, the SAS Protea participated in the 500
th
 
Centenary Celebrations of the discovery of Brazil (Vine, 2000:15).  The following year, 
SAS Rene Sethren and SAS Galeshewe docked in Walvis Bay and Luderitz for a 
goodwill visit during Operation DESERT DUNE (Beyleveld, 2001:13; Department of 
Defence, 2002:87).  In June 2002, SAS Outeniqua and SAS Umhloti visited Namibia 
during Interoperation WEST (Interop WEST), a joint exercise with the SAAF and 
SAMHS (Department of Defence, 2003a:90).  SAS Galeshewe and SAS Makhanda also 
visited Namibia during Interop WEST III in 2003 (Du Toit, 2003:20).   
From 6 December 2003, the South African government executed a Joint Inter-
Departmental operation named Operation KATUSHA that lasted until 28 January 2004.  
The aim of the operation was to forge, strengthen and consolidate political and 
economic relations with the states of the Caribbean Community.  The operation 
coincided with the Bicentennial Celebrations of the founding of the Haitian Republic.  
The leading department was the DFA, and other departments included the DOD, 
particularly the SANDF, SAPS, National Intelligence Agency and the Department of 
Health.  SAS Drakensberg was chosen for this operation because of her capabilities.  
Her tasks included flying the South African National Flag throughout Caribbean 
Community; conveying cargo for the various departments; conveying helicopters for 
surveillance and monitoring; providing a platform for command and control; and an 
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emergency safe haven for South African VIP during the Haitian celebrations, which 
became reality when riots broke out on land (Tshabalala, 2004:24).   
From 1994 to 2004, SAS Drakensberg, SAS Outeniqua, strike craft vessels, and SAS 
Protea were the only warships capable of conducting extended deployment.  Since the 
arrival of the new frigates, discussed in chapter three, the situation has changed.  For 
instance, after her arrival in South African waters, SAS Mendi conducted Operation 
UMBONISO, showing the flag on the east African coast to False Bay in September 
2004 (Department of Defence, 2005a:106).   
In 2005, SAS Drakensberg embarked on Operation VICTORY on 9 June 2005 aimed at 
representing the country in the celebration of the British victory at the battle of 
Trafalgar (Pietbooi, 2005:24).  The battle of Trafalgar, which was fought in 1805 during 
the Napoleonic wars, was a decisive battle in which Admiral H. Nelson defeated the 
French and Spanish Navies (Bennett, 1977:1; Bennett, 2011:74).  This battle illustrates 
the importance of sea power and the role of navies in war. Accordingly, it is 
commemorated in Britain.  On her voyage back to South Africa, SAS Drakensberg 
visited Lagos, Nigeria from 18 to 20 July 2005 (Pietbooi, 2005:29).  This visit followed 
that of SAS Amatola which became the first South African warship to dock in Lagos 
(Bennett, 2011:74).   
During Operation SIYAKHULA, the delivery voyage of SAS Charlotte Maxeke in 
February 2007, SAS Drakensberg paid diplomatic visits to Walvis Bay and Luanda in 
Namibia and Angola (Bennett, 2011:17).  Another important visit of 2007 was that of 
SAS Amatola when she visited the UK for a six-weeks training period beginning on 30 
May 2007 (Herne, 2007b:20).  The following year, SAS Spioenkop embarked on 
Operation CARAWAY, aimed at improving and expanding good relations with India 
and Mauritius as well as laying the foundation for increased relations, trade and 
cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam 
(Benjamin, 2009:16).  In 2010, South African grey diplomats participated in the 193
rd
 
anniversary of the founding of the Uruguayan Navy (Söderlund, 2010:20).   
What do the visits mean? The answer to this question is simple and straightforward.  
The visits imply that the country is a friend to all and a foe to none, as expressed by 
foreign policy objectives outlined in chapter two.  Some of the visits by South African 
grey diplomats were part of naval exercises and operations, while others were a show of 
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goodwill.  Certainly, these visits illustrate that South Africa established relations with 
various states since 1994, and the SAN supports those relations.  Thus, visits build and 
strengthen defence diplomacy. It is for this reason that various foreign grey diplomats 
have also docked in South African waters since 1994.   
4.8 FOREIGN GREY DIPLOMATS DOCKING IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
WATERS 
In 1994, President Francois Mitterand of France visited South Africa.  His visit 
coincided with BCR Var, a French command and replenishment vessel, which was a 
flagship of the French Indian Ocean fleet.  The arrival of BCR Var was followed by an 
informal visit of Antares, a Brazilian Navy Oceanographic Research vessel (Navy 
News, 1994:16-17).  Another distinguished visit of 1994 was that of HDMS Vaedderen, 
a Danish ice-breaking warship that paid a good will visit to South Africa for the first 
time in approximately 200 years.  The ice-breaking vessel’s primary roles include 
fishery protection, surveillance and air-sea rescue (Navy News, 1994:10).   
In December 1994, INS Gomati (frigate) and INS Khukri (corvette) visited Durban and 
Simon’s Town as the first Indian naval visit to South Africa (Salut, 1995:16).  On 14 
February 1995, FNS Germinal, French frigate, docked in Cape Town for the first time 
in almost thirty years of absence in South African waters (Thiart, 1995:24).  In April 
1995 Italian ships Driade and Scirocco visited SAS Scorpion in Durban (Navy News, 
1995b:2).  In October 1995, Spanish corvettes Infanta Elena and Infanta Christina 
visited Cape Town and Simon’s Town for the first time (Thiart, 1995:25).   
The following year, USS Caron and USS Underwood, missile destroyer and missile 
frigate, docked in South Africa to conduct an exercise with SAS Emily Hobhouse, SAS 
Hendrik Mentz and SAS Scorpion from 2 to 5 February 1996 (Shelley, 1996:14).  The 
same year, Juan Sebastian de Elcano, a Spanish training ship docked in South African 
waters visiting Simon’s Town and Cape town (Navy News, 1995b:17) 
The most memorable visit occurred in 2000 when the French Battle Carrier Group 
visited Simon’s Town and Cape Town for the first time.  It consisted of air-craft carrier 
FS Foch, as well ships FS Duquesne (frigate), FS Meuse (supply tanker) and combat 
support ship FS Jules Verne, as well as 12 fighter bombers, three patrol aircraft, three 
reconnaissance aircraft, and four helicopters. This was a goodwill visit to enhance the 
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partnership between the two countries in the Indian Ocean (Engledow, 2000:14).  On 22 
April 2002, the British Ice Breaking vessel, HMS Endurance visited Cape Town.  
Another memorable visit occurred on 8 September 2003 when INS Trishul, the Indian 
Navy stealth frigate, visited South Africa (Gounden, 2003c:10).  The same year, FNS 
Beautemps-Beaupre, French hydrographic vessel, docked in Cape Town for a goodwill 
visit. The following year, in June 2004, British nuclear-powered submarine HMS 
Turbulent visited Simon’s Town (Ingpen, 2004:4).10   
On 25 April 2005 HMS Portland docked in Simon’s Town for an informal visit 
(Vtaack, 2005:16).  INS Delhi and INS Ganga, Indian warships, visited Cape Town on 
9 June 2005 (Bennett, 2011:81).  In mid April 2006, Cuauhtemoc, Mexican sail training 
ship, docked in Table Bay with 75 midshipmen under training.  Captain Roberto 
Gonzalez Lopez paid a courtesy visit to Rear-Admiral H. Beste, then FOF (Engledow, 
2006a:26-7).   
The following year, BNS Godetia, a Belgian naval ship visited Simon’s Town on 8 
February 2007 (Herne, 2007a:13).  This visit coincided with the Defence diplomatic 
visit of General Van Daele, the Belgian Chief of Defence who presented two sailing 
boats to the Izivunguvungu Youth Development Programme- the SAN social 
investment initiative (Bennett, 2011:18).  HMS Endurance docked in Cape Town on an 
informal visit in April 2007.  The ship regularly stops in Cape Town annually as she 
patrols and surveys the Antarctic and South Atlantic oceans (Navy News, 2007:26).   
FNS Tonnerre, a French LHD geared for peacekeeping operations in all theatres, visited 
South Africa from 25 to 30 June 2007 (Perchoc, 2007:16).  This vessel is geared for 
current and future challenges requiring maritime power, and is similar to the one South 
Africa intend procuring under Project Millennium as discussed in chapter three.  The 
vessel afforded uniform members an opportunity to glance at the possible future vessel 
for the country.  In March 2008, BNS Garcia D’Avila, a Landing vessel previously 
known as RFA Sir Galahad of the Royal Navy, visited Simon’s Town.  Her visit 
coincided with the SPAS of 2008 (Venter, 2009:43). 
One of the 2008 highlights visit was that of ARA Libertad, an Argentinean sailing 
vessel which is one of the largest and fastest sailing ships currently (Jacobson, 2008:34).  
                                                          
10 Author was part of the Midshipmen contingent from the South African Naval College, Gordon’s Bay, who went for 
a tour of the submarine in June 2004.   
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Another visit was that of NRP Sagres, a Portuguese sail training vessel in October 2008 
(Söderlund, 2008b:40).  The most interesting, and controversial, visit was that of USS 
Theodore Roosevelt, the first nuclear powered aircraft carrier to dock in South African 
waters.  USS Theodore Roosevelt docked few miles off Victoria Warf waterfront in 
Cape Town.
11
  The visit was highly publicised and politicised.  Various 
environmentalist non-governmental organisations such as Earthlife Africa, the Anti-War 
Coalition and Green Peace, protested for the docking of a nuclear powered carrier in 
South African waters.   
On 12 January 2009, RFS Pyotr Velikiy, a Russian battle cruiser visited Simon’s Town 
for the first time.  This was a historic visit because RFS Pyotr Velikiy was the first 
nuclear powered surface warship, excluding the aircraft carrier USS Theodore 
Roosevelt, to dock in South African port, particularly Simon’s Town (Söderlund, 
2009:10).  Nuclear powered submarines such as HMS Turbulent visited South Africa, 
but for a surface powered warship, RFS Pyotr Velikiy, became the first.     
From 29 January to 2 February 2009, USS Robert G. Bradley, visited South Africa as 
part of the Africa Partnership Station Theatre Security Cooperation mission of the US 
Navy’s Sixth Fleet aimed at conducting maritime safety and security training with 
African navies (Söderlund, 2009:). On 19 July 2009, USS Arleigh Burke, a lead 
destroyer of the US Navy visited Simon’s Town (Stone & US Navy, 2009:12). The 
USA nuclear powered attack submarine, USS San Juan, was the highlight of the 2009 
visits to Simon’s Town (Söderlund, 2009:18).  The submarine arrived in November 
2009 and made headlines due to its nuclear technology.  Statistical comparison between 
the SAN submarines (see chapter three) and USS San Juan, shows that the latter is 
almost twice in size, twice in speed, and more than five times in crew complement 
(Stone, 2009d:21; Szabo, 2009:Online).  
Other visits in 2009 included that of French patrol vessel, FNS Albatross, visited 
Simon’s Town in November (Stone, 2009c:10).  In 2011, two vessels of the Chinese 
People Liberation Army Navy’s 7th Escorting Flotilla, Zhousan and Xuzhou, under the 
leadership of Rear-Admiral Huachen paid a goodwill visit to Durban from 2 to 8 April 
                                                          
11 Author was among the Military Academy contingent that visited USS Theodore Roosevelt docked few miles off 
Victoria Warf waterfront in Cape Town in October 2008.   
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
112 
2011 (Zulu, 2011:13).  The same year, German frigates Sachsen and Schleswig-Holstein 
visited South Africa in September (Khumalo, 2011:5).   
With regard to advancing South Africa’s foreign policy, grey diplomats docking in 
South African waters illustrate that the country has successfully crafted its relations 
with the rest of the world.  Naval visits are extensions of countries’ foreign policies.  
The SAN has received ships from North America, South America, Asia, Europe and 
Oceania.  One distinctive feature with regard to foreign grey diplomats docking in the 
country’s waters is that most of the vessels are from outside Africa.  From the first 
instance one may wrongfully deduce that the SAN is cooperating mainly with countries 
outside the continent.  Yet, this is not the case as previously elucidated. The fact is that 
most African states lack sea going navies.  Regrettably, with the exception of few states 
such as Nigeria and North African states, vessels used by navies in Africa are ill-suited 
for long deployments on the high seas.  In order to ensure that maritime and naval 
cooperation continues, naval and other dignitaries from South Africa visit various states.  
Conversely, dignitaries from other states visit South Africa as highlighted in the next 
section.   
4.9 GOODWILL VISITS TO SOUTH AFRICA BY NAVAL AND OTHER 
DIGNITARIES   
Goodwill visits by military personnel are part of defence diplomacy and extend from 
diplomacy which is a foreign policy instrument.  They ensure that there is mutual 
understanding and trust between various countries.  Prior to 1994, naval dignitaries 
docking in South Africa’s shores were very limited.  Similarly, the country’s dignitaries, 
military or otherwise, visited only few states (pariahs) in the world.  In the post-1994, 
naval and other dignitaries from South Africa have visited other states.  Reciprocally, 
foreign dignitaries have docked in South African shores to extend a hand of friendship 
through goodwill visits.  Some of the visits are highlighted in this section. 
Admiral V. Singh Shekwat, then Chief of Staff of the Indian Navy, visited South 
African in 1996 for seven days  (Navy News, 1996a:11). The same year, Prince 
Ferdinand of Denmark visited Simon’s Town (Greyling, 1996:19).  In 2005, Rear-
Admiral (Junior Grade) A. Krause and Captain K. Schneider of the Federal German 
Navy visited South Africa for the seventh annual staff talks between the navies of the 
two countries held in Pretoria from 25 to 28 October (Pietbooi & Van Rooyen, 
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2006:10). Other than Germany, the SAN also hold staff talks with other navies of 
countries such as Britain, Argentina, India and Pakistan (Eldon, 2012).  Staff talks 
enhance international naval cooperation by facilitating valuable information exchange 
on naval matters, exploring future training opportunities as well as participating in 
multinational exercises (Department of Defence, 2008b:135).   
On 3 February 2006, representatives of MONUC led by Mr M. Alam visited C Navy to 
discuss issues of mutual interest regarding the peace process in the DRC.  On 24 
February, Defence Attachés of Uruguay, Ukraine, Nigeria and Zimbabwe paid a 
courtesy visit to C Navy.  This visit was followed by another when Colonel G. Baker, 
the Australian Defence Advisor, paid a courtesy call to the Navy Headquarters in 
Pretoria (Pietbooi & Van Rooyen, 2006:10).  In May 2009, P. van Tra, the Minister of 
National Defence of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, visited Simon’s Town (Van 
Rensburg, 2009:6).  The same year, the President of the IHO, Vice-Admiral A. Maratos 
visited Simon’s Town (Janse van Rensburg, 2009:9).   
From 4 to 7 April 2009, the SAN had an honour of receiving a visit of Admiral Gary 
Roughhead, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) of the US Navy, who is a defacto C 
Navy.  This was a high profile visit as the CNO is one of the busiest naval officers in 
the USA.  Other visits in the same month included those of Rear-Admiral A. du Toit, 
the Commander Border Protection Command of the Royal Australian Navy as well as 
Captain R. Pegg of the UK’s Royal Navy (Navy News, 2009b:10-11). 
On 08 December 2010, the Deputy Chief of Human Resources of the People’s 
Liberation Army of China, Major General Z. Yong, and 29 other officers visited Fleet 
Command in Simon’s Town (Baatjies, 2010a:11).  The following year, Rear-Admiral G. 
Hueber, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy, Resources and Plans of the US 6
th
 Fleet, and 
three members of his staff and the US Naval Attaché paid a goodwill visit to Fleet 
Command on 25 January 2011.  Rear-Admiral P. Schoultz, FOF, received the 
contingent, which later visited various units of the SAN including SAS Spioenkop as 
well as SAS Charlotte Maxeke (Baatjies, 2010b:10).  The following month, Vice-
Admiral Harry B. Harris, Junior of the US 6
th
 Fleet in the Mediterranean paid a 
goodwill visit to Simon’s Town on 12 February 2011 (Oosthuizen, 2011a:13).   
The Naval Secretary of the US Navy, R. Mabus, visited Simon’s Town on 12 August 
2011 to increase the cooperation between the navies of the two countries.  Admiral Sir 
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T. Soar, Commander-in-Chief Fleet of the Royal Navy, visited the SAN from 21 to 23 
February 2011 to strengthen the ties between the two navies.  After making a courtesy 
call at the Navy Headquarters in Pretoria, Admiral Soar proceeded to Simon’s Town 
and visited SAS Charlotte Maxeke as well as attends a presentation by Rear-Admiral 
(JG) H. Teuteberg pertaining to the deterrent role of the SAN during the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup-discussed in chapter three.  The presentation was held onboard SAS 
Amatola (Bland, 2011:12).   
On 25 March 2011, a team from the DRC Armed Forces visited Simon’s Town to 
benchmark work procedures in the Human Resources and Finance Divisions to enable 
them to write plans for their recovering country from years of civil war.  They also had 
an opportunity of touring SAS Charlotte Maxeke and SAS Isandlwana (Bland, 
2011:12).  Admiral Murat Bilgel, the Turkish Navy Commander, visited South Africa 
from 23 to 26 January 2012 to strengthen the relations between the SAN and his navy in 
a Framework of Agreement for potential Bilateral Cooperation (Zulu, 2012a:8).  Good 
will visits by dignitaries are extremely important for naval cooperation.  It is during 
these visits where decisions are made with regard to exercises, training exchange 
programmes, information sharing, planning of conference as well as exercises.   
4.10 GOODWILL VISITS BY SOUTH AFRICAN NAVAL DIGNITARIES 
In October 2005, Rear-Admiral R. Hauter paid a courtesy visit to Malaysia.  The aim of 
the visit was to cement ties with the Royal Malaysian Navy (Navy News, 2006d:13).  
The following year, Vice-Admiral Mudimu visited Malawi to strengthen relations 
between the SAN and Malawian Defence Force’s Marine Unit.  Since then, the SAN 
and the Malawian Marine Unit have signed the MoU, which encompass assistance with 
regard to training the sailors of the Marine Unit based at Monkey Bay as well as 
providing equipment such as Namaccuras (Van Rooyen & Ngwenya, 2006:11).   
In 2006, Rear-Admiral H.M. Magalefa, then Chief of Naval Staff, visited the UK.  The 
aim of the visit was to attend the Farnborough Air Show in which the Augusta-
Westland Super Lynx 300 was flying.  The SAN acquired four helicopters of this make 
for each of the four frigates as explicated in chapter three (Fursdon, 2006:7).  Rear-
Admiral Magalefa, together with Rear-Admiral (JG) B. Donkin and Captain (SAN) N. 
Snyman, represented the SAN during a Maritime Safety and Security seminar in the 
GoG held at the Koffi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana, between 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
115 
19 and 22 March 2006 as already mentioned.  The workshop was organised by the US 
European Command, the US Naval Forces Europe and the Africa Centre for Strategic 
Studies.  The SAN delegation also paid courtesy calls to the Ghanaian Navy Chief of 
Staff and the South African High Commissioner in Ghana (Navy News, 2006e:17).   
Vice-Admiral Mudimu visited Gabon from 24 to 30 September 2011.  During this visit 
information sharing occurred, and C Navy emphasised the importance of continuously 
working together of the two countries with regional partners in order to deal with 
maritime challenges. Naval training of personnel as well as exchanges of instructors and 
ship visits was discussed.  C Navy also expressed the significance of SPAS (already 
discussed) which was supposed to be held in Senegal in 2012 (Khumalo, 2011:5).  
Goodwill visits by naval and other dignitaries to and from South Africa is part of 
defence diplomacy.  Numerous dignitaries have visited the country since 1994.  
Similarly, dignitaries from the SAN visited various countries, including African states, 
as part of South African naval diplomacy.   
4.11 CONCLUSION 
The aim of chapter four was to analyse South African naval cooperation as a function of 
naval diplomacy at the international, continental and regional levels.  Reasons for naval 
and maritime cooperation include reassuring allies and friendly bystanders. At the 
international level, the SAN cooperate with various states and international instituted 
bodies such as the biennial ISS at the NWC.  South Africa is also a member and the 
current leader of IONS and has hosted the third conference in 2012.  The SAN has also 
participated in IFRs and organised two PFR since 1994.  It is also instrumental in 
facilitating continental and regional naval cooperation through SPAS and SADC SMC.  
Apart from bilateral agreements with other navies, the SAN-after a long period of non-
involvement due to lack of political will- is also the major partner in the fight against 
piracy at sea.  Maritime and naval cooperation has culminated in a MoU on Maritime 
Security Cooperation, which signifies political will vital for eradicating piracy in 
Southern Africa.   
The SAN also participates in various exercises.  These exercises denote that South 
Africa is a friend to all and an antagonist to none.  Additionally, exercises illustrate and 
improve the interoperability of the SAN. By conducting exercises, the SAN has 
supported and continues to support the country’s foreign policy efforts.  The SAN sends 
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its members to training programmes abroad; and it also trains members from other 
countries.  However, SAN personnel receive training from international navies such as 
the US Navy and Indian Navy, while personnel from African states are trained in South 
Africa.  This is unsurprising because the SAN is, perhaps, the most equipped and 
professional African navy with years of reputable experience and expertise.  Hence, it 
has the ability to deploy its grey diplomats in support of the country’s foreign policy to 
distant regions.  Similarly, various foreign grey diplomats have docked in South African 
waters since 1994, illustrating that the country has successfully crafted its foreign policy 
with the rest of world.   
The foreign policy stance of the country has also ensured that naval and other 
dignitaries from South Africa visit various states.  Conversely, dignitaries from other 
states have visited South Africa.  Goodwill visits by naval and other dignitaries to and 
from South Africa are part of South African naval diplomacy.  Additionally, the 
country’s foreign policy principles as outlined in chapter two, has committed the 
country to assisting other states in and outside Africa.  The assistance ranges from 
providing aid where possible to international conflict resolution and management as 
dealt with in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 5 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ASSISTANCE AND INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND MANAGEMENT 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter five focuses on international maritime assistance and international conflict 
resolution and management.  In addition to maritime coercion and naval cooperation, 
these are the last two functions of South African naval diplomacy.  International 
maritime assistance relates to general assistance rendered to the international 
community, while the international conflict resolution and management relates to a 
large extent activities concomitant to peace missions.   
These functions occupy the peaceful, cooperative and persuasive extreme of naval 
diplomacy, which is non-coercive in nature as indicated in Figure 1 in chapter two.  
International maritime assistance and conflict resolution and management includes the 
secondary roles of the SAN, mentioned in chapter one, as outlined in the White Paper 
on Defence (Department of Defence, 1996), the White Paper on Participation in 
International Peace Missions (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999:5) and other policy 
documents guiding South African foreign policy.    
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the role of the SAN in international maritime 
assistance and international conflict resolution and management.  The chapter 
commences by focusing on South Africa’s maritime obligations bestowed on the SAN, 
followed by search and rescue missions.  It also focuses on the role of the SAN in 
equipping and empowering other African states; disaster management, humanitarian and 
relief operations; NCAGS; and international peace missions.  
5.2 SOUTH AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL MARITIME OBLIGATIONS 
As a member of international maritime bodies, South Africa has maritime obligations 
which range from fulfilling various roles in international organisations, to co-ordinating 
a navigational area and sending notices to mariners based on the constant and updated 
navigational information acquired through sophisticated technology (South African 
Navy, 2006:24).   
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5.2.1 International Membership 
South Africa became a member of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 
February 1995 after having an observer status since 1948 (Department of International 
Relations & Cooperation, 2006:1).  It is also a member of the International 
Hydrographic Organisation (IHO) since 1951 (South African Navy, 2006:24).  The 
IMO and IHO are two vital organisations responsible for the safety of navigation and 
life at sea as well as the marine environment.  The IMO organised the Convention on 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) which came into existence on 25 May 1980 following its 
adoption on 1 November 1974 (International Maritime Organisation, 2004:1).   
In addition to being a signatory to SOLAS and the Antarctic Treaty, South Africa 
subscribes to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (South 
African Navy, 2006:24).  The IHO is a consultative and technical organisation 
established by states in 1921 with the aim of supporting navigation safety and protecting 
the marine environment.  The objectives of the IHO encompass co-ordinating national 
hydrographic offices activities; uniformity of nautical charts and documents; adopting 
of consistent and competent hydrographic survey methods; and developing sciences in 
the hydrographic and oceanographic fields (International Hydrographic Organisation, 
2007a:8).   
Regularly, the IHO hosts conferences on hydrography.  Captain (SAN) L. Reeder, then 
Hydrographer, hosted an International Hydrographic Organisation conference from 13 
to 14 March 2001 at the Naval Base Simon’s Town.  The conference was aimed at 
deliberating the surveying and charting of the demarcated NAVAREA of member states 
in frozen waters of the Antarctic Ocean.  South African, Italian, Chilean, French, 
Norwegian, Australian, British, Argentinean and Chinese delegates attended the 
conference (Navy News, 2001b:7).   
5.2.2 Hydrographic Responsibilities  
Apart from its national charting responsibility covering the waters of South Africa and 
Namibia, the SAN has international hydrographic responsilities.  As a member of the 
IMO, the SAN is the co-ordinator of NAVAREA VII as shown in Figure 5.  
NAVAREA refers to a geographical sea area originated for co-ordinating the 
transmission of navigational warnings to mariners through NAVTEX stations.  
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NAVTEX refers to “an international automated direct-printing service for the 
promulgation of navigational and meteorological warnings and urgent information to 
ships” (South African Navy Hydrographic Office, 2012:8).  A Roman numeral precedes 
the term NAVAREA, hence NAVAREA VII in this case (South African Navy 
Hydrographic Office, 2009:6).  The purpose for the establishment of NAVAREA 
regions is to co-ordinate the broadcast of agent information pertinent to safe navigation 
utilising the media (South African Hydrographic Office, 2011:6).    
NAVAREA VII covers the South Atlantic and South Indian Ocean area in Southern 
Africa stretching from Angola in the west to Mozambique in the east.  The precise 
location of NAVAREA VII is the area “parallel of latitude 6°S, drawn from the West 
Coast of Africa to longitude 20°W, thence south to Antarctica; and the parallel of 
latitude 10° 30’S drawn from the East Coast of Africa to long(itude) 55°E, thence south 
to the parallel of latitude 30°S, thence east ward to longitude 80°E and thence south to 
Antarctica” (South African Navy Hydrographic Office, 2009:6) as shown in Figure 5.   
 
 
Figure 5: NAVAREA VII-South Africa’s Responsibility (South African Navy 
Hydrographic Office, 2009:6) 
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The co-ordination of this area falls within the Hydrographic Office of the SAN 
(SANHO).  Subsequently, the SANHO is a national asset (Kampfer, 2012), and is 
acknowledged as Africa’s Centre of Hydrographic excellence (Bennett & Söderlund, 
2008:135).  The Hydrographer commands the SANHO and is the co-ordinator of 
NAVAREA VII.  The responsibilities of the Hydrographer are: 
a. To endeavor to be in formed of all events affecting the safety of 
navigation in NAVAREA VII. 
b. To expertly assess all received information affecting navigation 
safety. 
c.  To draft NAVAREA warning messages iaw IHO/IMO guidance 
on standardisation of texts and message drafting. 
d. To direct and control the broad cast of NAVAREA warnings via 
national broad cast facilities. 
e.  To pass NAVAREA warnings to adjacent NAVAREA co-
ordinators where appropriate. 
f.  To transmit periodical NAVAREA warnings bulletins. 
g.  To promulgate the cancellation of NAVAREA warnings no 
longer valid. 
h.  To act as the central point of contact on MSI within the 
NAVAREA. 
i.  To promote the use of established international standards and 
practices in the promulgation of navigational warnings within the 
NAVAREA (South African Navy Hydrographic Office, 2012:6).   
The Hydrographer also serves in various IHO Committees such as the Hydrographic 
Commission on Antarctica (HCA); World Electronic Navigation Database (WEND); 
Committee on Hydrographic Requirements for Information Systems (CHRIS); Strategic 
Planning Working Group (SPWG); and the Southern Africa and Islands Hydrographic 
Commission (SAIHC) (Kampfer, 2007:15). Captain (SAN) A. Kampfer, the current 
SAN Hydrographer, chaired both WEND and SAIHC (Kampfer, 2012).  The 
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Hydrographer and the staff of the SANHO are members of the IHO and the Inter-
governmental Oceanographic Commission working groups.  Some of these working 
groups include the IHO Tidal Group; IHO Transfer Standards Maintenance and 
Applications Development Working Group; IHO Chart Standardisation and Paper Chart 
Working Group; IHO Commission on Promulgation of Radio Navigational Warnings; 
and International Bathymetric Charts of the Western Indian Ocean Working Group 
(Kampfer, 2007:15).   
The entire coastline of Southern Africa, as indicated in Figure 5, is the responsibility of 
the SAN. Since 1922, the South African Naval Service (prior to SAN) conducted 
hydrographic surveying onboard HMSAS Protea (the first Protea), formerly known as 
HMS Crozier, a Hunt class minesweeper.  Two other survey vessels carrying a similar 
name were acquired prior to the present SAS Protea (the fourth Protea), which is the 
SAN survey ship since 1972 (Kampfer, 2007:15).  SAS Protea is responsible for 
collecting data on NAVAREA VII to be processed and produce charts at the SANHO 
(Heitman, 1995b:42; Stone, 2009f:19).   
Continentally, SAN hydrography is unrivalled.  It is the only African hydrographic 
organisation that produces electronic charts.  Additionally, its charts are consistent with 
the international standards.  It is for this reason that Captain (SAN) Kampfer, won the 
prize in Monaco for being the best exhibitor in the Technical Exhibition category of the 
International Hydrographic Bureau held from 11 to 15 April 2005 (Nelson, 2005:11).  
He is also a recipient of the prestigious Alexander Dalrymple Award for the outstanding 
work in hydrography.  The award was presented by Britain on 17 June 2009.  It was for 
the first time the award was bestowed on a hydrographer outside Europe (Stone, 
2009g:20; United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, 2009:2).  This achievement illustrate 
that the SAN is making an enourmous contribution to world hydrography.  Both African 
and international ships rely on the SAN to produce quality charts as well as supply 
navigational warnings through South African Notices to Mariners to ensure safe 
navigation in NAVAREA VII.   
5.2.3 South African Notices to Mariners  
According to Regulation Four of Chapter Five of SOLAS, signatories are required to 
“take all steps necessary to ensure that, when intelligence of any dangers is received 
from whatever reliable source, it shall be promptly brought to the knowledge of those 
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concerned and communicated to other interested Governments” (International Maritime 
Organisation, 2004:264).  Accordingly, South Africa is obliged to ensure that 
navigational warnings are conveyed to mariners through the South African Notices to 
Mariners issued by the SANHO.  The Notices to Mariners is a publication containing a 
complete compilation of all South African charts and publication updates issued on a 
monthly basis to ensure the safety of navigation at sea (South African Navy 
Hydrographic Office, nd:Online).  
Each edition of the South African Notices to Mariners contains information on the 
following subjects: Agents for the Sale of Charts; Practice and Exercise Areas; 
Immediate Navigational Warnings; Report of Shoals obtained by Echo Sounding and 
Hydrographic Notes; Regulations for the Navigation of Laden Tankers; Oil Pollution - 
Observation and Reporting; Storm Warnings to Shipping; the SAFREP and AMVER 
Systems; Instructions to Ship Radio Stations; Maritime Boundaries and Zones; 
Information concerning Submarines; Safety of Navigation; Weather Reports from 
Ships; Mine Clearance Operations; South African Search and Rescue Organisation 
(SASAR); Offshore Under water Obstructions; Shark Nets - Kwazulu Natal Coast; 
Vessel Traffic Service (VTS); Crayfish Trap Fishing; Differential Global Positioning 
System (DGPS); Marine Reserves; Meteorological and Oceanographic Data Buoys; 
Submarine Cables and Pipelines; Marine Mining Vessels; South African Maritime 
Safety Authority (SAMSA) Reporting System; Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) 
Regulations; and supplementary notes (South African Navy Hydrographic Office, 
2009:6; South African Navy Hydrographic Office, 2010:6; South African Navy 
Hydrographic Office, 2011:6; South African Navy Hydrographic Office, 2012:6).   
5.2.4 Challenges facing the SAN Hydrographic Service 
As contained on SANGP 100, people matter the most in the SAN.  It is stated: 
“Personnel are to be trained to the highest standards based upon sound tactics and 
technological understanding of the on-board weapons’ systems” (South African Navy, 
2006:7). It is also stressed in the White Paper on Defence that the maintenance of 
technical, managerial and organisational skills and resources is instrumental in 
achieving the objectives of the SANDF (Department of Defence, 1996:8).  As indicated 
in the preceding chapters, the SAN faces several challenges including the loss of skills 
(Thiart, 2010:90), and the SANHO is not immune from the challenges.  One of the 
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major challenges is skilled human resources.  It is a long cycle of training to have a 
candidate qualify as a hydrographer.  To begin with, a person must be a qualified 
combat officer before commencing with hydrographic training.  The current reality is 
that the South African society suffers from the brain drain and the situation is worse in 
public service where various departments have to contend with the private sector 
offering lucrative salaries and benefits.  In an interview, Captain (SAN) Kampfer 
indicated that this impacts heavily on retaining skills in the SANHO (Kampfer, 2012).  
Numerous combat officers are leaving the SAN to pursue careers in the private sector.  
Apart from lack and loss of skills, other challenges include the equipment required for 
hydrography. 
One of the most important equipment is the hydrographic vessel, SAS Protea.  
Currently, the SAN is utilising the fourth Protea and has been in service for almost 40 
years (Thiart, 2010:88).  Given the number of years in service, the reliability of the ship 
is dubious and cannot be guaranteed.  Subsequently, the ship spends most time at the 
dry dock than sailing and surveying at sea.  Earlier in 2012, SAS Protea could not 
deploy due to a broken prop shaft and hydrographic surveys could not be conducted 
(Anonymous Interviews, 2012).  Currently the SAN is addressing this challenge by 
acquiring a new hydrographic survey ship under Project Hotel (Eldon, 2012).  The 
success of this project, however, has yet to be realised because of budgetary and other 
constraints.  Failure to acquire a serviceable hydrographic survey vessel will not only be 
detrimental to the SAN Hydrographic service, but to the service of the entire 
NAVAREA VII.  Put differently, the loss of hydrographic capability in the SAN will 
lead to the loss of such service to the entire Southern African region.  In addition, 
because of advance capabilities in terms of technology, hydrographic vessels such as 
SAS Protea are instrumental in search and rescue missions, as described in the next 
section.   
5.3 SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSIONS 
Regulation Seven of Chapter Five of SOLAS requires all signatories to ensure that ships 
and people in distress at sea around the countries’ coasts are rescued (International 
Maritime Organisation, 2004:266).  To fulfil this role, SAMSA established the MRCC 
which was officially recognised by the IMO in 2007.  On 16 January 2007, the IMO 
Secretary-General Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, commissioned the MRCC following a 
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Multilateral Agreement signed by the Comoros, Madagascar, Mozambique and South 
Africa aimed at co-ordinating maritime search and rescue services (International 
Maritime Organisation, 2007:5-6).   
The primary task of the MRCC is to synchronise searching, assisting and rescuing of 
vessels in distress as well as survivors of air crashes at sea and other maritime accidents.  
Organisations such as the SAPS, the National Sea Rescue Institute (NSRI) and the SAN 
are instrumental in achieving the primary function of the MRCC.  C Navy in 1997, 
Vice-Admiral Robert Simpson-Anderson, stated that the peace time functions of the 
SAN include disaster relief (discussed later) and search and rescue, which entails 
supporting both national and international authorities and in terms of the country’s 
international responsibilities (Simpson-Anderson, 1997:30).  When performed by the 
SAN, search and rescue missions involving foreign vessels or aircraft and their crews 
fall within the domain of international maritime assistance.  Despite challenges in 
resources geared for search and rescue missions (Simpson-Anderson, 2000:72) various 
elements of the SAN have performed search and rescue missions since 1994.   
In 1996, SAN divers were called to assist after the capsizing of Ferry MV Bukoba on 
Lake Victoria.  As part of naval cooperation between South Africa and other countries, 
the SAN divers, cooperating with Tanzanian divers, the Kenyan Navy and Tanzanian 
Railways recovered approximately 300 bodies.  The success of the operation led to the 
establishment of good Defence diplomatic relations between the SANDF and the 
Tanzanian Peoples Defence Force, and subsequently between the SAN and the 
Tanzanian Navy (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:145).  It is for this reason that the ships of 
the SAN with members of the MRS patrols the Tanzania coast during anti-piracy patrols 
(see Operation COPPER).  In 2005, the divers also recovered the United Nations 
Armoured Personnel Carrier at Lake Kivu following a formal request by the leadership 
of MONUC.   
SAS Protea has rescued several ships in distress as well as assist in the recovery of sea 
wreckages. In June 2005, SAS Protea rescued the crew of MV Kiperousa, a log carrier 
that ran aground East of Great Fish Point in KwaZulu Natal (South African Navy 
Hydrographic Office, 2006:3).  SAS Protea assisted NSRI in various instances.  For 
contributing to search and rescue, SAS Protea received the Sword of Peace in 2006 
from Rear-Admiral Bester, then FOF (Engledow, 2006b:18).   
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Other elements of the SAN have also performed various search and rescue operations.  
For instance, the Operational Boat Squadron of the MRS and SAS Isaac Dyobha 
assisted a stricken fishing vessel, Alma Lucie, amidst oncoming ferocious storm on the 
evening of 28 March 2007 (Harman, 2007b:16).  Another important rescue worth 
mentioning is SAS Protea’s rescue of the crew of Acechador, a Spanish fishing trawler 
which was taking water in the engine room and faced a danger of sinking off Durban 
coast (Hutson, 2009:Online; Oosthuizen, 2009:13).  This rescue received major media 
coverage and has indicated the positive role of the SAN in search and rescue missions.    
From 11 February 2011, the SAN assisted in salvaging the Pilatus PC-12 aircraft that 
crashed in Plettenberg Bay (Civil Aviation Authority, 2011:1).  The aircraft carrying a 
CEO of Italtile and eight other people crashed offshore of the Robberg Nature Reserve 
(Oosthuizen, 2011b:20-1).  During the day of the crash, SAS Protea was in Mossel Bay 
conducting Exercise REVIVE (Public Relations Department, 2011a:1).  However, 
Director Fleet Force Preparation ordered the ship to head to the crash site to assist the 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the SAPS.  The versatility of SAS Protea enabled 
her to redirect her focus to search and rescue (Bull, 1980:8, South African Navy, 
2006:37).  
On arrival, SAS Protea utilised her advanced technology, the Shallow Route Survey 
System, to search the aircraft.  This system provided quick results, and on the third day 
all relevant information was discovered (Public Relations Department, 2011b:1).  The 
MRS ODT salvaged the aircraft, whilst SAPS divers recovered the human remains.  
Warrant Officer I. du Plessis led the ODT consisting of Petty Officer L. Lotter, Petty 
Officer K. Nsibande and Leading Seaman T. van der Walt (Du Plessis, 2012).  The 
ODT cooperated with SAPS divers.  The ODT focused on salvaging the wreckage of 
the aircraft, while SAPS divers recovered human remains.  The operation was 
concluded on 15 February 2011 and SAS Protea transported the recovered parts to Port 
Elizabeth for further inspection by the CAA (Oosthuizen, 2011b:21).   
On September 2011, ferry Spice Islander, capsized off Zanzibar and resulted in one of 
the catastrophic maritime disasters in history.  The ferry capsized en route between 
Unguja and Pemba which are two islands off the coast of Tanzania.  It is suspected that 
more than 1000 voyagers were onboard.  Divers from the ODD managed to recover 
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more than 200 bodies (Al Jazeera, 2012; SABC, 2011).  It is some of these activities 
that make the ODD an important component of the MRS.  
Since 1994, the ODTs are instrumental in operations as part of the South African 
international maritime assistance (Bennett & Söderlund, 2008:145).  Search and rescue 
are vital in maintaining relations between South Africa and other states in the 
international community.  South Africa also empowers and equips other states in the 
continent to improve their capabilities in several areas including search and rescue.   
5.4 EQUIPPING AND EMPOWERING OTHER STATES IN AFRICA 
Most of the littoral states in the SADC region as well as Sub-Saharan Africa lack 
resources to ensure maritime security in their respective waters as elucidated in the 
preceding chapters.  The SAN has been equipping and empowering other states in 
Africa since 1994.  It constantly carries patrols for Namibia and conducts surveys for 
Mozambique.  In addition, it patrols SADC waters, particularly the Mozambique 
Channel and off the Tanzanian coast to deter piracy and other maritime challenges, as 
discussed in chapters three and four.  The SAN, as part of the SANDF’s post-conflict 
reconstruction in the DRC, assisted in rebuilding the facilities for the Congolese Navy.   
In 2003, the then Deputy Minister of Defence, Noziviwe Madlala-Routledge handed 
two HPBs to the Namibian Defence Force (Engledow, 2003:12).  It should be noted that 
the Namibian Navy is still in its infancy and relies on South Africa for assistance.  It is 
for this reason that few of their personnel, including combat officers, are trained in 
South Africa.
12
  Other states assisted by the SAN include Malawi.  In 2008, the SAN 
donated a Namacurra and constructed a floating dock at Malawi Defence Force Marine 
Base at Monkey Bay.  This was an extension of the government foreign policy focusing 
on the African Agenda (Harman, 2008b:28).  Other Namacurras were donated to 
Namibia and Mozambique (Ministerial Directorate of Communications, 2004:13; 
Nomtshongwana, 2008:14). Nationally, the SAN cooperate with other state’s 
department.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
                                                          
12 The author’s Military Training for Officers Part 1 in 2004 at the South African Naval College, Gordon’s Bay, was 
attended by Namibian candidate officers.  Most of them also attended Combat Officer Qualifying Courses at Naval 
Base Simon’s Town.   
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5.5 THE SAN AND INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION 
The assets of the SAN-outlined in chapter three- in particular and the military in 
general, are seldom found in other government departments.  These assets such as 
warships are equipped to perform various tasks including non-military functions or 
secondary functions.  Other government departments often require assistance from the 
SAN when faced with daunting tasks that can only be achieved by the utilisation of 
certain platforms and expertise.  It seems the SAN is always more than willing to 
cooperate with other state departments.  For instance, SAS Outeniqua before 
decommissioning, as well as SAS Drakensberg assisted various departments such as the 
DEAT.  Although the DEAT has SA Agulhas and other small vessels, it certainly lacks 
limited sea-lifting and ice-breaking capabilities necessary to perform specific tasks.   
The SAN cooperate with the DEAT when needed. The most notable assistance was 
rendered during the construction of the South African National Atlantic Expedition 
(SANAE) IV, an international Antarctic research station that began in the 1990s 
(Harman, 2008a:23).  In 1991 SAS Drakensberg, a support vessel with a capability to 
carry a heavy load as mentioned in chapter three, supplied victuals and fuel to SA 
Agulhas during the early stages of the construction of SANAE IV (Thiart, 2010:45).  
The SAN codenamed this assistance Operation SOUTHERN LIGHTS, aimed at 
assisting the DEAT by laying weather buoys and service island stations while building 
SANAE IV (Carter & Conradie, 1996:12).   
During her years of service in the SAN, SAS Outeniqua was known for her 
deployments to Antarctica under Operation SOUTHERN LIGHTS.  Antarctica is 
surrounded by ice, making it difficult for any ship, except ice-breaking vessels, to 
navigate.  SAS Outeniqua was required because of her ice-breaking capability.  During 
the second deployment of Operation SOUTHERN LIGHTS, the then Minister of Public 
Works, Mr J. Radebe hosted a press conference onboard SAS Outeniqua attended by 
other dignitaries such as the then Director-General of the DEAT, Dr. F. Hannekom who 
later deployed with the ship’s company to Antarctica (Carter, 1995:6). In one of her 
deployments to Antarctica, SAS Outeniqua ferried 200 aviation fuel drums as a result of 
an agreement between the South African and Norwegian governments (Spencer, 
1996:14).  Following the decommissioning of SAS Outeniqua, the SAN lacks ice-
breaking and sea lift capabilities to Antarctica which was useful for the DEAT.    
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In addition to transporting equipment to Antarctica, the SAN also assist the DEAT in 
protecting maritime resources.  For instance, the Reaction Force together with the 
Operational Boat Squadron and SAS Tobie executed Operation INTEXO assisting the 
DEAT in June 2007.  Operation INTEXO was an anti-poaching operation aimed at 
preventing the extinction of one of the most endangered species such as the Patagonian 
toothfish as well as other resources such as the Cape rock lobster and perlemoen 
(abalone).  The operation led to the incarceration of poachers off the Cape south coast 
(Harman, 2007a:10).   
Apart from the DEAT, the SAN assists other state departments.  One of the memorable 
moment in which the SAN, particularly SAS Drakensberg, assisted another state 
department was from 21 March to 6 April 2007.  SAS Drakensberg, following an 
instruction from the Presidency during the Mbeki era, transported a nuclear rotor from 
France for the Electricity Supply Commission.  Given the fact that the ship was not 
equipped to carry a nuclear rotor, reinforcement at the instruction of C Navy, were 
conducted to ensure the safe delivery.
13
  The successful transportation of the rotor 
illustrated the versatility of SAS Drakensberg which is one of the attributes of warships.  
On arrival, the rotor was fitted in the Cape Town Koeberg Nuclear Power station to 
eradicate power outrages following the malfunctioning of one of the rotors (Sharwood, 
2007:14).   
5.6 DISASTER MANAGEMENT, HUMANITARIAN AND RELIEF 
OPERATIONS 
Disaster management and relief operations are some of the peacetime tasks of the SAN 
and refer to “the provision of support for the preservation of life, health and property in 
emergencies that exceed the capacity of the civilian authorities” (Simpson-Anderson, 
1997:30).  In 1991, the SAN rendered humanitarian assistance during the foundering of 
a Greek cruiser, Oceonos; while SAS Drakensberg supplied relief-aid to Bangladesh, 
Turkey and Mozambique.  SAS Tafelberg rendered humanitarian relief in September 
1992 to Somali refugees in Kenya (Thiart, 2010:45-46).  The SAN also shipped relief 
supplies to Bangladesh, Turkey, Mozambique and Kenya (Heitman, 1995b:40). 
                                                          
13 Author’s reminiscence of the Address by C Navy, Vice-Admiral J. Mudimu during a visit at the Military Academy 
in 2007.   
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In the post-1994 settlement, elements of the SAN such as the diving teams have 
continued to be instrumental in disaster management and relief operations.  Although 
these kind of tasks are regarded as constabulary, some have an international dimension 
making them part of South African naval diplomacy.  For instance, a formal request 
from a state to South Africa requiring assistance in relief operations falls within the 
sphere of diplomacy, and when the SAN is called to assist, such operations become part 
of South African naval diplomacy.  The country has received various requests to assist.  
Accordingly, South Africa has offered assistance, in times of disasters, to various states 
in and outside Africa.   
In late 2000 and early 2001, Mozambique experienced some of the worst floods in the 
21
st
 century when tropical cyclones hit its shores resulting in heavy rains covering most 
part of the country.  With their limited resources, SADC members were instrumental in 
relief operations during the floods (Rafrouf, 2000:27).  South Africa responded 
promptly by sending elements from the SANDF.  From Simon’s Town Diving Centre 
divers Petty Officer Jan Uys, Leading Seaman Gareth Vallender, Leading Seaman 
Shane Ferguson, Leading Seaman John Briscoe, Able Seaman Deon van der Merwe and 
Able Seaman Dean McCue, were given 24 hour notice to prepare for deploying to assist 
in the Mozambican floods (Navy News, 2001a:20-1).  During the same period India 
experienced an earthquake. General Siphiwe Nyanda, then Chief of the SANDF, 
authorised SAS Drakensberg to be utilised as a cargo ship for organisations willing to 
assist the victims of the earthquake disaster in Gujarat, India.  SAS Drakensberg 
departed from Durban en route to India on 4 February 2001 (Gounden, 2001:22).   
In order to ensure its readiness in dealing with disasters, the SAN often hosts workshops 
with other stake holders.  For instance, the DOD and the SAN co-hosted the Defence 
Environment International Co-operation Workshop from 30 March to 2 April 2009, 
focusing on disaster management of oil spills.  The workshop was presented by the US 
AFRICOM and the US Navy Europe/Africa, supported by the coasts guards of the USA 
and Latvia.  Participating states included the navies of the USA, Namibia and South 
Africa, as well as the Marine and Coastal Management, City of Cape Town Disaster 
Management, National Ports Authority and the Institute for Maritime Technology 
(Linderoth, 2009:29).  
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It should be noted that relief operations, particularly humanitarian in nature, require 
specialised equipment geared for such operations.  As highlighted in chapter three, the 
SAN lacks LHD capable of accommodating large numbers of people.  Vice-Admiral 
Mudimu admitted during an interview with Navy News in 2005 that the 
decommissioning of SAS Outeniqua has reduced the SAN’s capacity in relief 
operations (Navy News, 2005:10).  With the exception of SAS Drakensberg, the SAN 
does not have the sea lift capability as highlighted in chapter three.   
5.7 NAVAL CO-ORDINATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING 
SANGP 100 defines NCAGS as “the guidance of friendly merchant shipping through 
safe lanes/areas in time of crises. It is used for the protection of maritime trade” (South 
African Navy, 2006:36).  The SAN cooperate with other stakeholders in the maritime 
industry such as SAMSA, SASAR, Marine and Coastal Management, City of Cape 
Town Disaster Management, National Ports Authority, the Institute for Maritime 
Technology and the broader shipping industry (Linderoth, 2009:29). This cooperation 
makes the South African experience in NCAGS unrivalled in Africa.   
South Africa has been involved in this area for several years, making it the only country 
to lead SADC in NCAGS.  The NCAGS centre is situated at the Joint Tactical 
Headquarters West at Silvermine, Tokai near Cape Town.  Its strategic function is to 
protect merchant shipping in South African and international waters as well as monitor 
piracy and other forms of crimes at sea.  The centre has two regions, East and West, 
each with three ports.  Region West focuses on Port Elizabeth, Cape Town and 
Saldanha Bay, while Region East focuses on Richards Bay, Durban and East London.  
Following the closure of Naval Reserve units in the SAN, the NCAGS function is 
mainly performed by the Reserve Force members who occupy more than 100 posts 
(Von Zeil, 2006a: 32).   
In the post-1994 settlement, the NCAGS centre established closer relations with SADC 
countries and has trained several members in NCAGS Part 1 and Part 2 courses.
14
  As 
part of assisting other SADC states, the SAN coordinates Exercise DEEP BLUE, which 
is an NCAGS exercise as mentioned in chapter four (Von Zeil, 2006b: 15).  In 2004, 
South Africa joined the PACIOSWG (Von Zeil, 2006a: 32).  The PACIOSWG is an 
                                                          
14 Author’s own experiences while working at the NCAGS at Silvermine in 2005.   
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arrangement created to promote common doctrine and procedures in the area of 
NCAGS in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.  Initially the core membership includes the 
USA, Australia, Canada and the UK.  The membership has grown to include other states 
such as Chile, South Korea, France, South Africa and other states (Rahman, 2001: 26).  
The common doctrine and procedures of the PACIOSWG are practiced each year 
during Exercise BELL BUOY which members host on a rotation basis.  Other NCAGS 
exercises include TRANSOCEANIC as discussed in chapter four.  By regularly 
participating in various NCAGS exercises, the SAN harnesses the skills needed for 
keeping SLOCs safe for various ships (Eldon, 2012).  Keeping SLOCs safe is, however, 
a challenge because some African states are in conflict, while others face the potential 
for conflict, which have spill-over effects to the maritime domain as discussed in the 
next section.   
5.8 CONFLICT AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS IN AFRICAN STATES: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SAN 
Africa is a continent that has been ravaged by conflicts for many years beginning in the 
pre-colonial era, to colonial and the post-colonial eras.  Some African countries may be 
considered to be weak, failed or collapsed states.  Conflicts in some of these states 
continue and have become a challenge to the development of the continent.  Conflicts 
have implications for pivotal states which are engaged or seek to engage in conflict 
resolution and management such as South Africa.  Subsequently, the SANDF as a 
partner in the diplomatic process to resolve these conflicts become involved, and the 
SAN is often called to assist in some of the regions.  This section deals with weak, 
failed and collapsed states, African states in conflicts, the implications for the SAN as 
well as the involvement of the SANDF in UN and AU Missions in Africa.   
5.8.1 African Weak, Failed and Collapsed States 
Since independence, some African states have regressed to become weak states, while 
others are considered failed states.  The relative strength of a state can be measured by 
its ability and willingness to have an effective government, and legitimate political 
institutions to provide physical security and welfare for the citizenry (Patrick, 2006:29).  
Simply put, a state should not only meet the criteria of statehood as mentioned in 
chapter one (Dugard, 2005:82-9), but it should also possess the capacity and willingness 
to make that criteria a reality.   
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There are three different kinds of states in a sense that some have failed, while others 
have ultimately collapsed (Rotberg, 2004:1).  Some states are strong in one area, while 
weak on other areas.  Within a spectrum, they range from fragile states to collapsed 
states (Patrick, 2006:30).  One of the leading scholars in the field of weak and collapsed 
states, Robert Rotberg states that  
Weak states include a broad continuum of states that are: inherently 
weak because of geographical, physical, or fundamental economic 
constraints; basically strong, but temporarily or situationally weak 
because of internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, 
despotism, or external attacks; and a mixture of the two. Weak states 
typically harbor ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal 
tensions that have not yet, or not yet thoroughly, become overtly 
violent (Rotberg, 2003:4). 
Other authors often use weak states interchangeably with failed, fragile, quasi and crises 
states (Huria, 2008:1).  These states are unable to fulfil the mentioned duties that enable 
them to meet the criteria for statehood.  Although there is lack of consensus of the 
definition of a failed state; there is, however, consensus that it is a state at the precipice 
of conflict and instability.  Furthermore, the government structures are unable to prevent 
the situation from degenerating into chaos (Wyler, 2007:3).  Examples of weak states 
due to the lack of capacity include Mozambique and Senegal, while weak states due to 
lack of political will include Zimbabwe (Patrick, 2006:30).   
Failed states, on the other hand, are mostly or were in conflict with government forces 
fighting against one or more insurgent movements.  In addition, conflict endures and 
violence is directed towards the incumbent government.  In most cases, failed states 
have experienced or experience civil wars. Examples of failed states include Angola, 
Burundi, the DRC and Sudan (Rotberg, 2003:5).  The three states have experienced 
some of the deadliest civil wars in the last two or three decades.  The tremendous 
version of a failed state is termed collapsed state in which the strong rules.  Examples 
include Somalia in the 1980s, Bosnia, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone in the 
1990s (Rotberg, 2003:10).  In 2012, Somalia is currently one of the worst collapsed 
states in the world characterised by criminal activities such as warlordism on land and 
piracy at sea.  It is a major concern as elucidated in chapters three and four.  Somalia 
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has economic underdevelopment, failed political institutions and widespread violence, 
making it worse than a weak and failed state (Clapham 2004:84-90).   
According to the Failed States Index 2012 of Foreign Policy, which rates states in five 
categories; critical, in danger, borderline, stable and most stable, 15 out of 20 states in 
the critical category are in Africa.  These states, in order of severity, are Somalia, the 
DRC, Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivore, Guinea, 
Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Ethiopia, Burundi, Niger, and Uganda.  In the second 
category of states in danger, 10 out of 20 states are in Africa namely; Eritrea, Liberia, 
Cameroon, Egypt, Sierra Leone, Congo, Rwanda, Malawi, Mauritania and Togo 
(Sheldon, 2012:Online).   
 
 
 
Somalia has topped the ranking for the past few years.  The Fund for Peace Failed State 
Index 2012 categorises each state from Alert (critical) to Sustainable (more stable) as 
indicated by colours in Figure 6.  It illustrates that some African states are considered 
weak, while others are failed and collapsed states (The Fund for Peace, 2012:Online).  It 
is worth noting that African weak, failed and collapsed states have experienced conflict 
or are still experiencing conflict.  
5.8.2 African States in Conflict 
With the exception of few countries, most African states have experienced conflict since 
independence.  Some of these conflicts are part of the colonial heritage, while others are 
Figure 6:  The Failed States Index 2012 Interactive Grid (The Fund for Peace, 
2012). 
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due to greed and praetorian tendencies of the African elite.  Some African states, 
particularly weak, failed and collapsed states as indicated in Figure 6, have experienced 
some form of conflict.  In the 1990s, states such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Eritrea, 
Cote d’Ivoire, the DRC, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, the Comoros 
and Sudan, have experienced conflict as indicated in Figure 7 in the next page (Shar, 
2011:1).   
Conflict in some of these states such as Somalia, the DRC, Sudan and Nigeria, is 
recurring.  In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, conflict continues between various 
groups (Ayodele, 2010:111).  The Sudanese conflicts, regardless of the successful 
secession of the southern region leading to the creation of South Sudan in 2011, 
continue.  These conflicts are inconsistent with, and hinder, the African Renaissance. 
More importantly, landward conflicts spill into the maritime domain which is crucial to 
the development of Africa.  Without the eradication of conflict, Africa will not progress 
forward towards the development and economic emancipation of the continent.  
Consequently, the African Renaissance will remain an unreachable goal.  To achieve the 
African Renaissance, various countries, including South Africa, play leading roles in 
African conflict resolution and management as efforts to bring stability which is a 
precondition for economic development.  
5.8.3 Promoting the African Renaissance:  South Africa and Peace Missions 
South Africa’s reacceptance into the international community coincided with ferocious 
intra-state conflicts ravaging some parts of Africa as shown in Figure 7 (African Centre 
for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2007:21). As early as 1996, Thabo Mbeki, 
then Deputy President, together with like minded African leaders embarked on the 
African Renaissance aimed at steering Africa towards economic development, stability 
and democracy (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2006:293).  From this moment, South 
Africa’s agenda became clear.  
Accordingly, all major policy documents of the country enacted reflected support for 
the African Renaissance.  In addition, all state apparatus including the military were 
reconfigured to achieve the African Renaissance.  In order to play a positive role in 
eradicating African conflicts, South Africa entered into peace missions’ discourse which 
later featured in several policy documents, particularly the White Paper on Participation 
in International Peace Missions (1999).  International peace missions are regarded as 
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secondary functions of the SANDF as contained in major South African policy 
documents such as the White Paper on Defence (Department of Defence, 1996:23; 
Matheba, 2003: 15).  The White Paper on Participation in International Peace Missions 
explicates the shift from peacekeeping to peace missions in conflict resolution and 
management discourse (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999:6).  Although some people 
use the two concepts interchangeably, peace missions are broader than peacekeeping, 
and are essentially political and diplomatic activities aimed at conflict prevention, 
management and resolution.  In contrast, peacekeeping refers to placing of forces in the 
theatre of operations (South African Navy, 2006:34).   
 
 
Figure 7: Hunger and Conflict in African States in the 1990s (Rekacewicz, 2007) 
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Since 1997, the country has been instrumental in brokering peace in Africa.  It was 
involved in Angola, Burundi, Lesotho, Kenya, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe. South African peacekeepers, under the banners of the UN and AU, deployed 
to countries such as Burundi, DRC, Comoros, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Central African 
Republic and Sudan in efforts to resolve the conflicts (Habib, 2009a:148; Lipton, 2009: 
334).  Conflicts and potential conflicts in African states do not only have implications 
for South Africa, but also for the SANDF, which include the SAN.   
5.8.4 Implications for the SAN 
During the annual navy conference, co-hosted by the Institute for Security Studies, the 
SAN and the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Cape Town on 17 October 1996, it transpired 
that the navy, as part of foreign policy instruments, would play a meaningful role in 
achieving the African Renaissance.  It was stated that the SAN’s role in Southern Africa 
should be understood within the context that South Africa’s development is inextricably 
linked to that of other African states.  It was obvious in 1997 that the formulation and 
implementation of South Africa's foreign policy towards Africa would revolve around 
conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy (Evans, 1997:6).  As clearly captured by 
Evans, “(i)n peacetime, the Navy can play a role in naval diplomacy, it can contribute to 
South Africa's commitment to help to maintain international peace and security, to 
safeguard the environment, and it can assist in preventing the proliferation of arms” 
(Evans, 1997:7).  From this moment it became epiphanic that the SAN should 
contribute to conflict resolution and management.  One of the well-known military 
analysts, Heitman (2009:52), noted that the SAN should prepare to play a large role in 
peace missions because it is Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest navy.  
The above assertion raises the question: Is the SAN prepared and equipped to play a 
vital role in international conflict resolution and management?  Before attempting to 
address this question, it is pertinent to reflect on the implications of the geostrategic 
locations of some of the states in conflict.  Most of these conflicts occur in states with 
close proximity to the ocean as indicated in Figure 7, while others occur in states with 
vast areas covered with waters in the form of rivers and lakes, such as the Great Lakes 
region.  With the exception of specialised forces and the SAN, the majority of the 
SANDF members are not trained to operate in rivers and lakes.  The fact of the matter is 
that naval commanders should prepare the SAN for riverine operations to assist in 
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conflict resolution and management.  Evidently, the SAN’s leadership resonates with 
this reality.  In an interview with the Navy News in 2005, Vice-Admiral Mudimu stated 
that South Africa’s current priorities are to ensure peace and stability in the continent in 
order to achieve economic development and reconstruction (Navy News, 2005:10).   
He also admitted to the existence of turmoil in the continent, particularly the situation in 
the Great Lakes region and the DRC in particular (Navy News, 2005:10).  C Navy 
stated that all State Apparatus including the SAN need to get involved in peace making, 
peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction.  He also stated: “(w)ith the Defence 
Force in that scenario we need to ask: What good can the (SAN) do in that kind of 
environment? –It’s more-or-less all forest, just bushes and mountains – Could the Navy 
have a role in such a scenario where there is no sea?” (Navy News, 2005:10).  It is 
within the context of this rationale that the SAN began developing a role in riverine 
operations including the Operational Boat Squadron.  From this juncture it became 
epiphanic that the SAN will play a vital role in South Africa’s effort to bring peace and 
stability in the continent.   
It should be noted, however, that this role require specialised units and equipment.  
Revisiting the question on the preparedness and equipment with regard to peace keeping 
operations posed earlier, it should be noted that when South Africa ventured into peace 
missions, the SAN was neither equipped nor prepared for such operations.  Initially, the 
SAN lacked Marines’ type forces trained for amphibious operations following the 
disbanding of the Marine Branch in 1990.  With the creation of the MRS (discussed in 
chapter three), the SAN currently possesses forces trained for amphibious roles during 
peace operations as well as other kinds of operations.  However, the major challenge, as 
already indicated, is the lack of sea lifting capability.  SAS Drakensberg, as discussed in 
chapter three, cannot successfully perform supporting duties on her own, and the 
frigates and submarines are definitely ill-suited for sea lifting duties.  It should be 
reiterated that acquiring vessels such as LHD, discussed in chapter three, will elevate 
South Africa’s contributions to different missions ranging from disaster relief to 
humanitarian and peace missions.   
LHD vessels are useful in peace missions and will give South Africa and the region a 
range of capabilities including amphibious and sea-landing operations in crisis response, 
peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations; poised force to supplement diplomatic 
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negotiations during crisis; sea lift to deploy and support peacekeeping forces; non-
combatant evacuation during crisis; as well as other capabilities (Heitman, 2009:53; 
Kempf, 2000:5).  Despite these challenges, the SAN has participated and still 
participates in various UN and AU missions as well as bilateral missions around the 
world, in which the SANDF is involved.   
5.9 UN AND AU MISSIONS IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE: AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE SANDF INVOLVEMENT 
In order to contextualise the role of the SAN in international conflict resolution and 
management, it is necessary to provide an overview of the SANDF involvement in 
various missions.  The SANDF has been involved in UN and AU missions as well as 
other operations resulting from bilateral agreements since the end of the Cold War.  The 
African environment has changed since the end of the Cold War as reflected in various 
South African policy documents mentioned earlier.  African challenges range from 
famine and environmental degradation.  Some of these challenges have led to different 
kinds of conflict in the African continent.  The UN as well as the AU and other actors 
have been involved in resolving most of the conflict ravaging the continent (Coyne, 
2006:349; Menkhause, 1998:220; Menkhaus, 2003:405).   
South Africa, however, only began participating in conflict resolution and management 
after 1994.  By the end of 2005, the SANDF was already involved in some of the weak, 
failed and collapsed states such Burundi, Eritrea, Sudan and the Cote d’Ivore (Navy 
News, 2005:10).  These are some of the states indicated in Figure 7 illustrating hunger 
and conflict in Africa in the 1990s.  During the 10
th
 anniversary celebrations of the 
SANDF involvement in peace missions in October 2009, President Zuma stated that 
“(t)he SANDF has placed South Africa amongst the world’s largest contributors to 
United Nations peacekeeping operations” (The Presidency, 2009:1).   
Since 1994, the country has initiated various peace operations such as operations 
MISTRAL, ESPRESSO, FIBRE, TRITON, AMPHIBIAN, SUNRAY, MONTEGO, 
CORDITE, TEUTONIC, PRESTINE, CURRICULUM, INDULI, VIMBEZELA and 
BONGANE, as shown in Figure 8.  These operations have been conducted under the 
banners of the UN and the AU as well as part of bilateral agreements with some states.  
Resolution 1279 of the UN Security Council adopted on 30 November 1999 led to the 
establishment the MONUC (United Nations, 1999:1).  MONUC was sanctioned with 
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about 20000 troops stationed in the region.  South Africa contributed financial, human 
and logistical support in the DRC’s presidential elections and provincial elections in 
2006 and 2007 respectively (Adebajo & Paterson, 2010:2).  In addition, the SANDF 
provide troops since 05 February 1999 when Colonel Hans Swart became the first South 
African peacekeeper deployed in Kampala as capital liaison officer supporting the DRC 
peace process (Ross, 2009:10).    
     
 
 
The SANDF involvement was termed Operation MISTRAL conducted during the 
different phases of MONUC.  Initially, 25 staff officers and military observers were 
deployed to the DRC under MISTRAL (Department of Defence, 2005b:30). 
Simultaneously as Operation MISTRAL was underway, Operation AMPHIBIAN, 
during the negotiation of the South African brokered Global and Inclusive Agreement 
on Transition in the DRC leading to foreign forces withdrawing from the country, a 
secretariat (later known as the Third Party Verification Mechanism) was established 
from August 2002 to June 2004 comprising members of the SANDF and the UN 
Figure 8:  SANDF Deployments in various Missions (Ross, 2009:10) 
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(Department of Foreign Affairs, 2002:2; Ross, 2009:13).  Operation AMPHIBIAN 
involved a deployment of 10 members to the DRC and Rwanda (Department of 
Defence, 2005a:72).  The deterioration in the Ituri province in the DRC in May 2003 led 
to the UN Security Council authorising the deployment of the French-led European 
Union Interim Emergency Multinational Force.  South Africa provided helicopters and 
Rear-Admiral (JG) D. Forrest led the country’s planning team to the UN Headquarters 
and Paris.  This team planned Operation SUNRAY commencing in June and ending in 
September 2003 (Ross, 2009:13).  
In March 2004, 147 members of the SANDF were deployed in the DRC as part of the 
operations.  Additional members were deployed during the different phases of MONUC 
(Department of Defence, 2004:26).  During Phase III of MONUC about 1 269 SANDF 
members were deployed at Kindu (Department of Defence, 2005b:30).  Following the 
decline of hostilities, Operation TEUTONIC aimed at integrating and training the 
Congolese forces was instituted.  In 2005, 36 members of the SANDF assisted in 
integration and training more than 40000 members of the Congolese Army in the DRC 
(Department of Defence, 2005b:30).  These members were reduced to 28 between 2008 
and 2009; and were assisting in the Security Sector Reform in the DRC (Department of 
Defence, 2008a:40).  As mentioned earlier, Eritrea and Ethiopia were states in conflict 
following the end of the Cold War.  The hostilities between the two states date back to 
decolonisation.  Following Italy’s withdrawal in its former colonies, Eritrea fought a 
war for secession against Ethiopia since 1961.   
Until recently, Eritrea remained the only African state of successful secession which 
was gained in 1993 (Schraeder, 2004:94-95).  Since 1993, the hostilities between the 
two countries with regard to a border dispute continued until the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) managed to broker the peace in 1999, culminating in the peace 
agreement signed on 18 June 1999 (Ross, 2009:11).  Both countries requested 
assistance from the UN leading to the establishment of the UN Mission in Eritrea and 
Ethiopia (UNMEE) (United Nations, 2005:1). The Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) of the UN requested South Africa to deploy operations plan officer, 
information officer, an engineer cell warrant officer and two military observers, while 
the OAU requested two liaison officers (Ross, 2009:11).  In response to the request the 
SANDF commissioned Operation ESPRESSO deploying to Ethiopia and Eritrea as part 
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of the AU Liason Mission and the UN Mission in those countries (Department of 
Defence, 2004:27).   
In 2005, six members appointed as staff officers and military observers deployed to 
Eritrea, while a staff officer deployed to Ethiopia as part of the operation (Department 
of Defence, 2005b:30).  In 2008, the members were increased to 10 prior to the 
termination of the operation in July 2008 following resolution 1827 of the UN Security 
Council (Department of Defence, 2008a:41; Department of Public Information, 2008:1; 
United Nations, 2008:1).  The conflict in Burundi emerged in 1999 when Bujumbura 
was attacked by rebels.  As one of the principles of South Africa’s foreign policy, the 
country began immensely involved in bringing peace into Burundi.  Nelson Mandela 
became the leader of the Arusha Peace Process in December 1999.   
Following the adoption of Resolution 1375 by the UN Security Council endorsing “the 
efforts of the Government of South Africa and other member States to support the 
implementation of the Arusha Agreement” (United Nations, 2001:2), the SANDF, at the 
instruction of the government, commenced deploying members to Burundi.  The 
deployments were termed Operation FIBRE encompassing deployments under bilateral 
agreement between South Africa and Burundi as well as deployments under the AU 
from 2003 and UN from 2004 (Ross, 2009:11).  
The AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was instituted on 1 May 2003 with a mandate 
aimed at the protection of negotiators during the process and the returning political 
leaders.  Following the institutionalisation of the UN Operations in Burundi (ONUB) in 
2004, the SANDF deployed more than 1000 personnel of which 44 were naval 
personnel.  In March 2004 about 1600 Members of the SANDF were deployed in 
Operation FIBRE to AMIB (Department of Defence, 2004:27).  In 2005, more than 900 
SANDF members were deployed in Burundi.  Some of them were part of the VIP 
protection contingent (Department of Defence, 2005b:30).  In 2007, Operation 
CURRICULUM was initiated as a Special Task Force in Burundi.  Between 2008 and 
2009, 1137 members of the SANDF were deployed before the operation was terminated 
in 2009 (Department of Defence, 2008a:40).   
In Sudan, the situation in the Darfur region resulted in the AU Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) being initiated.  Members of the SANDF deployed under Operation CORDITE 
in July 2004 (Ross, 2009:14).  More than 300 peacekeepers including staff officers, 
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military observers and a legal practitioner, from the SANDF were deployed in the 
Sudan as part of the AMIS (Department of Defence, 2005b:30).  Following the 
termination of AMIS and the commencement of the AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID) mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1769 of 2007, Operation 
CORDITE remained in Darfur supporting the mission (United Nations, 2007:3). Less 
than 1000 members of the SANDF were involved since the beginning of the operation 
(Department of Defence, 2008a:41).   
The Comoros Islands have been instable since the secessionist attempt in 1997 in 
Anjouan.  The OAU took a leading role of peace building efforts in the Islands.  The 
SANDF was requested to provide members to be part of the OAU team in the Comoros.  
Consequently, Operation TRITON I commenced in 2001 and military observers and 
communication technicians deployed for the operation.  Operation TRITON I was 
followed by II, III and IV between 2002 and 2006 under the AU banner (Ross, 
2009:13).   
Other operations include Operations VIMBEZELA, BONGANE, MONTEGO, 
PRESTINE and INDULI, which were conducted in the Central African Republic, 
Uganda, Liberia, Cotê d’Ivoire and Nepal as shown in the map.  Operation 
VIMBEZELA, initiated following a bilateral agreement between South Africa and the 
Central African Republic, entailed military assistance. Between 2008 and 2011, about 
85 members were deployed in the operation (Department of Defence, 2008a:41).   
Operation BONGANE, which also culminated from a bilateral agreement, supported the 
AU peace process in northern Uganda.  Only two members were deployed as observers 
between 2008 and 2011 (Department of Defence, 2008a:41).  In 2003, the Security 
Council established the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) under Chapter Seven of the 
UN Charter following the limited successes of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) led mission in that country.  UNMIL aimed at supported the 
implementation of the ceasefire agreement between the warring forces (United Nations, 
2003:3).  
The UN DPKO requested South Africa to provide three staff officers to UNMIL.  The 
SANDF deployed members under Operation MONTEGO from October 2003 to 
January 2005 when the operation was terminated (Ross, 2009:13).  The same year, 
Operation PRESTINE emerged from the Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in 
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Cotê d’Ivoire of 6 April 2005 (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2005:1).  South Africa, 
as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, deployed SANDF members 
from July 2005 to December 2006 to assist in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration in Cotê d’Ivoire (Ross, 2009:14).  Members were also involved in 
operations outside the African continent.  Five members were deployed in Operation 
INDULI in Nepal, South Asia, as military observers and staff officers under the UN 
(Department of Defence, 2008a:41).  There is no doubt the SANDF has been involved 
in UN and AU missions since the late 1990s.  The SA Army, understandably as the 
largest component of the South African military, has contributed the most personnel in 
peace mission.  Nonetheless, what has been the role of the SAN in peace missions?  
This question is addressed in the next section.  
5.10 THE ROLE OF THE SAN IN PEACE MISSIONS 
Within the roles of a navy explained in chapter two, peace missions are part of the 
policing roles.  These roles include peace support operations, peace enforcement, peace-
building, anti-piracy operations, enforcement of embargoes, and interdiction operations 
to name but few.  The SAN is instrumental in all these operations (South African Navy, 
2006:35).  As explained in the theory of naval diplomacy in chapter two, the boundaries 
between the different roles of a navy are nebulous.   
Due to their attributes (strategic reach, controllability, independence, strategic mobility, 
flexibility, durability, and symbolism) navies may shift swiftly from one role to the 
other in comparison to armies and air forces (Booth (1997:33-6).  By providing 
platforms for negotiations in peace missions as done by the SAN (to be discussed later), 
navies play more than policing roles, particularly in peace missions, which is a 
diplomatic effort directly supporting foreign policy as illustrated by the use of the 
military instrument in South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994.     
When the Bureau Chief for The Beeld in Durban, Dries Liebenberg, asked a question on 
the role of the SA Navy in peace support operations in the DRC and in Burundi, Vice-
Admiral Retief, then C Navy, articulated: 
Our job in the DRC and Burundi is not to retaliate, but to stop 
violence and assist refugees. In order to retaliate we need a mandate. 
We will patrol the long stretch of the Burundi border. We are 
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currently boosting our commitment to the African Union Mission in 
Burundi with the addition of a maritime component comprising three 
harbour protection patrol boats delivered to Durban by the ship that 
you are on at the moment, supported by our Protection Force 
Personnel from Naval Base Simon's Town and Naval Station Durban. 
Their main role will be to assist the mission commander to extend the 
security operation to the area (Gounden, 2003d:41).   
Members of the SAN as well as warships have been instrumental in some of the 
operations discussed earlier in states such as the DRC and Burundi.  The involvement of 
the SAN ranged from providing platforms such as ships to deploying personnel suited to 
operate in certain areas such as rivers and lakes (Department of Defence, 2008b:135).  
One of the SAN vessels, SAS Outeniqua, contributed to the peace process in the DRC. 
5.10.1 The Role of SAS Outeniqua in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
The severity of the conflict in Zaire (now the DRC) required meaningful contributions.  
South Africa as a soft power took a centre stage in conflict resolution and management 
in the region beginning with mediation efforts. In 1997, Nelson Mandela mediated 
between President Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent Kabila (Solomon, 2010:134; Vines, 
2010: 59).  Initially, Mandela sought to convince Mobutu to form a coalition 
government with Kabila (Matheba, 2003: 20).  As a foreign policy instrument, the 
SANDF was soon called to support the diplomatic process.  The involvement included 
the SAN.  Although navies are limited in their roles in peace missions, they “may be 
used as neutral territory for talks, while naval personnel can be employed as military 
observers, liaison officers, HQ staff officers, disarmament inspectors or in medical or 
communications teams” (South African Navy, 2006:34).  Accordingly, the SAN 
provided a neutral territory for talks.   
In May 1997, South Africa initiated Operation WHITE DOVE during the Great Lakes 
peace process (Ross, 2003: 23).  The operation was part of South African naval 
diplomacy and involved the use of the now decommissioned SAS Outeniqua, docked in 
Pointe Noire in the DRC, as a feasible non-aligned platform for peace negotiations 
(Mbeki, 2008:30; Thiart, 2010:44-45).  The South African mediators led by Mandela 
and Mbeki utilised SAS Outeniqua as the venue for peace talks at sea, off the coast of 
Zaire, away from the hostilities (Habib 2009a:149; Werkman, 1999a:15).  This is one of 
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the uses of navies in peace support operations, which Heitman (2009:47-8) calls secure 
negotiating venue.  The talks resulted in the Outeniqua Agreement or Accord, named 
after the ship, which sought Laurent Kabila succeeding Mobutu Sese Seko as the 
president of Zaire, and eventually changing the country to the DRC (Bennett & 
Söderlund, 2008:119). Mbeki congratulated the SAN for “discharging its 
responsibilities with great distinction and loyalty to the national cause” (Mbeki, 2008: 
30) during the 1997 negotiations.  He also stressed that the SAN is a significant partner 
in the realisation of the African Renaissance. The Outeniqua Agreement proved difficult 
to implement leading to the SANDF being involved in the peace process, as already 
described.  While the peace negotiations were underway in the DRC, another Great 
Lakes country, Burundi, commenced experiencing conflict.   
5.10.2 The Role of the SAN Maritime Contingent in Burundi 
When the Burundi conflict that emerged after rebels attacked Bujumbura, Mandela 
became the leader of the Arusha Peace Process in December 1999.  South Africa 
commenced deploying a contingent to protect negotiators during the process.  
Following the institutionalisation of the ONUB as mentioned, the SANDF deployed 
1264 personnel of which 44 were naval personnel constituting the Maritime Contingent 
from the SAN.  The Maritime Contingent, housed at 450 Base Camp, was responsible 
for waterborne operations in Lake Tanganyika covering about 133km from Bujumbura 
to the Tanzanian border (Department of Defence, 2005a:71).  The contingent used 
HPBs, operated by members of the Protection Force, to conduct operations.  Initially 
only two HPBs were engaged in operations before the arrival of additional boats.  The 
contingent played a crucial role of eliminating threats to land forces from the waters and 
ensuring that no weapons and personnel smuggling occurred via the lakes and rivers.   
However, the fact that only few HPBs were available limited the effectiveness of the 
contingent.  These boats faced challenges such as refuelling and had to operate for only 
two hours at a time.  Additional boats, two HPBs and Vredenbergers, were flown from 
Cape Town to assist with the operations.  With the arrival of the additional boats, 
patrols hours increased from two for every six hours, to a presence of two HPBs at any 
given time, and one boat on standby (Gounden, 2003e:13; Sverdloff, 2005:20-21).  
Subsequently, naval presence increased in the lakes and rivers, and deterred insurgents 
and criminal groups from using the waterways as SLOCs. 
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One of the sensitive areas was Romongi, situated along the peninsula side of the DRC, a 
closest access point to Burundi.  In this area, arms and personnel smuggling was rife 
before the additional patrols of the Maritime Contingent.  One of the reasons for 
smuggling problems was that the DRC was also in conflict and different groups 
obtained arms from one region to the other.  Following the increase in naval presence, it 
is safe to postulate that smuggling decreased as there were no reports of arms crossing 
the lake.  The contingent cooperated with forces from Kenya and Nepalese Special 
Forces operating in the area (Sverdloff, 2005:22).   
Given the dynamics of the Great Lakes and the fact that the SANDF did not have 
Marine style trained forces, the SAN was soon called to assist (Public Relations 
Department, 2008:1).  The disestablishment of the Marine Branch of the SAN in 1990 
created a vacuum in the Marine capability.  The SAN resorted that the Marines were no 
longer required following the end of the Cold War.  South Africa in the post-1994 
settlement found itself needing Marine trained forces for the Great Lakes region and 
other tasks requiring the capability.  Without this capability, the SAN had a very limited 
contribution in the Great Lakes region.   
Some scholars such as Heitman argued that “(t)he Navy should further consider 
establishing a small marine branch to handle the very specialised and highly demanding 
role of amphibious raids and larger-scale beach-landing operations” (Heitman, 2002:67) 
needed for the African continent. At the time, it seemed the recommendations failed to 
resonate with the leadership and the reasons for that, whether budgetary or otherwise, 
are unclear.  Nonetheless, it was apparent that Africa was in a state of flux and that the 
SANDF needed to be geared to deal with the current challenges.  Subsequently, the 
SAN decided to create the MRS, as explained in chapter three, to assist the SANDF 
when needed.   
Following its formation in 2006, the MRS deployed various elements to the Great Lakes 
region (Combrink, 2012).  During Operation CURRICULUM initiated as a Special 
Task Force in Burundi under the banner of the AU, the MRS deployed members to that 
country in 2007 (Department of Defence, 2008a:40).  Sub Lieutenant D.S. Thukani 
(then Able Seaman) deployed with 39 other members of the RFD to Burundi.  The 
initial role of these members was to protect the VIP returning from exile to engage in 
the negotiating process (Thukani, 2012).  This deployment included other members of 
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the SANDF which played various roles (Department of Defence, 2008a:40).  While 
RFD members were at the demobilisation centre at De Brug, Bloemfontein, preparing 
for deployment to Burundi, they faced a major setback when it became apparent that 
they lacked VIP protection training.  At the time of operational planning for the 
mission, the responsible planners failed to realise that the types of activities that the 
MRS can perform, excluded VIP protection.   
Certainly, the SAN has members that can perform VIP protection duties (Combrink, 
2012); regrettably, the MRS members do not perform such operations (Anonymous 
Interviews, 2011 & 2012).  While at De Brug, these members were almost withdrawn 
and returned to their base in Simon’s Town.  Fortunately, they were kept as part of the 
contingent.  Their evitable failure to deploy to Burundi due to omission would not only 
have had serious ramifications for the MRS, but also for the entire SAN.  It is postulated 
that the MRS would have been viewed as a failure even though the planners made the 
omission.  This is based on the understanding that the rationale for the creation of the 
MRS was its future role in African conflict resolution and management, particularly 
peace missions.    
The ability of decision makers in the SANDF, Chief of Joint Operations and his staff in 
particular, to adapt to changing circumstances saved the MRS from embarrassment.  
Subsequently, other duties were allocated to the members.  The main roles included 
protecting the houses in which the returning VIP members were housed instead of 
protecting the members themselves.  Other roles encompassed guard duties 
(Anonymous Interviews, 2012).  The challenges experienced by the RFD members 
included lack of adequate training, as the unit was still an infant, which decreased their 
confidence and increased anxiety.  A contributing factor to this is the fact that most 
members were on their first operational deployment on foreign soil.  Nonetheless, the 
situation has drastically changed since that deployment of the RFD. Members have 
since undergone various training programmes both in the SAN, Infantry School and 
other training areas in South Africa and abroad. They also conducted multinational 
exercises with other navies and national exercises with other elements of the SANDF 
(as discussed) and the SAPS (Malepe, 2012).  The MRS also deployed to the DRC.     
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5.10.3 Contributions of the MRS in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
On 15 December 2008, 19 MRS members deployed to the DRC for six months as part 
of MONUC.  Their main mission was to guard the air force base of the UN in Kamina, 
Katanga Province.  Their duties included patrolling and guarding the unit as well as 
providing access control. A year later the members were relieved by other members of 
the MRS in May 2009 (Cloete, 2009:Online; Kalake, 2009:Online).  From 26 
November 2010 to 26 may 2011, the MRS deployed members to the DRC under the UN 
Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) as part of the SANDF’s Operation 
MISTRAL.  Sub Lieutenant Letsoalo deployed as the protection element commander of 
the 19 members of MRS contingent formed by the RFD and ODD deployed in the 
eastern DRC at Goma, near Lake Kivu.   
The main duty of the members was to protect South African aviation elements, while 
the Indian contingent protected those of MONUSCO (Letsoalo, 2012).  Other 
responsibilities included protecting civilians, humanitarian workers, personnel and 
human rights defenders under threat of physical violence from the belligerents at Goma, 
near Lake Kivu and surrounding areas.  During the deployment no serious combat 
action was experienced, although uncertainty was rife.  All 19 members deployed 
returned home safe and sound.  The only challenges experienced by the members were 
discipline related issues due to boredom (Anonymous Interviews, 2012).  Despite its 
contributions to the Great Lakes and other areas and missions, the major weakness of 
the MRS remained its equipment.  Most of the equipment utilised were ageing and some 
had surpassed their life span, such as the mentioned boats.  In addition, other equipment 
was not ageing but lacking.  Failure to address the challenges with regard to equipment 
may result in the MRS unable to discharge its duties during operations.    
5.11 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the role of the SAN in international maritime 
assistance and international conflict resolution and management.  In this regard, South 
Africa -as a member of the IMO and IHO- is responsible for charting and surveying 
NAVAREA VII.  Both African and international ships rely on the SANHO to produce 
quality hygrographic services including charts and navigational warnings through South 
African Notices to Mariners to ensure safe navigation in NAVAREA VII.  The 
hydrographic services of the SAN, however, face major challenges.  These challenges 
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range from loss of skilled personnel to ageing equipment such as the hydrographic 
vessel.   
The SAN conducts search and rescue missions in conjunction with the NSRI, CAA, and 
other national institutions.  It has rendered assistance in various missions involving 
vessels and air craft of other states.  In addition, the SAN has equipped and empowered 
various African states as part of international maritime assistance.  The SAN also 
cooperate with national departments in performing tasks that only its assets can conduct 
such as ferrying materials to SANAE IV, which requires a vessel with ice-breaking 
capability.  Since the SAN no longer possesses ice-breaking capability, its assistance in 
Antarctica is limited.   
The SAN also renders assistance during natural disasters as illustrated by deployments 
to Mozambique during floods and the relief-aid transported to Bangladesh, Turkey and 
Mozambique by SAS Drakensberg.  However, the lack of sea lift capability is a 
limitation for disaster management, humanitarian and relief operations.  In case there is 
a major disaster, the SAN lacks a large vessel that can be transformed into a hospital 
ship.  Nonetheless, the SAN also plays a role in NCAGS in order to ensure safe SLOCs.   
In terms of conflict resolution and management, the SAN has a special role to play as 
illustrated by the use of SAS Outeniqua in the DRC and the deployment of the MRS 
and other elements to peace missions.  It seems the role of the SAN in peace missions 
will continue because the country’s foreign policy continues to emphasise on conflict 
resolution and management.  In addition, weak, failed and collapsed African states 
facing a high possibility of conflict are in close proximity to the coast.  Other states 
facing conflicts are located in the Great Lakes region where the amphibious role of 
Marines is seriously needed.   
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of the study is to investigate and theoretically appraise the nature and scope 
of South African naval diplomacy since 1994.  It is informed by the following research 
question: “what is the nature and scope of South African naval diplomacy since 1994?”  
The problem statement of the study emanates from the assertion that very little is known 
about South African naval diplomacy as part of the military instrument of foreign policy 
since 1994 outside naval ranks.  Thus, there is a gap in the literature with regard to 
South African naval diplomacy, resulting in a lack of knowledge to the academic 
community and the general public.  Based on the aforementioned, this study attempts to 
contribute to the literature concerning the diplomatic role of the SAN.  In this study, 
South African naval diplomacy is understood as composed of four main functions, 
namely; maritime coercion, naval cooperation, international maritime assistance, and 
international conflict resolution and management.  In order to achieve the purpose, the 
study has two objectives: 
 Firstly, the study seeks to outline the most salient features of South Africa’s 
post-1994 foreign policy as the framework for naval diplomacy. 
 Secondly, the study seeks to analytically describe maritime coercion, naval 
cooperation, international maritime assistance, and international conflict 
resolution and management.  
The study is demarcated to solely analytically describe South African naval diplomacy, 
with specific reference to maritime coercion, naval cooperation, international maritime 
assistance, and international conflict resolution and management.  The other roles of 
navies are omitted.  In addition, the study focuses on the period from 1994 to 2012 due 
to the change in the political landscape of the country and its foreign policy.  The 
research methodology of the study is a qualitative descriptive analysis, using literature, 
factual data and interviews as techniques to investigate and theoretically appraise South 
African naval diplomacy since 1994.  Both primary and secondary sources have been 
consulted in order to reach credible findings.   
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6.1 SUMMARY 
6.1.1 South Africa’s foreign policy and naval diplomacy since 1994 
South African naval diplomacy is defined as the use of maritime coercion, naval 
cooperation, international maritime assistance and international conflict resolution and 
management to support the country’s foreign policy objectives.  It has been pointed out 
that South African naval diplomacy should be understood within the ambits of the 
country’s foreign policy since 1994.  Navies world-wide are part of the military 
instrument and are significant role players in supporting their foreign policies thorough 
naval diplomacy, which can range from peaceful means in the form of naval 
cooperation and assistance, to coercive means in the form of gunboat diplomacy.  The 
country’s foreign policy underwent evolutionary transformation during the different 
eras from 1994 to the current period (2012).  
Although administrations in each era had various priorities, the principles of South 
Africa’s foreign policy which include, commitment to the promotion of human rights; 
commitment to the promotion of democracy; commitment to justice and international 
law in the conduct of relations between nations; commitment to the interests of Africa 
in world affairs; commitment to international peace and to internationally agreed-upon 
mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts; and wealth creation and security through the 
African Renaissance, remain unchanged.  The focus of South Africa’s foreign policy 
since the democratisation, which is peace rather than war, has definite intimations for 
the SAN.  Accordingly, the SAN focuses on secondary rather than primary roles and its 
benevolent posture enables it to play a pertinent role in the country’s foreign policy.   
Each of the functions of South African naval diplomacy supports the mentioned 
principles of the country’s foreign policy.  Maritime coercion is comprehended against 
the backdrop of the country’s foreign policy, which seeks to pursue its objectives using 
amicable means such as quiet diplomacy and the non-use of coercive force.  It is 
reiterated that the use of force or the threat of the use of force, a province of gunboat 
diplomacy, is not at the forefront of the country’s foreign policy priorities and national 
interests.  South Africa favours cooperation and the SAN engages in naval cooperation 
with navies from different states.  Naval cooperation encompasses picture and coalition 
building.  The SAN also engages in international maritime assistance and international 
conflict resolution and management supporting foreign policy efforts.  The activities 
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conducted by the SAN in each of these functions are summarised in the following 
sections.   
6.1.2 Maritime Coercion  
The SAN’s coercive naval diplomacy capabilities have improved since 1994 with the 
acquisition of frigates and submarines.  These capabilities are necessary for the 
protection of South Africa’s geostrategic position and territorial integrity as well as 
national and commercial interests.  Taking into cognisance foreign policy priorities and 
defence posture, it is reiterated that the use of gunboat diplomacy in its traditional sense 
to influence events on land and at sea is not prominent in the current environment.   
Maritime deterrence, in the form of expressive force and non-combatant evacuation 
operations; anti-piracy operations under Operation COPPER; security of South African 
waters for the 2010 FIFA World Cup; and other sources of maritime insecurity were 
conducted in the post-1994 period.  More importantly, the SAN did not use or threaten 
to use any naval force against any state.  The deployment of SAS Drakensberg to the 
GoG in the midst of the looming Cote d'Ivoire conflict in the aftermath of the elections, 
hardly constitute a threat of force.   
In terms of naval compellence, naval non-lethal operations are conducted by the SAN.  
For instance, the SAN conducted Operations LARIAT I and II in 2001 and 2003.  These 
operations illustrate that the SAN has coercive capabilities which can be employed 
anytime when needed.  In contrast, lethal compellence operations are not conducted due 
to foreign policy posture and priorities.  It seems the focus of the SAN in terms of 
maritime coercion is mainly on anti-piracy operations in the absence of any 
conventional sea-based threat.   
The deployment of the SAN on Operation COPPER off the coast of Tanzania and 
Mozambique Channel since 2011, illustrates the future sphere of engagement for the 
SAN.  Accordingly, more resources and vessels to replace the ageing ships are needed 
to executive these operations.  It should be cautioned, however, that extending anti-
piracy operations beyond SADC waters, given the current capabilities, may have 
devastating ramifications for the country.  Acknowledging that the permanent solution 
may only be found on land, the best option to effectively deal with threats facing Africa 
at and from sea, is through naval cooperation with other states and maritime actors.  
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South Africa has already illustrated its willingness to cooperate with other states in the 
region by signing the trilateral agreement on maritime security cooperation with 
Mozambique and Tanzania in February 2012.   
6.1.3 Naval Cooperation 
The SAN conducts naval cooperation at the international, continental and regional 
levels.  Reasons for naval and maritime cooperation include reassuring allies and 
friendly bystanders, as well as training to fight together during war.  Internationally, it 
cooperates with several states and international instituted bodies such as the biennial 
ISS at the NWC.  South Africa is also a member and the current leader of IONS and has 
hosted the third conference in 2012.  The SAN has also participated in IFRs and 
organised two PFR since 1994.  In Africa and SADC, the SAN is instrumental in 
facilitating naval cooperation through SPAS and SADC SMC.  Regionally, naval 
cooperation has not only culminated in Operation COPPER, but also a MoU on 
Maritime Security Cooperation, which signifies the existence of a political will vital for 
eradicating piracy in Southern Africa.   
The SAN also participates in several exercises as part of naval cooperation, namely; 
ATLASUR, GOOD HOPE, IBSAMAR, GOLFINHO, TRANSOCEANIC and BLUE 
CRANE.  These exercises denote that South Africa is a friend to all and an antagonist to 
none.  Additionally, exercises illustrate the interoperability of the SAN. By conducting 
exercises, the SAN supports the country’s foreign policy efforts.  The SAN regularly 
sends members to training programmes abroad; while members from several other 
states are trained in South Africa.  SAN personnel receive training from international 
navies such as the US Navy and Indian Navy. In contrast, naval and other military 
personnel from African states are trained in South Africa.  This is unsurprising because 
the SAN is, perhaps, the most resourced African navy.  Most importantly, it is a 
reputable organisation with knowledge and skills acquired through the years.  Hence, it 
has the ability to deploy its grey diplomats in support of the country’s foreign policy to 
distant regions.  Similarly, various foreign grey diplomats have docked in South African 
waters since 1994, illustrating that the country has successfully crafted its foreign policy 
with the rest of world.   
The foreign policy stance of the country has also ensured that naval and other 
dignitaries from South Africa visit various states.  Conversely, dignitaries from other 
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states have visited South Africa.  Goodwill visits by naval and other dignitaries to and 
from South Africa are part of South African naval diplomacy.  Additionally, the 
country’s foreign policy principles, as outlined in chapter two, have committed the 
country to assisting other states in and outside Africa.  The assistance ranges from 
providing aid where possible to international conflict resolution and management.   
6.1.4 International Maritime Assistance 
South Africa -as a member of the IMO and IHO- is responsible for charting and 
surveying NAVAREA VII.  Both African and international ships rely on the SANHO to 
produce quality hygrographic services including charts and navigational warnings 
through South African Notices to Mariners to ensure safe navigation in NAVAREA 
VII.  The hydrographic services of the SAN, however, face major challenges.  These 
challenges range from loss of skilled personnel to ageing equipment such as the 
hydrographic vessel.   
The SAN conducts search and rescue missions in conjunction with the NSRI, CAA, and 
other national institutions.  It has rendered assistance in various missions involving 
vessels and air craft of other states.  In addition, the SAN has equipped and empowered 
various African states as part of international maritime assistance.  The SAN also 
cooperate with national departments in performing tasks that only its assets can conduct 
such as ferrying materials to SANAE IV, which requires a vessel with ice-breaking 
capability.  Since the SAN does no longer possess ice-breaking capability; 
consequently, its assistance in Antarctica is currently limited.   
The SAN also renders assistance during natural disasters as illustrated by deployments 
to Mozambique during floods and the relief-aid transported to Bangladesh, Turkey and 
Mozambique by SAS Drakensberg.  However, the lack of sea lift capability in the form 
of LHD is a limitation for disaster management, humanitarian and relief operations.  In 
case a major disaster occurs, the SAN lacks a large vessel that can be transformed into a 
hospital ship.  This vessel could also contribute immensely in international conflict 
resolution and management.   
6.1.5 International Conflict Resolution and Management  
In terms of conflict resolution and management, the SAN has a special role to play in 
support of foreign policy efforts.  There are weak, failed and collapsed states in Africa.  
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Some of these states are in conflict, while others are at the brink of conflicts.  Some of 
states experiencing conflicts in the 1990s and the period after that include Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Somalia, Eritrea, Cote d’Ivoire, the DRC, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, 
Burundi, Liberia, the Comoros and Sudan.  Conflicts in these states hinder the 
development of the continent pertinent for the realisation of the African Renaissance.   
South Africa, as a soft power and the main driver of the African Renaissance vision, 
engages in peace mission.  Since 1997, the country has been instrumental in brokering 
peace in Africa as indicated by its involvement in mediation processes in Angola, 
Burundi, Lesotho, Kenya, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zimbabwe. South 
African peacekeepers, under the banners of the UN and AU, deployed to countries such 
as Burundi, DRC, Comoros, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Central African Republic and Sudan in 
efforts to resolve the conflicts.  The deployments were carried out under operations 
MISTRAL, ESPRESSO, FIBRE, TRITON, AMPHIBIAN, SUNRAY, MONTEGO, 
CORDITE, TEUTONIC, PRESTINE, CURRICULUM, INDULI, VIMBEZELA and 
BONGANE.   
In the DRC, SAS Outeniqua provided a feasible non-aligned platform for peace 
negotiations that culminated in the Outeniqua Agreement in 1997.  In Burundi, the 
Maritime Contingent, using HPBs, conducted waterborne operations in Lake 
Tanganyika from Bujumbura to the Tanzanian border.  Additionally, members of the 
MRS were part of the Special Task Force under Operation CURRICULUM initiated to 
protect VIP.  Members were responsible for guard duties.  In December 2008, members 
of the MRS deployed as part of MONUC in the DRC. The duties of the members 
included patrolling and guarding the unit as well as providing access control.  They also 
deployed in MONUSCO as part of the SANDF’s Operation MISTRAL and were 
responsible for protecting South African aviation base.   
6.2 CONCLUSIONS 
With the procurement of the four Valour Class frigates, namely SAS Amatola, SAS 
Spioenkop, SAS Isandlwana and SAS Mendi; Type 209 submarines SAS ‘Manthatisi, 
SAS Charlotte Maxeke and SAS Queen Modjadji I, and the four Super Lynx 
helicopters, the coercive or combat capabilities of the SAN have improved.  These 
capabilities ensure that the SAN fulfils both its primary and secondary functions as 
stipulated in the Constitution (1996) and other policy documents such as the White 
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Paper on Defence (1996), the Defence Review (1998) and the White Paper on South 
African Participation in International Peace Missions (1999).  Despite the improvement 
in capabilities the SAN faces vulnerabilities.  The strike craft vessels have surpassed 
their life span, and the frigates and submarines cannot effectively cope with warranting 
that the SAN remains unchallenged and able to win at sea.  The SAN intends addressing 
this vulnerability through the acquisition of IPVs and OPVs under Project Biro.   
It transpired that South Africa lacks strategic sea lift capability.  Without sea lift 
capability, the SAN will have difficulties in the transportation of naval forces and 
equipment, such as the FDB of the MRS, for operations at distant regions unless a 
private sea lift capability is chartered or assistance is rendered by friendly international 
forces possessing the capability such as the USA or France.  During Exercise 
GOLFINHO the MRS did not deploy with its FDB to Walvisbay.  The reason for this, 
although not confirmed by the SAN, may be the lack of sea lift capability and the 
difficulty in using trucks to transport the system over the road.  The deployment of the 
FDB is limited to the Saldanha and Cape Town areas as illustrated in 2009 by the 
deployment of the base at SAS Saldanha and Cape Town harbour during Operation 
KGWELE in 2010.   
The lack of sea lift capability clearly limits South African naval diplomacy, particularly 
international maritime assistance and international conflict resolution and management.  
In case of major disasters, Africa lacks large vessels that can be converted into hospital 
ships geared for humanitarian relief operations.  Although, Project Millennium aims at 
addressing the lack of sea lift capability, it has lost momentum and some believe it can 
only be completed by the year 2025 or 2030.   
In terms of coercive naval diplomacy in the traditional sense, particularly gunboat 
diplomacy, the SAN has not conducted it.  Given the fact that Type 209 submarines and 
frigates are operational, South Africa possesses capabilities to conduct limited gunboat 
diplomacy.  The foreign policy stance, however, does not explicitly encourage the use 
of coercive means.  The only operations relating to naval coercion, although not 
directed towards any state, were maritime deterrence and compellence.  Maritime 
compellence is illustrated by operations LARIAT I and II.  The main maritime 
deterrence operation contributing to safety off the coast of Southern Africa is Operation 
COPPER.  This operation is perhaps the best way in which the SAN serves foreign 
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policy effort in terms of maritime coercion.  The SAN only received authorisation from 
the government to begin deployments following the official request from Mozambique.   
Operation COPPER is the result of maritime and naval cooperation.  The SAN is 
spearheading continental and regional cooperation.  Without the SAN as the main role 
player, it is doubtable that maritime and naval cooperation can exist in Africa.  On the 
international level, the SAN conducts exercises that directly emanate from foreign 
policy efforts as illustrated by IBSAMAR.  The recent addition of the country to BRICS 
partnership provides more opportunities for the SAN to cooperate with those countries.  
With regard to South African grey diplomats docking in international ports, it is clear 
that the frigates elevated the flag showing deployments of the SAN.  Prior to their 
procurement, SAS Drakensberg-following the ageing of strike craft and 
decommissioning of SAS Outeniqua- and to some extent SAS Protea were the only 
vessels geared for flag showing deployments.    
In terms of international maritime assistance, the findings show that the SAN is the lead 
player in Africa.  It contributes to search and rescue missions as well as the field of 
hydrography.  South Africa is perhaps the only country in Africa that has the capability 
to coordinate NAVAREA VII.  Despite its positive contributions on hydrography, the 
SAN faces several challenges.  These challenges include skilled personnel as well as 
equipment such as serviceable survey vessel.  The loss of hydrographic capability in the 
SAN will lead to the loss of such service to the entire Southern African region.  Hence, 
Project Hotel is underway to replace the almost 40 year old SAS Protea.   
With regard to international conflict resolution and management, it was found that the 
SAN has a huge role to play particularly in Africa’s Great Lakes were Marine style 
forces are needed.  However, its involvement has been hindered by several factors 
including asset limitations, skills and capacity. The creation of the MRS enables the 
SAN to augment its involvement in peace missions.  It should be noted, nonetheless, 
that the success of the MRS depends heavily on the support in terms of equipment and 
training.   
The study makes an original scholarly contribution to South African naval diplomacy.  
As illustrated by the literature consulted for the study, South African naval diplomacy is 
one of the areas which have been regrettably neglected by scholars, particularly in the 
post-1994 settlement.  Subsequently, a major literature gap exists.  The lack of scholarly 
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literature on the diplomatic role of the SAN does not only illustrate the limitation and 
weakness of the study; but also its importance.  It is acknowledged that few scholars 
produced works on some of the functions of South African naval diplomacy. Prior to 
this study, however, no comprehensive literature existed with regard to South African 
naval diplomacy in the post-1994 settlement.  Most of the literature available deals with 
the SAN in general, rather than specifically focusing on its diplomatic role.  Although 
the study contributes immensely to filling the literature gap in terms of the diplomatic 
role, the other roles remain understudied.  
This study illustrates that South African naval diplomacy ranges from peaceful means in 
the form of naval cooperation and assistance, to coercive means in the form of gunboat 
diplomacy.  Guided by foreign policy since 1994, South African naval diplomacy is 
mainly conducted on the peaceful extreme in the form of naval and maritime 
cooperation, international maritime assistance and international conflict resolution and 
management. 
With Operation COPPER underway, it shows that maritime coercion (of course not in 
the traditional sense) is becoming more relevant to the SAN.  Additionally, it indicates 
South Africa’s future theatre of engagement, particularly the SAN.  The recent MoU on 
Maritime Security Cooperation between South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania 
signed in February 2012 congeals the assertion that regional governments are becoming 
more vigilant by authorising their navies to be more visible at sea through anti-piracy 
patrols.   
With the preceding premise, it is unambiguous that South African naval diplomacy will 
continue to be conducted along the lines of naval coercion, naval and maritime 
cooperation, international maritime assistance and international conflict resolution and 
management.  More crucially, the current and future engagements of the SAN should 
guide policy makers and budget allocation to ensure that the navy is able to effectively 
and efficiently conduct naval diplomacy in service of South Africa.       
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